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Whoever rubs the lamp of Non-philosophy (aka recently also Non-standard philosophy) will certainly be conjuring the genie of the prodigiously prolific French author and dazzling thinker, almost miraculously multi-talented and multifaceted, as at home in Quantum physics as in the language of  Kant’s critiques, François Laruelle (b. 1936).  Among the major French philosophers who have emerged after the May 1968 uprising, and, in its spirit claiming or reclaiming the freedoms an oppressive Capitalist system were seen as obstructing or denying—Baudrillard, Deleuze-Guattari, Derrida—to name probably the most familiar—he has been among the longest to find his public, both at home and abroad.  Nevertheless, as a perusal of the excerpts following should confirm, he has had over the years a loyal, devoted and insightful following, as well as a productive and engaged one, while interest in his work is now on the rise, certainly in the Anglophone world, and I think for the best of reasons: that through him an authentic voice is speaking, one that cannot be heard anywhere else, as through the great philosophers of the past, Descartes, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and those closer to the present, Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze; not forgetting two other underappreciated French summits: Michel Henry and Pierre Legendre, the former being in fact a formative influence, through his concept of ‘radical immanence’ on the non-philosophy of Laruelle.


Although I think he has had as much ‘to say’, whatever other reasons there are for the relative neglect of Laruelle compared to others, his prose style has been a factor, many complaining of the abstraction, perhaps prolixity (depending on your attitude), the round-a-boutness of his language—Zizek even going so far as to admitting, half humorously (I hope, but then when is Zizek ever not joking?), he couldn’t understand him, I think also he has given the best of reasons for the originality of his style (neologisms or seemingly hapax legomena are in his toolbox) is that he had to invent a new language for the new things he was saying, and whether you go along with them or not, not that he even necessarily wants that, or how completely, I think it would be absurd to deny their novelty. 

On the level of content, which I think matters more; since after all difficulty of access doesn’t keep us from reading and rereading Being and Time, Ulysses, or Finnegans Wake for that matter, while Lacan and Derrida, Badiou (Being and Event), certainly Husserl or even Hegel (the Greater Logic for example) are no marshmallows either—I think a major reason has not been how but what he has been writing.  Specifically the rigor, stubbornness, even the ‘let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may’ manner he points out how his mentors and even models as thinkers and intellects have fallen into the same traps as they set for others; for instance once describing Derrida to his face, during a Q & A following a discussion of an early book of Laruelle, as being still the very metaphysician it was Derrida’s stock-in-trade to ‘deconstruct’ Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, and Lacan as being.  Similarly confrontational was Laruelle’s attitude toward this ‘radical immanence’ of Michel Henry’s, excluding as it does all transcendence, as per the ‘rear worlds’,  higher, lower, before, or after, which Nietzsche banished from philosophical discourse.

For Laruelle, Henry’s bedrock notions of Life, Affectivity, and such still smacked too much of transcendence, therefore metaphysics—as indeed for Laruelle did Nietzsche’s Will to Power, or Schopenhauer’s Will for that matter.  For Laruelle, no one could be Immanent enough; and notably, to be fair, he’s an equal opportunity disdainer, demarcating his non-philosophy as brashly not only from the philosophies of contemporaries (and in one case from a ‘non-philosophy’, that of Deleuze-Guattari), but from those of a tradition stretching back at least as far as Kant.  Even if acknowledging that preceding and contemporaraneus ‘Immanentists’ had broken in some literal ways from the metaphysics of past philosophy, for instance removing the place of a supreme being from that of keystone to epistemological or teleological construction, they remained, for him, metaphysical, and therefore handicapped, insufficient and paralyzed in relation to Immanence, in one crucial way: they all accept the supreme being of Philosophy itself, its self-appointed and self-ascribed authority, reality, hegemony and legitimacy—along with the myriad privileges and advantages—of course humiliating, denigrating, and certainly for Non-philosophy, harmful, manipulative and exploitative to other domains of human activity, that go along with such ‘faith’.

True, an Immanence, already more than stirring in Voltaire, Rousseau and Kant in the 18th Century, and continuing in the philosophies of Marx, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in the 19th , freed us from kings, rulers and priests, whose power, based on the authority of an ‘on high’ that had ceased to exist, collapsed; but who will protect us now against the Philosophy and Philosophers of Immanence themselves—to update Cicero’s timeless question of who will guard us against the guards?  These Rights of Man, for instance, that philosophy had been clarioning for centuries, since Locke’s affirmation of the preeminence of private property as the basis for all civilization, rights of assembly, vote, free expression, what was to keep them from becoming newly urgent obligations?  Were indeed these rights not rights as philosophy defined them and deemed them to be, as well as providing for ‘States of Exception’ (as per Agamben and Carl Schmitt), when they can be and very much are, as likely as not with the blessings of philosophy, suspended or denied?  What about also those ‘negative rights’ Isaiah Berlin calls negative liberty?  What about the right not to assemble, vote, own (supposed you don’t want to bother, or come to think with Proudhon that all property is theft anyway?), to stay silent, not to participate?  Especially in the post-Nietzschean abeyance of that ‘rear-world’ of metaphysics, from which the powers of the past drew their legitimacy, Philosophy was the one now calling the shots; for instance calling one what was or not a just war, including of course what constituted a valid casus belli.  At the beginning of the Renaissance it was the priest who came first, followed by the army and the trader, to complete the job of saving souls for Christ; by its end it’s the philosopher, the likes of your Locke, and Voltaire, who blazed the way, saving souls for progress and improvement, as defined of course by the enlightened West..

We have to understand Philosophy, as certainly Laruelle does, as very much more than what goes by that name, mentioning which is probably one of the quicker ways of getting people to pay no attention to you at all today; this philosophy is not one that speaks Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel knowingly (maybe a little Locke, or even Marx and Machiavelli however), but one that has percolated into the society, like a rain that has soaked the earth deep down and that we now walk on differently, and about as free to go where we’d like as we are to express ourselves as we are in the chair of a dentist who has filled our mouth with instruments, or wave with our hands tied behind our backs or decide on direction with our feet shackled; all the less so, if invisibly, or as is surely mostly the case we are unaware of such, and kept that way.  For instance, the rationale for the invasion of Iraq, of 2003, whether the explicit, Platonic, eventually Enlightenment one of spreading progress, and civilization or what may seem as the underlying and implicit one of capturing resources, as for the ‘war of all against all’ of Hobbes, was that not philosophy speaking?  How about now familiar philosophical concepts such as Biopower, that such as Foucault (who locates its source in the 18th century), Agamben and recently Roberto Esposito have made familiar to us, but to most people under such locutions or euphemisms as well-being, ‘quality of life’ and so on?  Specifically speaking a Machiavelli our rulers can understand, they deploy Biopower as a method to hold us all hostage to our health and our life and those of our ‘loved ones’.  When we’re swallowing or swilling that daily pablum they force feed us daily, a mess made of words and images that are meant to satisfy totally ridiculous needs and urges  that have been instilled in us by those who have an interest in our buying into the means to satisfy them, because they are the ones who sold them to us, aren’t we really swallowing a whole philosophy, and of the self-appointed, self-justifying sort that non-philosophy’s purpose is to denounce?

Teleology, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics had always been just branches off the trunk; so now it would be Philosophy, in the distilled form in which it percolates into our daily lives, which would be the unchallenged arbiter of what should be (1) our goals in life; (2) reliable sources of knowledge, for instance ‘objective observation’; (3) how to act and live and with whom; 4) what art is, and who is an artist and deserves to be supported or at least tolerated. This last category is a little tricky, since it suggests an exemption, to some degree at least, from the social compulsions to ‘participate’ projected by the first three.  However, look no farther than to Boris Groys, who in his  recent In the Flow, notices the Emperor’s New Clothes of a lack of justification, other than what works do for a ‘bottom line’ of power, influence, and profit.  So, in fact it’s a philosophy of ceaseless growth (Laruelle recommends ‘de-growth’) and limitless expansion permeating Capitalism, as Karl Marx announced it to his revolutionary generation of 1848—that accounts for where they are exhibited as works of art; and this on the basis of a judgment on no other grounds than its self-declared authority, of who is and who is not an artist, and therefore who’s entitled or not entitled to be these ‘exceptions to the rule’.  These are consequential decisions to which there is no real right of appeal, whether in ‘totalitarian’ societies by decree, or ‘democratic’ ones as if or not more effectively, by awards or denial of grants and of course market forces, our gods and sacred of today.

Laruelle and Laruellians have no trouble finding in this “liberator” philosophy a new master and oppressor; one even more redoubtable, insidious and dangerous than those of yore—in fact more so since parading under the flags of, say, liberty, fraternity and equality before the law, human rights, justice—you know the tune.  That doctrine, really myth, of progress, ceaseless improvement and self-fulfillment, has been for centuries now, and still is a central theme and message of Philosophy.  “Improvement” was indeed the justification John Locke invoked to facilitate the seizing of Amerindian lands in the new world, and others invoked as well in the enclosures that dispossessed much of rural England, earlier and later too: the inhabitants, ‘natives’, ‘indigenous peoples’ could not be considered property owners, since they did nothing to improve the land, in terms of production, and how a mercantile culture defines it, as ‘output’—a reason Palestine more recently also could be considered ‘a land without a people’ and treated as such, and up for the taking, which of course it has been.  

This Philosophy, distilled, disseminated and disguised in the forms it reaches most of us—as in sports, politics, economy, entertainment, even much of what goes by the name of art—urges or if need be compels conformist, and compliant behavior that brooks no objection,  and just assumes its own authority as self-legitimating.  Challenging this authority would be like someone denying it’s raining when it is, someone to be consigned to the category of the irrelevant, ‘frivolous’ (if you go to law) or otherwise absolutely nuts or mischievous (even evil).  On the other hand Non-philosophy assumes no authority, in fact nothing of the sort, in fact nothing at all, especially not even its own authority and legitimacy (it calls itself heresy), except the existence of a Real, which it also calls a One ‘we’ are all part of, come from and go to, and which as a fact neither we, nor anyone else has ever known anything about, and ever will, whatever has been claimed, acted on or believed.  This is that bedrock of the Real—on which Parmenides a few millennia ago started philosophy off (moving?) with a flick of the finger (the Lucretian clinamen that was all Descartes needed God for, rued Pascal)—called Being, the Sage of Elia, Parmenides, saying not only that It (Being) Is but that It Is the Same as Thought, meaning human thought, there being for him no other.  In other words, Being and Thought are One.

For Descartes ‘the Mix’, Non-philosophy’s pejorative for it, meant you needed to think to be: I think therefore I am.  Princess Elizabeth objected in a letter to him that, treated as women were in society, deprived of education and other tools of thinking, this meant you had to be male (and a privileged one too) to think, to be.  He agreed, saying finally the mind has no sex, which become one of the mottos for a nascent feminism, a leitmotif of Cartesian Women, by Erica Harth, about the women-led salons of the 17th and 18th century, but this still left out—children, the insane, animals, plants(?).  Subsequent ‘mixes’ with Being haven’t done any better; in this country for instance you have to have money too, just being won’t do; in many places to believe in certain beings, to do or not do, to say or not say. You have to a be a man, or a woman, but that’s not enough, you have to be a real man, or a real woman, or a real neither or both, and be always ready to prove it, like the Ringo Kid, Mae West or Michael Jackson.

For Laruelle this Mix of Being and Thought of Paremenides was the original sin of philosophy, one like that of Genesis, we never stopped paying for, since it conflated the Real with Something Else.  Well Parmenides’ ‘error’ was ineluctable, since, in the days nearer Hesiod’s, for whom creation of the Earth was contemporaneous with creation by such as Titans, they didn’t suspect how very ancient the world was.  Just staying in this pre-human Ancient Time, not venturing any farther into black holes or the endlessness of  Piranese visions of provenance before the advent of Spaceship Earth—surely there was Being, and so a Real for those thousands of millions of years before mankind, when there was no one or nothing to think it, unless trilobites, plants, even rocks and molten lava think. However, getting back to the present or closer to it, when we mix up Being with something else, we’re asking for trouble; if someone is always wearing something or with something or someone we don’t recognize them dressed differently or by themselves, and I mean recognize not only just literally but the kind of recognition we all need and crave, of our being, the kind Hegel said, calling, in The Phenomenology,  the ineluctably perpetual battle for it the dialectic between the master and the slave, we needed to be ready to risk life and limb to obtain, and he wasn’t the only one; Axel Honneth, latest scion of the Frankfurt School, updating this need for recognition as one as essential, even more so, considering how conspicuous and consequential it can be in its absence, than even the three basics.  Even not caring about recognition, isn’t that on the basis of being recognized in the first place?

Now Non-philosophy gets rid of all that, or at least, practicing a Husserlian reduction, suspends it from practical consideration and purposes, like an evidence that is not receivable in court—it tosses out, won’t let its jury hear of what it calls the Mix.  The Real then is considered to be what stands on its own, and can neither be approached or left or left behind; for it there is no authentic Real or nothing masquerading as the Real.  It’s all only the Real.  Philosophy having always mixed the Real with the Other (whatever it is mixed with, like oatmeal, can be made with water or milk, but Philosophy won’t recognize it, meaning allow it, until it is), it’s also made and remade this Other in its own Image; its changing ideas and preconceptions about order, art, politics and priorities are what prevail—for instance should the mother or child be spared?, don’t tell me Philosophy does not have its role in making that decision!  However Laruelle’s challenge to Philosophy is not in declaring the Mix null and void, or even obsolete or outdated. That would be like trying to outlaw death or taxes, especially death.  What Laruelle is making is a declaration of democracy for thought, namely the equivalence of every Other under the sun, and doubtless beyond the sun, where Ecclesiastes did not dare; and this declaration is not made so much in the assertorial mode, and not even the hypothetical one, but as a roll of the dice, which Mallarme wrote would never abolish chance, but even more surely in the sense of Pascal’s way of wager: but spinning Pascal’s bet in a more haphazard, immanent sense, being that Heaven, no longer assumed, is no longer there as the prize; it’s not necessarily that we have everything to gain and nothing to lose if we win, but there is in fact nothing (left) to lose.

Consider indeed that things are going only from bad to worse and can only get worse, where a philosophy of progress—in “this best of all possible worlds”, of Leibniz, which Laruelle, in the tradition of Candide, thinks of instead as “the worst of all possible worlds”—in the many forms, disguises, puppets and avatars this philosophy deploys, is in charge; whether of State, Health, Incarceration, Pedagogical or Mercantile orders that promote its values and require conduct that conform to it, or punish conduct that doesn’t in ways that reduce noncompliance either to submission or erases it, in one way or another, from Being (the homeless strewn on our streets are a good warning for the rest of us to not get any ideas).  Aren’t all these orders of what I call deployed philosophy indeed cloning its self-appointed, self-justifying, self-assuming posture?  Aside from questions about the feasibility of Democracy in mass society, which such as Arendt raised long ago, and even farther back with de Toqueville warning about the tyranny of the majority in his Democracy in America, there’s the question of representation.  For Arendt indeed Democracy had to be direct, or could not be, which is why after a certain threshold of population it’s impossible.  Now Non-philosophy rather ups the ante on this, being anti-representation, period, considering its Immanence as fundamentally, structurally and constitutionally opposed to it, and in all domains, not only the political.  Representing means nothing, for Non-philosophy, but standing in for something else outside of Immanence, whether an ideal state, state of mind, being, work of art, in other words a crippling flaw that thoroughly imbues an obsolete transcendence, the ghost or survival of a ‘rear world’ that haunts, reduces and thwarts us now.  As concerns democracy, as for Arendt it’s direct or won’t be; for Non-philosophy you can appoint no one to speak, or certainly decide or act in your name, to write, dance, make love, and the rest of it.  Indeed even in what we call representative democracy, aren’t elections, public opinion, and the poll numbers that decide them determined by money, rhetoric, exploitation of induced fears?  

So Non-philosophy would rather dare to intimate that in our world of ceaseless technological persecution and induced paranoia, of evident environmental degradation, of war-of-all-against-all, let’s at least declare an epistemological, teleological, ethical and aesthetic truce, or at least a draw, tie or stalemate.  Let’s assume, for example, that in the ‘conflict’ between Philosophy and Science, the former supposedly providing the goal and purpose, the latter the means and method, Science would be as good of a guide as Philosophy, or even in some respects a better one; for instance in Non-philosophy’s turning in its recent phases to Quantum theory’s ‘repeal’ of the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction, namely that things can not be and not be at the same time.  Witness as a frequently cited example of this Schrodinger’s Cat, which until we’ve opened the box and find out whether or not the famously imagined feline (no animal has been hurt in this experiment) has tripped the wire electrocuting it—has to be considered both alive and dead.  Another quantum name for a tolerance of contradiction is Superposition, invoked lately much by Laruelle.  This  is a quantum theory concept, whereby things can be thought of in different ways, indeed contradictory, until they are measured, which process then limits them; Laruelle wanting to delay, or postpone, perhaps even cancel indefinitely that measurement.

In Dance for instance, why not think we are at once moving and not moving, and never not moving; and so much in us is moving or not moving, both as performers and audience.  Or in theatre or the speaking arts similarly, we are speaking and not speaking, or not speaking even in speaking, in the sense of hiding what we mean to say.  Talleyrand’s (in)famous boutade that the purpose of language is not to reveal the truth but to hide it comes to mind.  Even closer to the spirit of Non-philosophy than that, Kierkegaard’s (pseudepigraphically, it’s important to note in Either Or) ‘demonic’ correction: and to hide the fact that there is no truth—puts in doubt the very existence of meaning, that is even knowing, or being conscious of what matters to us, or at least expressing that in language.  Do not indeed those works in art and literature where meaning, certainly discursivity is most in abeyance, have a special appeal to us today?  Think the White on White of Malevich or those indelibly blank pages of Tristram Shandy or Mallarme’s Roll of the Dice.  These are places that fascinate and obsess because they make us wonder about very possibility of meaning, or whether that is, or is any longer, possible or even desirable, merely asking such questions becoming something like that throw of the dice of Non-philosophy.

This is not new news, though perhaps in a different, more scientific, or seeming so, vocabulary.  Pataphysics, a modernist philosophy of the arts and much else, started early in the last century by Jarry, was defined by Roger Shattuck as “The imaginary resolution of real contradictions”.  Following closely on the heels of Pataphysics and on the terrain cleared by it,  Dada was conflating reality and serendipity, protest and absurdity in collage, poetry and performance; or Surrealism dreams, fantasies, class struggle, challenge to temporal linearity and scientific consciousness, resistance and even revolution and waking life in the films of Abel Gance and Bunuel-Dali (Le Chien andalou and L’Âge d’or), and of course in poetry and other  genres by such as Artaud, Breton, Tzara and Daumal.  In other words artists were listening and ‘creating’ on the basis of a framework of indeterminacy, and the suspension of the laws of logic and preeminence of discourse that was to become that of Non-philosophy.  In the arts thoroughly immanent concepts like “the existence of unreal objects”, as was conceived by Alexius Meinong, or “paraconsistency” (essentially superpositional logic) are now givens in the arts; where you are as free to render a zebra with four legs or four hundred, or as a blur, or better yet render nothing at all, and not even that.   That artist’s shit in a can that no one surely is going to open to find out, or if so, reducing (?) its market value, what can that mean, except itself, meaning nothing?  Or take Concept Art, whereby a non-existent work can be loaned to a non borrower, although really paid for and ‘delivered’. For however absurd something might appear to the gaze of objective science and common sense, nevertheless anything that can be imagined or dreamt of does exist in some modality, and enjoys rights of entry into these immanent worlds of modern art, where what matters is what’s in front of us, not how logic or language wants to organize it, interpret it, which logic or language always puts us at odds anyway with someone else’s language or logic.

Cinema especially, as John Mullarkey implies, in Refractions of Reality, would seem to be in fact the privileged domain of these Arts of Immanence—though probably fiction cinema would be more so than documentary.  Equally its relevance to the other arts of non-philosophical immanence, whether performing, plastic or language seems clear, although here I think the fictional, or imaginary is where such Quantum approaches as Superposition and Paraconsistency will pass with fewer cavils.  When, in fact, it’s a political reality, an evident injustice, tragedy or catastrophe you’re dealing with, such complexities and liberties, thoroughly fundamental in the arts, especially now, might not be so, in fact appear even cruel, arrogant and abhorrent.  It’s one thing to ask me to consider your shit as art, another the shit you pull.  Entertaining contradictory motives, images, theories and ideas in a movie or a novel, a work of theatre or dance, a painting or sculpture, even architecture (bridges have been known to lead to nowhere, even a cathedral to be abandoned halfway to heaven) is one thing; but in history, economy, geopolitics, how avoid decisions and conclusions that in works of the imagination can be neglected, minimized or even omitted?  What place would such a style of indeterminacy, the decision not to decide, have, except as another mollifying strategy of the rulers and winners?  If indeed All Thoughts are Equal, as John Ò Maoilearca (aka John Mullarkey) has it in his eponymous description of a central theme of Non-philosophy, applied so well in aesthetic realms, then why not deal with certain pressing and urgent crises today, for instance the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by considering the narratives of both sides equally valid?  Well and good, but how about the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian lives and livelihoods that were either lost or damaged, the hundreds of villages plowed under?  Not that it might not make some sense to entertain contrary or even contradictory narratives in such cases; since looking at things from the point of view of the dispossessed Palestinians might and has made others worldwide, and even some Israelis  consider the possibility of redress, like compensation or ‘right of return’.  The reader can doubtless adduce similar situations, past, present, or on the horizon, where a non-philosophical declaration of the equality of all narratives can be salutary.  Even if such cannot bring the dead back, restore wrecked or diminished lives, still the centuries of slavery, colonialism, imperialism, (and now we’re more aware of ) sexism our current World Order is based on, and grew like a plant out of soil fertilized with the blood, sweat, and tears and shit of countless expendibles will not vanish with a snap of the finger.  Whether or not ‘real’ compensation is possible or can even be anything else than a further insult, given the essential irreversibility of the damage, basically, certainly recognition and acknowledgment would not be unwelcome, possibly serving as a basis for undertaking to do better in the present and future, making us more conscious of the injustices of today than our parents and ancestors were (presumably!) who invented those practices and allowed them to continue for so long.

However useful the neutrality and indeterminacy of this non-philosophical approach might be (or not) in dealing with political and social situations and conflicts, I think unquestionably its clearest impact must be (for now) in the world of the arts.  It’s no coincidence, indeed, that from a magisterial compendium like Ò Maoilearca’s All Thoughts are Equal, indeed focused on aesthetics, and in aesthetics film, and in film one of the most and daring and outrageous of experimental filmakers Lars Von Trier, and on The Five Obstructions, his most experimental film, the fact that politics and political, in any concrete sense as that adduced just now is missing.  While philosophical-political allusions are far from inexistent in the library of Non-philosophy, for instance in Laruelle’s Introduction to Non-Marxism; and in Laruellians like Gilles Grelet or Sophie Lesueur, where even if there are articulate and passionate statements in support of some general philosophical-political positions like Utopian (for Laruelle), Anarchy (for Grelet) or Direct Democracy (Lesueur), Non-participation (Galloway), I have found references to concrete situations and recommendations of how to deal with them sparse indeed; nothing, for instance, like the consequential endorsement of the logic of the General Strike early in the last century in Sorel’s Reflections on Violence, such as the one that might have inspired the Battle of Algiers (see Pontecorvo’s classic film), catalytic to unleashing the war of liberation that led to the independence of Algeria.  

However salutary in the arts, even though Non-philosophy might fail us, if guidance is what we’re looking for, in other words another authority to replace the demoted one, on the Leninist level of ‘what is to be done’, that is what to do—being a more apposite manual on what-not-to-do, it nevertheless does have some things to say, if not about action and activism, then behavior in everyday life.  For instance, Philosophy (through teleology) demanding we have a purpose or goal, by definition one that is socially sanctioned, Non-philosophy might well intimate, given that all goals today are corrupted and diluted by the compromises, falsity and lies, to ourselves first of all, they require to pursue and have any hope of realizing—then the harm they do in our cultures of competition to others who naturally lose out, Non-philosophy proposes we do without goals, which ‘without’ becomes the Other in the Mix, since we must have one—and that we not feel it necessary to ‘become’ anything .  From the point of view of Philosophy and the Capitalism it exists in symbiosis with, according to the Laruellian Sophie Lesueur, this  compulsion to ‘become’ can be seen in the tyranny of its basic algorithm  as X must become Y, she insisting that for Non-philosophy it’s fine if X=X, so we can be just what we are.

Likewise ethics, let’s do without that too, this doing without which Laruelle will call a non-ethics.  Germane here is the maxim of Protagoras, whose sophistry Plato’s Socrates more scorned than refuted, which another Laruellian, J.M. Lacrosse, cites: “About everything you can make two affirmations exactly contrary” in support of the idea that “since value is merely convention, then all values are contingent and none is any more legitimate than any other.”    Updating these suspicions for an Age of Reason, Kant proved contradictory notions (e.g. the world has a beginning, or doesn’t), in the Antinomies of the first Critique, but back-against-the-wall, so to speak will invoke the Deus Ex Machina of a categorical imperative to exempt ethics from being similarly threatened.  That defense, from the point-of-view of Non-philosophy, by now has collapsed, because it was based on the assumption of authority that has been stripped of all legitimacy, except a self-appointed one and self-validating one—by its evident depredations.
 .
Doesn’t everyone anyway find perfectly good and even ‘moral’ reasons for everything they do anyway?  As the patron saint, also ‘martyr’ (excommunicated, spat on, attacked 
by his coreligionaries of Amsterdam) of Immanence, Spinoza, pointed out (in his Ethics): first you desire something then you call it good, or don’t and call it bad.  So let’s start modeling our thoughts on how we behave, rather than continue vainly to make our actions fit the Procrustean bed of our thoughts and preconceptions, more comfortably meant for the size of our rulers than for us lesser beings.  After all who benefits from the commandment Thou Shalt Not Steal except those who have plenty to lose, a fortiori, which is what wealth is anyway, all of it, more or less subtly or directly, extorted from the property-less?  Doesn’t Thou Shalt Not Kill mean really, being a person of property, don’t even think of killing me, to get back (or get back at me, if that’s gone for good, like a ‘stolen childhood’) what I took from you, or deprived you of, or else suffer the full force of God’s law, landlord of everyone, whose deputy I am, on earth and after, and mine here and now?

By now this drift might be raising some hackles in the reader.  If the non-philosophical axiom of the equality of all thoughts, all values, and all statement be taken at face value, what of my communist or anarchist take on the law as what even Pascal called the right of the stronger and my treating the Bible and its almighty author as a security force to defend the wealthy of the world against the masses they have robbed to become so?  What about a Pauline Christianity that abrogates the Decalogue, the communism of the early Essenes, from which Jesus was supposed to have emerged?  Or someone could wonder about this ‘all property is theft’ of Proudhon, as to how coherent that is, given that a little reading in or about him reveals that what he was condemning was a certain kind of property, or wealth that was not beneficial to humanity, but only for its holders (as long as they can hold off a more or less violent redistribution of it), the kind that Thomas Piquety denounced in his recent book on Capital, which advocated a universal tax on wealth itself to help even things out.  Even the phrase ‘all property is theft’ could do with a little deconstruction; by calling it theft aren’t you recognizing the right, more really the duty of property, or seeing it as some kind of essential human need or instinct, to call something ours, implying that those bereft of it had it in the first place and acknowledge the legitimacy and desirability of the institution?  A more coherent attack on the very principle of property would probably be that of Mikhail Bakunin, more deserving thereby for the name of first anarchist; he who doesn’t recognize its legitimacy in the first place, nor ‘want back’ what we never, or anyone, ever ‘had’.

Equally art, which I look at above from the bottom-line point of view, in terms of how it’s exhibited and tolerated, with artists (somewhat) exempted from the compulsions to conform the rest of us must obey or else—might invite the kind of further scrutiny we’ve just made of the issue of property.  The context of my analysis of art today was meant to illustrate the ways a certain philosophy’s emphasis, which we may as well call capitalistic, on productivity, exchange value and profit allowed no real exceptions to its hegemony.   However, aren’t we here begging the question that it has ever really been any other way, that artists, poets, playwrights, architects, musicians even, have ever been anything else than the playthings and slaves of power.  How indeed did the peasant rebellions do in the Henry VI plays of Shakespeare, objects of scorn or derision? Indeed the only independence ever for the artist would be in changing masters or sponsors, as the bard seems to have done on the night of the Essex rebellion, when his company presented Richard II out of repertory, ostensibly for the message of its royal deposition scene—almost costing Shakespeare his head, or at least his ears.  Things seem to change, at least a bit, by the 18th century, when the artist, the writer becomes the servant of the market; but now instead of  a master whom presumably you can desert there is only one worldwide, or too many.  Artists have always allied themselves with the interests of a ruling class, or else bet on a rising underclass that promises to be ruling.  Wasn’t the pamphlet that got Shelley thrown out of Oxford, “The Necessity of Atheism”, as well as the evident iconoclasm of other English Romantics, Byron, and even (the young) Wordsworth, not forgetting the invention of feminism by Mary Wollstonecraft inspired by the advent of new rulers, a consequence or result of the recent revolution in France that had swept away aristocracy and church, ones who were taking over from a class they were in process of dispossessing?  At the other end of the century, don’t we find in Strindberg’s Miss Julie, the patron’s daughter driven to suicide by her valet lover, who prevails in the end—does he in fact not represent a changing of the guard and what is starting to do more than loom on the horizon as a new ruling class?

Although a principle of Non-philosophy, insofar as there is one, is to make no statements that aren’t revocable, or at least modifiable, certain themes emerge as fairly constant in perusal of the multifarious texts of Laruelle, as well as those who have been more or less closely allied to him—for instance contributing to volumes of essays he has edited or even monographs to series he supervises; one theme is the example of the arts as being close to the tradition-defying, independent style of non-philosophy, which we have just examined for possible gaps in that logic.  Another theme and a far more frequent one, indeed almost omnipresent, is the opposition to Authority in all its shapes, forms, guises and disguises.  Well, if ‘all thoughts are equal’ isn’t this one that can come up for discussion?  Who, for instance, given the hazards of modern urban life almost all of us are caught up in today, who would think of letting little kids run free around our streets?  Perhaps we can do without the police, or even the prison and justice system without unduly affecting the ‘crime’ rates (except perhaps for the class of victims), but who is going to do without the fire department, or without an authority with the power to keep them from taking off a day whenever they feel like?  Similar arguments may be pertinent to this debate over this ‘right to bear arms’ so rife in the U.S. today, and the place of Authority in placing limits on that right, which not even the most ardent defenders of the Second Amendment will contest (for instance a citizen’s right to possess a Sherman tank or little nuclear device).   Equally are we ready to do away with compulsory public and public funded education, with a library system all are obliged to contribute to whether they avail themselves of it or not, medical options for those in need of emergency or other care, and so forth?  With Non-philosophy, and in a way with Herbert Marcuse, who decried, while waiting for the revolution what he called ‘excess repression’ exacted by the capitalist system, we may well wonder whether we need all these structures and strictures, which at a certain point seem to become self-serving and self-perpetuating institutions that are more about stifling dissent, creativity and originality than preserving life, liberty and ‘property’—the latter especially of course a very dubious category.  However, on the level of the actual and the ontic, not that it can’t be defined in different ways, we are faced with decisions: for instance whether or not to allow opting out for a vaccination, which if not accepted may put an entire population significantly more at risk.

In spite of its frequent qualifiers that its statements be regarded as impermanent and temporary expedients, since even discourse (language) can’t be regarded as necessarily an adequate, or the optimal expression of thought, lets continue on this tangent of themes, like the opposition to Authority, that permeate Non-philosophy too thoroughly to be regarded as non-essential.  An even more basic theme, in Non-philosophy, and once it adapts or shares with other philosophies (of Nietzsche, Deleuze-Guattari, Henry...) and artists (Dadaists, Surrealists, in the wake of Pataphysics, Kandinsky...) of Immanence, it can’t have escaped the reader would be the hostility to representation—to put it mildly, or more exactly a scathing scorn of representation.  Well and good, of course, as a reminder in the realm of electoral politics, that representative is no substitute for Direct Democracy, and afortiori Direct Action, as the Occupy movement illustrated amply.  However considering the ballot box, at least in all cases, that piège à cons, sucker’s game Sartre called it won’t do either; if there’s a choice of tyrannies or oppressors in the offing it might make more sense to opt for a Roosevelt over Hoover, an Obama over Romney, a Hillary (forgive me Hillary haters) over Trump.  Unless you want to get the worse (to you) in, following a certain logic, which would bring on the Revolution all the sooner. Even Arendt would never come out against voting per se, far from it.  In a quantum world anyway won’t philosophies and style of Immanence coexist nevertheless with those of Transcendence and Representation?   By dint of Superposition, a constant recourse of Laruelle’s anyway, why not vote in the morning, or block the entrance (or worse) to a recruiting office on the way to dancing in the streets, assuming we get that far, and thereby stopping traffic?

What a non-ethical approach in fact affirms in taking Protagoras more as a model than the reformer Socrates, the idealist, Plato or even Kant, the metaphysician of morals, is the wisdom of not over-determining situations by insisting on outcomes that connect to previously decided or anticipated solutions or goals.  Your Socrates, Plato, Kant—and any number of others, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Sartre, Kierkegaard, Luther, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy (as philosophers certainly) and yes Marx, Adam Smith, and even Bakunin—only a haphazard list from ‘different walks’—all have visions already formed of a future that must somehow fit into their dreams and plans—visions that more often than not are radically contradictory and mutually exclusive, depending on the values and goals each esteems as priority.

Invoking Quantum theory, and Superposition, or at least Laruelle’s generic take on it—generic, another synonym for Non-philosophy, meaning released from the ‘brand name’ of belonging only to any particular discipline, like physics, and so available for wider applications, for instance in art or politics—why can’t contradictories coexist?  So Schrodinger’s cat be both alive and dead, Augustine’s City of God and the Communist Utopia of Marx thrive symbiotically, concurrently?  Not that we’re predetermining any outcomes by postponing or neglecting to decide who’s right.  Isn’t that the level we’re all on anyway, in this multi-universe we live in today, enslaved and domesticated by the machinery and technology, the medicine and therapies we’ve designed to serve us; not to mention the world we’ve been in always, where we manage usually to go on and get on with our lives, no matter what our dreams, the mirror,  the fates, the gypsy or ‘the facts’ are saying to us otherwise. So, let’s see, before we make up our mind, or instead of making up our mind, or pretending that we do, have our mind make up for us; and on the basis of what it ‘feels’ like rather than what kind of advice or bottom line they make for, what the dice say, or if we don’t like the numbers throw them again, the way a friend of mine used to throw the stalks or pennies until the I Ching said something that made sense.  Or redesign the dice—why must they be six sides, doesn’t that limit things already? 

While we’ve been rehabilitating representation a bit for the confrontations and quandaries of politics, power and daily life, we might as well throw in a few doubts as to how obsolete it really is in the realm of art, where its discredit as led to fewer objections.  A reader who has dipped even a little into Non-philosophy might wonder at my demarcation earlier, in regard to cinema, which I characterized as the ideal art of imminence, that I privilege fiction cinema far over documentary in that regard; this because fiction is more free of the trammels of representation, doesn’t really have to refer to anything factual, empirical, or historical—well, unless it insists on it, like the allegories of the Bible, Dante, Milton, or (who knows?) Kafka.  In fact a clearly pervasive leitmotif of Non-philosophy, as a perusal of the following excerpts will confirm, for instance under Paraconsistent Fictions or Photo-fiction, Philo-fiction, is rather the conflation of the domains of imagination with fact, whereby it occludes, contests and dissolves this wall of  separation, constructed by  Philosophy. Really Non-philosophy rather likes to talk of the interpenetration of these domains rather than their separation, the imaginary becoming fact, the fact becoming fiction, thereby both becoming liberated, for art to be taken more seriously and for fact to be treated as less limiting.  Although above we express doubts about how free we can be, for instance in the political realm, from representation, or how desirable that would be even if it were possible, some of the same suspicions might follow us into the realms of art, which we characterized as more open to imminence.  An art of imminence that eschews representation, for instance as recommended by Deleuze-Guattari and Non-philosophy generally, must it not from the get-go eschew certain contents or at least attitudes, disregarding which it would fall, and most heavily, into the depths of representation?  Take a film that celebrates genocide, revels in extermination, or depicts unspeakable, irreversible acts, can this possibly pretend to be an art of imminence, one which doesn’t have to mean anything?   Such a work can only be a work of representation, and a false one at that; but beyond such extreme examples, citing literary examples where I am more at home there are works of evident artistic merit, which however can make us wonder about how redemptive imminence can be for them; I’m thinking of Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov, Capote’s In Cold Blood, or Mailer’s Executioner’s Song; how can they not represent, however ‘beautifully’ and/or profoundly.  I dare you to read Henri Barbusse’s Le Feu, Dalton Trombo’s Johnny’s Got His Gun, or Remarque’s All Quiet On the Western Front without thinking of the anti-war statement they make, so unlike the clearly immanent fictions of Flaubert, and his disciple Henry James, which are just what they are...   Then pretty recently there was Roberto Bolaño’s 2666, recounting in grisliest detail, and actual names, the many rape-murder victims in a Mexican border town—how not think of family or close friends perusing same without being freshly traumatized; or Jonathan Littel’s Les Bienveillantes (The Kindly Ones), originally published in French, so all-too horrifyingly specific in its representation the World War II Eastern Front to be regarded as a work of pure immanence; equally for the all-too-human perversions of Sade, and those 18th century novels ‘you read with one hand’, then on to Cinema, art of the voyeur and indeed schadenfreude par excellence.

Moving back to the art of the moving image, from those of the word, how avoid a certain sense of complicity and exploitation in the crimes depicted so vividly in cinema?  Take for instance the sadism, violence and brutality of  Night of the Hunter (Charles Laughton), one among countless others, where two children are terrorized by a psychotic misogynist religious fanatic (magnificently played by Robert Mitchum) who has murdered their mother (among other women)—played so believably by Shelley Winters, pathetically led like a sheep to slaughter, but willingly too.  This terrifying gratuitous cruelty creates an effect of shock hardly redeemed by the moralizing, although beautifully acted intervention of the proxy mother (Lillian Gish) the children find, or who finds them.  Here, between the beauty of the film, the perfection of the acting and direction and the horror of the all-to-real (or seeming) events and in similarly contradictory films, quantum superposition has its work cut out for it.  Yes, as Marianne Moore had it so famously, a poem should not mean but be; but not that that was supposed to be easy.
 

























“For Gnosis, madness is one of the possible adventures of the One in its voyage toward salvation... The One is not the human person...any person anyway is only an actor playing a role, whether this role assumes the shape of a social role or a pathological one, or of the reasonable moral agent to whom one can impute their actions.” (59-60)                   
                        --Rannou, Jean-Luc (2003).  François Laruelle et la Gnose non-philosophique.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [François Laruelle and the Non-Philosophy Gnosis]                                                                





“The ‘vision-in-One’ is what makes possible this suspension of philosophical sufficiency, , making it necessary also to denounce in the spontaneous practices of Greco-philosophy a powerful spirit of  conservatism and unitary domination making philosophy incapable of the theoretical and technical mutations that the sciences and the arts—especially painting and music—have been making since the end of the 19th century.  This is why non-philosophy finds in these scientific and artistic mutations, if not its reason for being, at least its most powerful support.” (10)
-- Laruelle, François (1989). Philosophie et non-philosophie.  Mardaga: Brussels.
-----                               

“...Relinquishing philosophical critique, to enter into another domain, of a sort more chaotic, one that admits paradox, considering the work as a chaotic ensemble open to re-combination, the work of art is always a discourse de trop.... From the point of view of generalized non-esthetics you may invent or reinvent everything, there would be a work corresponding to it...[sic], inventing esthetics liberated from philosophical order, which demanded they speak a single truth, (which at the same time would be the truth of an epoch or even that of a movement, artist or work).” (8-12)

“The poetic, artistic image seems totally suited for the teaching of that which cannot be taught.  It knows how to get around the aporia of Meno​[2]​” (38)

 “...Baudelaire, in “The Beacons,” conquers a new critical space.... since it touches on the three traditional domains : creator, artist and aesthete. ” (43)

“...This sinking effect is what comprises the spirit of non-philosophy....Scarcely has it succeeded in expressing itself, when it must express itself differently.” (91-2)

“All systems take over a Real whose chaotic dimension they hide, so as to reinscribe it on a chart of particular and constraining truth. As to non-philosophy really it is non-systematic, it is chaotic. Its incompleteness is essential (possibly because it is really beginning, a permanent beginning) ...It’s in its chaotic dimension that the great originality of non-philosophy lies.” (98-99)

“Anything therefore can become ‘aesthetic-isible’” (106)

“The cristal​[3]​ is the very prism of existence, through which  you can regard and even read existence without having recourse to logos.  Since logos is prisoner of the proposition, while cristalizing prolifération is chaotic.” (114)”

“Non-philosophy transforms the rigorous formulation into veritable art...especially if you define art as what must appear each time to be the first day of its new birth....” (n. 29, 209)

“Critique is an ‘anabasis’, a return to the inspiring sea.”  (n. 39, 213)”
                       
                                           -- Kieffer, Gilbert (1996).  Esthetiques non-philosophiques.  Paris: Kimé
                                               -----

“We must, as François Laruelle emphasizes ‘invent the rules of thought that haven’t been programmed by philosophical decision...’.  “ ‘novel’ rules that haven’t been programmed by decision about novels.” (191, bold sic)

-- Petit, Philippe (1995). “Adieu: Sartre ou les dernières aventures du roman”: 189-205. In (La) Non-Philosophie des contemporains. Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: Kimé. [The Non-Philosophy of Contemporaries]                
 -----
“Thesis 11​[4]​: Non-Standard aesthetics means an aesthetics without representation, as aesthetics of the immanent rather than the transcendental.” (219, ital sic)
                                               
        --Galloway, Alexander (2014). Laruelle Against the Digital. Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press .  
                                                        -----
 
Extending The Concept of Non-Photography (2011), countering Philosophy’s control of Art—Art ‘resists the enterprise and rebels’ (1), rebutting the consideration of Art as deficient philosophy: Photo-fiction= a non-standard aesthetics (8)

“[Photo-fiction] is a return to the Kierkegaardian and theatrical sense of ‘repetition’ rather than the automaticity of repetition (which determinist necessity often implies) in such a way that the individual agent—subject manipulator of the apparatus merges with the general process....The world of the photo is now the end of realism via an excess of the real....The artist of photo-fiction...loses his realist and causal belief in the world...the photo is no longer an instrument of enslavement of individuals to the world.” (21-22)

“The style of photo-fiction is taking a photo with one’s eyes closed, on the condition that one admits they are closed, which is to say they had been open and more precisely, that they are half-closed...” (35)

“To photograph an object is to address the big Other that either validates or not my understanding.” (50).

“Photo-fiction is...an insurrection against the all-too-great superior faculties....Art is the world without the world, the entire world but without its over-determined concept...[the] insurrection does not simply substitute itself for domination but acts upon it—redirects it toward its spontaneously insurrectional roots, but which has taken a ‘wrong turn’ into over-transcendence and over-totality.” (63, 65)

--François Laruelle. Photo-Fiction, A Non-Standard Aesthetics.  Translated Drew S. Burk.  Minneapolis, Univocal, 2012.  Bilingual edition.
                                                       -----
“We need to affirm that the painter-insofar-as-painter does not speak, he paints; therefore, the canvas, the real of painting says nothing.” (bold sic, 138)

“If philosophers cannot see painting as painting it’s because for philosophy it is truly a provocation.... Painting provokes philosophy because it reveals its vanity and vacuity.  We’d even be tempted to say painting shows this without even saying it.  It is not even critical.” (bold sic, 146)
                                             
                                              -- Leboeuf, Mathias (1998)“La Peinture telle qu’elle,” 137-68. [“Painting As Such”]. In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]
                                                    -----
“Non-philosophy therefore is not about taking a position [prise de parti] or an intervention in the current debate...continuing philosophy through an identifiable step, counting as one more or less, or else deconstructing it by a step more-and-less.​[5]​  It’s not a matter of inventing a new philosophy  or ‘thought’, either through reactivation of an ancient possibility, expressed or else dissimulated; either through bricolage​[6]​ and the invention of new rules of the same sort....Doubtless it’s on this level of expression and form, of style and genre—that of the textuality specific to non-philosophy...we can invoke artistic mutations (Twelve-tone music, John Cage, Cubism and Abstraction etc).  On the one hand certainly there is an analogy between artistic revolutions and the program of non-philosophy, a profound analogy within the mutation into ‘non’ of the style and type of thought....On the other hand these artistic mutations function here, if not as real cause or essence, at least as impulsions and possible models over-determining the non-philosophical model, one too immanent or transcendental to be the result of a simple transfer.” (183)

“I believe that the discovery of the non-thetic Other​[7]​ in general, but given himself (to) the One, is very consequential for...the theory of literature....Non-thetic transcendence is a dimension of absolute alterity that allows us to realize the very possibilities of science-fictions.....the idea that the fictional and speculative potentialities of philosophy should be developed, that it is perhaps possible, not to deny philosophy, which is not what I wanted to do, but to somehow release its fictional powers by dint of this non-thetic Transcendence....I’m calling that ‘hyper-speculation’ or still ‘non-philosophy’” (223)
                                               -- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One]
                                                ------

“It’s not on the side of the artistic or poetic regime that we must situate the non-philosophical practice of language. ‘In the vision-in-One, language is...delivered from the ends and servitudes of poetry’​[8]​.....This refusal of poetics means...that in non-philosophy language loses its authority and its right—but...its practice gains in liberty, rigor and generality: freeing the Real from language is also to free language from the task of touching or attaining the Real, consequently opening up new territory for it.” (192)
-- Choplin, Hughes (2007).  L’espace de la pensée française contemporaine à partir de Levinas et de Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [The Terrain of Contemporary French Thought, with Focus on Levinas and Laruelle]      
------

“This term, ‘philo-fiction’ and its variants (photo-fiction, christo-fiction, art-fiction, amongst others)...refers to what non-philosophy creates when it enters into the various domains of philosophy with its logic of the ‘non’.  When Laruelle enters these domains, he does so without regard for an authenticity that would be granted by following the rules of discourse, even those of the art-World.  Instead, the purpose of fiction is a kind of counter-creation to that of the world....in thinking how the world might be otherwise...we engage in a practice of drawing from what appears to be that world but under the logic of the without, of the otherwise: ‘Art is the world without the world, the entire world but without its over-determining concept.’”​[9]​ (119-20)
                                                  
                                                    -- Smith, Anthony Paul (2016b). Laruelle: A Stranger Thought.  Malden MA and Cambridge UK: Polity. 
                                                                 ----- 

“A non-philosophy of cinema [sic, rubric]....What philosophy calls the reality of the subject is always its concept of the subject.  Hence, every  philosophy is a mixture (‘mixte’) of that reality with a predefined interpretative schema....Laruelle’s own ‘non-philosophy’, however, makes no explanatory claims at all about the nature of any subject, or even the Real as such—it is instead a thought alongside the Real.  The Real is simply posited as that which resists philosophy.  Indeed, non-philosophy is defined as an immanent thought precisely because it does not try to think of the Real but is hypothesized as a part of it.” (204-5, referring to FL, Principes de non-philosophie, 1996)
  -- Mullarkey, John (2009). Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image.  London: Palgrave McMillan.                                                                                                  
                                                                     -----
“...why the Greeks erected a theatre, isolating the stage with high walls, forever separating it from the city, because everything we experience in what is called life—daily life and its rounds, the empirical individuals we think we see and know, everything that proposes an aspect or face in ek-stasis—must be put aside and ignored (if necessary covered with a mask) if life’s coming into itself in the sole conceivable form of its suffering and joy is to be accomplished and Dionysus is to be present.´(250)
--Henry, Michel (1993) The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis.  Trans. Douglas Brick.  Intro. François Roustang. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
             -----




“Even the most pioneering work, such as Antonio Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens [1999], while putting affectivity at the heart of consciousness, still does not go far enough for Henry​[10]​.  As with Merleau-Ponty, a trace of transcendence always remains to blur the conception, whereas an absolutely immanent approach, in complete rigor, has no trace of the outside.” (66)
      
--Mullarkey, John (2006). Post Continental Philosophy, an Outline.  N.Y.: Continuum.
-----
“Self-affection, independent of the difference between ‘subject and object,’ between ‘knower and known,’ independent of difference as such, constitutes life’s essence in will or in any other determination containing that original essence.” (164)

“ Tragedy, because it opens us to life, stands ‘amid this excess of life, suffering and pleasure in sublime ecstasy.’ Suffering and joy are not two modes of affectivity.  Together they constitute the unique essence of being, as life...This original connection of suffering and joy, together constituting being’s historicity as life, was discovered by the young Nietzsche in Dionysus.” (232)  Citing Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, and also the author’s own Essence of Manifestation #70, where he states in note that ‘the connection was originally grasped in the apodictic mode’.

“To confide to memory the reassembly of our being, of all the morsels of ourselves scattered throughout the absurd exteriority of ek-stasis, of all those so-called traumatic events that mark the course of our existence, to restitch infinitely the infinitely broken thread of all those little stories, is to forget that the reassembly is already accomplished.  It is the original inner assembly in which the essence of all power and memory itself reside, the Archi-Revelation of the Archi-Body, the eternal self-embrace of being and its pathos and before its illusory dispersion in the unreal exteriority of ek-stasis, the very essence of our being.” (327, last words of book)

--Henry, Michel (1993).  The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis.  Trans. Douglas Brick.  Intro. François Roustang. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
-----
“For Deleuze, art should affect rather than be understood...”  (63)
--Uhlmann, Anthony (2009). “Expression and Affect in Kleist, Beckett and Deleuze,.”  Deleuze and Performance.  Ed. Laura Cull.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press.

                                              -----
“ ‘Matthew Goulish spends upward of 10 minutes standing and rubbing the back of one hand with the fingers of his other hand...[sic]leaving the audience with time to watch seemingly very little for---in theatrical/performance terms—a long time’  In this sense the company are willing to risk boredom, but from the position of conceiving boredom as an affect that can immediately precede an optimum audience state of what we might call a kind of passive alertness, when we have stopped trying so hard to understand why what is happening is happening, and concentrate on attending to what is happening—in itself...” (138)

--Cull, Laura (2009). “Goat Island, Deleuze’s Bergsonism and the Experience of Duration.”  Deleuze and Performance.  Ed. Laura Cull.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press.
         -----
“Feeling is the gift which cannot be refused, it is the arrival of that which cannot be sloughed off....In the helplessness of suffering the power of feeling is born.” (475)

“Every life is essentially affective, affectivity is the essence of life.” (477)

“Strictly speaking, Being is not enigmatic or invisible as it escapes us and withdraws far from us but insofar as it affects us.” (478)

“...the world is capable of affecting us and touching us, because the power of opposition which opens the world to us and is affected by it, originally affects itself.  The world is not given us in order later and ultimately to touch us and move us or leave us in indifference, it cannot even be given us except as that which touches us and moves us... The essence of sensibility is in affectivity” (482)

“...feeling, every feeling in general, is ‘pathological’ according to the explicit affirmation of Kant.” (520)​[11]​....Hence, sensibility now presents itself as something opaque, irrational, heterogeneous to the spirit, as representing an inferior element in man in his relation to nature, an element more or less marked by evil...” (527)

“One of the characteristic traits of the thought of Scheler is his effort to redeem affectivity from the discredit with which it was been traditionally burdened, and this by recognizing it as a power of revelation peculiar to it, and what is more, an original and fundamental power.” (571).

“[However] Here we see a changeless element which traverses the entire history of philosophy, viz. the extraordinary deterioration of the concept of affectivity....visible...in the Schelerian critique of the affective conception of religion. ‘No idea concerning a religious object could in any way be based on a feeling, viz. on a subjective state’, and more generally in the relegating of all affective sates as such to a mechanistic process: ‘Pure affective states can only be taken note of and then explained by means of their causes.’” (584)​[12]​. Scheler, as seen by Henry, however much credit he deserves for his redemption of affectivity, falls into the same consequential error as the tradition by ultimately derogating it epistemologically.

“If we can feel listless and miserable at the same time as we experience an ‘exciting’ sensorial pleasure, this is not, as Scheler thinks, because these two tonalities are supposed to develop on affective levels exterior and really separated from one another.  The very possibility of opposition rather resides in unity, in the concrete unity of a single fundamental tonality...: what should be a pleasure and present itself under the concept thereof, in reality is not a pleasure, is not experienced as one.  The very indifference which seems to prevail...where pleasure leaves us indifferent....is the indifference of existence as in principle incapable of being modified by anything whatever...” (619)

“This possibility of co-sensing feelings which are not my own, the anxiety of a man confronted with immanent death, whereas, as far as I am concerned nothing menaces my own life...and moreover, the possibility of co-sensing feelings which are those of no living man, the suffering of Christ in Gethsemani, for example,...is the foundation of the possibility of enlarging my existence far beyond the limited sphere of experiences and feelings heretofore lived and known by me.” (624).​[13]​

“...the possibility of ‘living again’ a feeling, put by Scheler on the same level as that of the post-, co-, or pre-sensing appears equivocal in the highest degree.  Either ‘to live a feeling again’ means to really experience it once again...excluding every act of grasping intentionally directed toward it....Or else, ‘living a feeling again’ means to present it again either 1) in an act of reproduction, of imagination, of representation, of perception or else 2) in an act...[that] is never that of the consciousness which ‘lives it’....The same results hold for the relation of consciousness, not to its own feelings, but to those of another person....For example, there is no relationship whatever between the feeling of sympathy experienced because of the suffering of another and this suffering itself.” (624-25)

“...feeling is radical immanence, it is affectivity....The reality of feeling is the reality of the absolute.” (627-28).

--Henry, Michel (1973).  The Essence of Manifestation.  Trans. Girard Etzkorn.  The Hague: Nijhoff.  Orig. pub, 1963: L’essence de la manifestation.  Paris: PUF. 
                                                     -----  
“Affectivity never occurs as one content of experience among others or as a contingent, perishable content; instead, it is the a priori condition for the possibility of experience.” (115)





“Amphibology...as the essence of all and any philosophy consists in the indiscernibility between instances of the real and thought....François Laruelle’s choice in Philosophie et non-philosophie​[14]​ is to attempt to invent a mode of thinking that is outside the aporetic labyrinth, to confer a possibility of thinking in a nonaporetic situation.” (60-62)

-- Kolozova, Katerina (2014). Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy.  Foreword by François Laruelle.  New York: Columbia UP








“...the return of the gnostic war on culture...We distinguish in effect two possible meanings of this war that returns, according to whether it’s a matter of aiming at occupying the place of the enemy, that is to say to conquer some position of mastery, to take power—or whether it’s a question of liberation from mastery as such, to attack it at its root rather than to reinvigorate it, exchanging this master against a new one...This distinction belongs to the Angel​[15]​, that is to say to the Real whose coming to the world signifies not an absolute combat to occupy the dominant place, but the combat to destroy this place, to abolish all mastery.” (75)
                                                    
                                                      -- Grelet, Gilles (2002). Déclarer la Gnose: d’une guerre qui revient à la culture [Declaring Gnosis: a War of Culture]. Paris: Harmattan,                                                            
                                                      ------
“The master does not misunderstand the rebel, but forecloses the rebel;  producing a history where the rebel is unheard of and foreclosed from it; where the rebel cannot reappear in the real since the real is entirely on the side of the master.  The rebel reappears in another history, which is not at all the super-sensible: under another name, an other real.” (77) 
                                           
-- Jambet, Chistian and Guy Lardreau.  L’Ange (Paris: Grasset, 1976)

                                            ------
“[About,] Guy Lardreau and Christian Jambet in their work L’Ange...(1976) which posits a radical dualism between master and a rebel, Laruelle claims​[16]​ that such a simplistic Manichaeism is too narrow...He instead suggests a fourfold structure...that looks at thinkers as sorts of machines that operate within the parameters of Master, Rebellion, Fascism, and Resistance.” (66)
                                          




     “Should music’s ‘complete indifference to everything material...’,​[17]​ towards all the natural and social facts be extended to painting...?  Kandinsky writes, ‘It became, however quite clear to me that art in general was far more powerful than I had thought, and...that painting could develop just such powers as music possesses’....if this reference to the objective world were abolished, as music ‘the most immaterial of the arts’ does with great effect, if sounds were no longer the sounds of things but were heard as movements of the soul, like the cry of pain arising from wounded Desire or the slow change of suffering need into its satisfaction, then the same meaning and purpose could be attributed to painting.” (116-17)
--Henry, Michel (2009). Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky.  Trans. Scott Davidson.  New York: Contiuum, Orig. pub,  1988: Voir l’invisible. Paris: François Bourin, 1988.  
                                              -----

“The Concept is itself disappearance.  It is the Night of disappearance.  The fact of acting in itself and for itself is objectivity itself....It is the essence of manifestation....Manifestation is the movement of perishing....; it is the deep misery of objectivity....Art, but also every form of human activity in general, encounters the monstrous contradiction of the essence.  The pretense of the essence is to realize itself whereas its realization means its very disappearance.  That which must be realized is actually never this or that, it is the Concept; but the concept is enclosed in the night.  What is produced is not the essence; man’s deception when confronted by the realized task, regardless what it is, stems from the inequality between the determination and its ontological milieu, an inequality which pertains to the essence of objectivity as such.” (711)




“The intervention of a still transcendent model of becoming and creation, that of artistic activity, to assure the highest synthesis of Being and becoming and bind the Eternal Recurrence of the Same into itself in the circularity of its process, has been a misinterpretation.  It’s no coincidence that Heidegger, and other less perspicacious, believed art to be the key to the Nietzschean synthesis: only a secret metaphysician, a deconverted theologian could have projected into Nietzsche this ontic-ontological primacy of art as mode of the Will to Power.” (182)
- Laruelle, François (1977b). Nietzsche contre Heidegger: Thèses pour une politique nietzscheene.   Paris: Payot. [Theses for a Nietzschean Politics]
-----
“Dufrenne reproaches Freud for having a system of values conforming to established order....​[18]​  Since there is no such thing as innocence.  Having utilized established languages, artists also are ‘aware of it or not, accomplices of power’.  Therefore their sublimation will be called a legitimate and radical ‘desublimation’​[19]​....To this cunning ‘desublimation’, fruit of utilitarianism and industrial society (with its mythology of the doomed artist [artiste maudit] etc. there will respond ‘a even more radical and violent desublimation’, inventor of ‘non-art’.  ‘Better yet call it counter-art, the way we say counter-culture.’...[sic]  This is a ‘de-spiritualization: Wild art [l’art sauvage] refuses the control of mind, in favor of spontaneity of gesture, and the  powers  of desire and of chance.’ ”   (37-38, citing Mikel Dufrenne, Esthetique et Philosophie, t. 3, pp. 74- 79)

“All the same Dufrenne poses the question: ‘Is desublimation (...) [sic] really liberating, or is it still, in its way repressive?’ (Dufreene, p. 79).  We answer that it does remain philosophical.”​[20]​
     -- Kieffer, Gilbert (1998). “La Non-philosophie, mode d’emploi”: 24-39  [“Non-philosophy, Instructions for Use”]. In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]      
                                              ------
“...you might think, mobilizing the analyses of the philosophical decision developed by Laruelle that it’s art (or painting) that constitutes the model of the extra-philosophical empirical springboard of phenomenology.” (161)

   -- Choplin, Hughes (2007).  L’espace de la pensée française contemporaine à partir de Levinas et de Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [The Terrain of Contemporary French Thought, with Focus on Levinas and Laruelle]

                                                 ------

“Information is the means of the system to spread to society the predominant message on what it is supposed to believe.  This, according to Deleuze, is the basic way that allows passage from primarily repressive societies of discipline—to societies of control (both also described by Foucault).... Therefore, the only act of resistance possible vis-a-vis this system (whose priority is persistence of its order and control) would be the work of art, since it is not an instrument of communication, conveying no information.  The work of art would be the only efficacious counter-information, insofar as act of resistance, since ‘the work of art has a fundamental affinity with the act of resistance’, Deleuze also citing Malraux: ‘art is the only thing that resists death.’” (261-62)

Lesueur here demurs somewhat but consequentially from Deleuze above, in this idea of art as resistance; first of all, since it involves the creation of ‘another man’, ‘the artist’ which project is in perfect accord with the techknè​[21]​ of political philosophy....Secondly, “if there is something than can’t be resisted it is death.... Death is the Real par excellence....we can as well say ‘philosophy fears death as it fears the Real.” (262)

Since even for Deleuze ‘all art is not act of resistance’​[22]​, since for him “there are two faces of the act or resistance, as in the act of art: a first face that is inscribed directly in a systemic perspective of order: that of technical process, method, fabrication, even if it opposes the system literally—in the case of the act of resistance, whereby the system itself conveys an aspect of intrinsic resistance, which is part of the way it functions.  A second face we call rather Rebellion and we recognize as that of Inspiration, whose particularity is that of breaking with all forms of domination....The work of art has no potential for real resistance, that is to say a heretical posture, except as Inspired by the In-Man, of that creative and rebellious part of the Human indifferent and rebellious to all forms of system, order and technical procedure in view of a telos.[goal]” (263-64)
                                               





“...Laruelle’s primary concern, which is to initiate a new, not Differential form of thought that would no longer reproduce philosophical authoritarianism.” (154)

“The non-philosophical vision-in-One is.... how we human beings see if and when we acknowledge honestly that we are real and yet no longer bolster that acknowledgement with any foundation, ground or authority: World, Logic, History, Power, Matter, Reality, Self truth, Philosophy, God, One.” (179)

--Gangle, Rocco (2013). François Laruelle’s Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction and Guide.  Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2013.                                                                                       
                                                        ------
“If ethics is to be ‘based’ on something adequate to the essence of man, it must exclude any idea of a unitary and transcendent essence.  Man is possibly not an ego-subject structured by a supposed ‘human nature’, but, for example, an Ego and a ‘Stranger’, dual and non-unitary structure and which destroys at the root all the naturalism, juridism [juridisme]​[23]​ and rationalism, historical positivism also, engraved into ethics.... A non-philosophical ethics, understood in this way, does not define man as a being subject to morality as a verb is to a predicate, nor even as being or horizon of  morality....Philosophical morality is not very human, but made by and for the physis, the polis, the cosmos etc., and is only the process or procedure of the insertion of man into these frameworks and his subjugation to these Authorities.” (181-182)
-- Laruelle, François (2000). Ethique de l’étranger: du crime contre l’humanité.  Paris: Kimé. [Foreigner Ethics : Of Crimes Against Humanity]                                                                                              

                                                 ------
“We propose breaking the alliance between man and the authoritarian predicates (Desire, Language, Sex, Power, the State, History etc.).” (14)

“ ‘Between’ minorities and Authorities, naked individuals and the powers of the world there is no ‘line of demarcation’ nor even ‘difference.’​[24]​  We reject these politico-philosophical procedures which amount typically to make of minorities a sub-system, or at best a ‘member’ or a ‘difference’ in the great entities that are the State, Culture, Language etc.” (42)

“The state is not necessary for minorities, even if it presents itself as such....That individuals precede the World, History, Language, Authorities in general; that parties are independent of the All; that beings precede Being and stamp it with its non-controllable  irreversibility, etc.—these theses are considered by philosophy and politics as impossible paradoxes that defy reason.” (87)

“The existence of the Authorities, the practice of the State, the interminable processes of History etc., all of that is of a piece with the sure illusion of what man is, with the pretention to make of him homo ex machina (publica)” (94)





“...when artists stop considering themselves philosophers in a minor key, they’ll join the true ‘minorities’—authentic minorities who will no longer allow themselves to be cornered and controlled by philosophical Authority.” (23)

                                        -- Laruelle, François (1992). Théorie des identités.  Paris: PUF.


Laruelle’s idea is that philosophy’s authority is self-established, founded on nothing but its own arrogance, determining not only its own superior status in a hierarchy, but the standing of others, assigning them as more or less deserving of  resources; therefore, except in El Dorado resources always being limited, prompting ultimately competition (war) for them.
                                   -----

“Esa Kirkkopelto: ‘This is about a process of transformation to which this manifesto calls all those, equally and without distinction, who work with performing arts.  Abandoning the model of the human means that we really first turn our gaze to each other in this situation where there is no authority, ideology or ideal to supervise us anymore.’” (cited, 288, from “A Manifesto for Generalized Anthropomorphism.”, online)








“The axiomatic style is important for Laruelle’s setting up the mechanisms of non-philosophy, for axioms are not representational....In other words, the axioms are evaluated by what they allow to manifest through them, not by the strength of their ability to represent something beyond them” (42)

-- Smith, Anthony Paul (2016b). Laruelle: A Stranger Thought.  Malden MA and Cambridge UK: Polity.                                   
 




“The controlling formula of Parmenides ‘Being and Thought are the Same’ that structures all philosophy...is eradicated by the One-in-itself; as soon as it’s a matter of the One conceived as without-Being or outside-Being...” (113)
                                      
                                        -- Laruelle, François (1992). Théorie des identités.  Paris: PUF.
                                        -------

“What makes the individual is no longer a consciousness,​[26]​ but the fact that at a certain point in himself—where he is only an individual—man ‘receives’ himself as man and does not belong to any universal apart from himself; there is no need for him to alienate himself in a Becoming, in History, the World—to be what he is.  To conceive of this non-alienation of man, I had to resort to a concept, an experience that philosophy has always claimed but never did justice to: the One.  I therefore reintroduced, against the philosophical primacy of Being, a thought of the One.  The One, in effect, this structure of the non-thetic experience (of) self--‘unreflected’, since it has no need of reflection, of distance from himself to be what he is.” (210)

-- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One]

                                             -------

“Differently from Being, which ends always by supposing a contrary, deficient or other, a should-be, an appear-entity [être], a non-being, always a neighbor, a subordinated or superior instance, the One-in-person no longer should be thought of as an attribute, and even less so through identity and unicity as attributes”​[27]​ (170)

--François Laruelle, Mystique non-philosophique à l’usage des contemporains.  L’Harmattan, 2007. [Non-philosophical Mystics​[28]​ for Contemporaries]
-----
“Philosophy has the pretension of intervening really in the Real; intervention which can only begin in supposing the Real within its domain.  It believes still, at least since Parmenides, that being and thinking are the same, and that the Real is” (26)







“Poetics and non-poetics constitute the binomial due to a form of the dialectic of passivity and activity.  Every time we’ve proposed dealing with something at stake with our theme here we find ourselves once more in a situation that proves that our affirmation, our free will, was only what circumstances wanted to make us believe: that we were acting....What can we say about the binomial?  The binomial is the dimension where the example is the impossibility of the example and example of itself.”  (139-42)
 -- Bertocchi, Alessandro (2006). Philosophie et non-philosophie du poétique.  Houdiard: Paris,.









 “It’s because Blanchot attempts to disengage thought from all power that Hughes Choplin assigns him a totally unique place—somewhat outside of how he conceives of contemporary French thought in L’espace de la pensée française contemporaine, à partir de Lévinas et Laruelle (2007).” (215n.121)

 “While Heidegger envisions and conceives of language etymologically as the privileged unique house and site of Being, presupposing thereby that there is a proper language for such—Blanchot in L’Écriture du désastre writes on the contrary that what is meant by the neutral word has no ground in any etymological propriety—however wondrous—of a word in the purity and authenticity of a proper language....We have no other choice than to write ‘like one dies; without goal, without power, without  unity and more precisely without just like’—without condition.” (260)

“There is no transcending [dépassement] of this situation that does not make of this system and movement of writing the two terms of the same alternative—either the system and the whole of philosophy or the step [pas] of writing....Now, in taking from us all possibility of transcending...we are exposed...to an indecidability and therefore an irreducible nonpower: in Le Pas au-delà and L’Ecriture du désastre  ‘whereby our only choice is stay in a state of indecision, refusing to decide once and for all...’” (264, citing Blanchot’s L’Amitié)


“Compared to Derrida, the originality of Blanchot consists finally in inviting us to think of differance, without deconstruction and all its avatars; or better yet to think of differance without prowess, without, that is to say indifferent to all the forces and powers of difference, to ponder a certain difference indifferent to all philosophical forms of difference.” (my bold, 272).

Differance is Derrida’s neologism whereby deciding on the certain meaning of a word is indefinitely deferred.  Compared to the coinage Differance, Difference would be the more traditional concept, presuming there is a meaning, but whereby meaning would be thought of as something constructed rather than belonging to things and beings essentially, the latest version of which (after Plato, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger) was a structuralist  (language-focused) avatar of such as Althusser, Foucault and Lacan.

Here, at least through Harlingue’s reading Blanchot seems to overlap with Laruelle’s non-philosophical notion of ‘non-response’ (non-agir) as the way the minorities (not necessarily in population) oppose most effectively the Authorities of the State, Philosophy, Law etc... Cf. passim, certainly in one of his most polemical-political texts, Une Biographie de l’homme ordinaire: des autorités et de minorités (1985).

“Far from all worldly strategies, methodologies and calculations (literary and philosophical), it’s necessary from now on to invent, with and after Blanchot, a thought without art, without works [oeuvre], therefore one far from any power, star, culture or market, that would be really non-exchangeable, impossible to co-opt [irrécupérable] and non-exploitable.” (274)

-- Harlingue, Olivier (2009).  Sans-condition: Blanchot, la littérature, la philosophie.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [Without-condition: Blanchot, Literature and Philosophy.]                                       

 ------
“...our own opinion is that [non-philosophy’s] liberation from philosophy proceeds less from a transformation, for example Laruellian, of thought—transformation that seems to us authentically philosophical—than from an interruption of thought, such as that that the Blanchot night seems to trigger, according to Zarader.” (footnote, 238)

Citing M. Zarader, L’être et le neutre.  À partir de Maurice Blanchot (2001), 297 ; this provocative study challenging the coherence (but not the importance) as well as the ‘neutrality’ of Blanchot’s concept of the neutral, 

-- Choplin, Hughes (2007).  L’espace de la pensée française contemporaine à partir de Levinas et de Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [The Terrain of Contemporary French Thought, with Focus on Levinas and Laruelle]      

-----
“Blanchot and Levinas suggest a transmanence without power of our quotidian milieu....The idea of trans-manence implies not only a disqualification of the transcendence/immanence couple and its powers—with which it seems inseparable in contemporary French philosophy.  It indicates also, through the ‘trans’ prefix that this milieu traverses or bathes the subject and, through the idea of manence, how this—trans-personal—traversal or immersion requires in reality a ‘maner’—to wit an immobility, a ‘remain’ or a ‘dwell’ in virtue of which this traversal is stripped of all power.  As if, far from enveloping a chaotic sea (as could be for Deleuze), the trans-manent milieu and its element were less traversing the subject and they were themselves traversed by it—or by the authorities and powers that inverted and uprooted it. (40-42, bold sic)

Seems to me to relate, through borrowing from Germanic languages to ‘manner’, as ‘to the manner’ born’, implying stasis, or staying there.


“It’s the neutral rapport—stripped of all power of neutralization—that in our eyes structures Blanchot’s dimensions in non—which are non-attraction, non-power or even non-writing.  However, is such a rapport even possible?  Remarkably the non-philosophy of Laruelle is based on a Real-without-force and without-weakness—the One as radical immanent—which could not in itself, be captured in rapports of authority, of power or even of neutralization....The fact is that the deployment of the non-philosophy of Laruelle—determined in the last instance, by the One-without-rapport—requires, itself, a uni-lateral rapport, or one of unilateriliz-ation, centered on philosophy itself, a rapport which, far from being neutral (in Blanchot’s sense) is a rapport of theoretical domination.  Lets not confound therefore the non-Blanchotian—non-writing, non-power, non-work, or even ‘non-knowledge’—with the non- of non-philosophy, distinguishing from this point of view, the determination (meaning the specific causality of the One) in the last instance of Laruelle from the neutral rapport of Blanchot  insofar as it is ‘indeterminate’.​[29]​  How then to think of the neutral Blanchotian rapport, insofar as it does not neutralize?  Only one solution in our eyes is possible: freedom from the immanence/transcendence couple, which rules in effect not only contemporary philosophies of power—immanent—of movement and authority—and transcendent—of the Other, but also non-philosophy itself.  If the neuter no more dominates than it neutralizes, this is because one of its ‘essential traits’ is ‘not to allow itself be defined either in terms of immanence nor in transcendence and to draw us into an entirely other kind of rapport.’  Blanchot introduces us thereby to the trans-manent character of silence.” (125-26)​[30]​

-- Choplin, Hughes (2013). Chercher en silence avec Maurice Blanchot.  Paris: L’Harmattan, 2013. [Searching  in Silence with Maurice Blanchot





“Chaos is not confusion....In reality science is a chaos whereby even local variations are fractal events and absolutely irreversible catastrophes.  It’s impossible to control science with what should or must be [a devenir] or a teleology...as is the case for philosophy.  Science is not a matter of capital [Capitalism=Philosophy—‘determination by domination’​[31]​], as is philosophy; it is a matter of chaos.” (225)

                                               -- Laruelle, François (1992). Théorie des identités.  Paris: PUF.

                                           -----
“DC [Interviewer]: Could you give us some idea of the practice of non-philosophy?....
FL:...you take some philosophical material (simply a statement or  text), borrowed from somewhere or you can fabricate it.  Then you go about rewriting it, reformulating it according to five or six precise rules—now elaborated—that are meant, since they express the One and are not to be found in philosophy, to produce statements that would not be receivable by any philosophical system...weakening philosophy or rather its authority....For example, among these rules one of the first is to treat the statement like an indifferent chaos (for the One itself all philosophical Decisions are equivalent and form a chaos).  You have already an infinite number of possible combinations, among which you will chose—not even a computer could face up to this ‘chaotic explosion’—a few elements you think more pertinent than others.  Whereupon you reformulate and describe these statements according to these rules that program the suspension or ejection (la mise hors jeu) of all elements that are characteristic of philosophy....I use the liberty these rules give me to invest in other practices, among which are musical,​[32]​ in the production of non-philosophical statement.  I attempt for example to produce effects not only of philo-fiction,​[33]​ poetry-fiction, religion-fiction (241-42).”

-- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One]  
For instance, as ‘religion fiction’, FL’s later, Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy.  Trans. Anthony Paul Smith.  Bloomsbury, 2011, where Gnosticism is ‘reinvented’ as an approach for challenging authority, which is what it was,  but without any Prince of Darkness necessarily ruling ‘this world’....
                          
 -----
“This institutionalization of the Decision, this ‘concretion of spirit’ to use the formula of Hegel, pretends to decide...about the Real, about the essence of men, of which the ‘axiomatic’ of the Rights of Man is only one case,  So that minorities, even imperceptibly, through philosophy form a system with the State....The World, the State, the Law, Capital, Philosophy, opposed to the ‘Chaosmos’, Minorities, Nomads, Nature and Philosophy, actually constitute but a single amphiboly, a single other-than-Real object, whose hallucination always is a symptom of Philosophy.  On the contrary, non-schizoanalysis unilateralizes in the non-thetic and radical non-reversibility of man and malady, the contents of schizoanalysis...” (242-43)

-- Bufalo, Erik del (2003). Deleuze et Laruelle: de la schizo-analyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé
 
‘Unilateralizaton’ is a cardinal notion of FL; for example, the decision not to respond to a demand, question, or order is unilateral, not one suspended because awaiting further dialogue or any clarification or modification thereof.
 ‘Chaosmos’ is Felix Guattari’s term for the ontology or Being of world of the schizophrenic he described for instance in terms of “the facticity of being there, without qualities, without past, without future, in complete decrepitude, and still a virtual nexus of complexity without bound.”  (Chaosmosis, tr. Bains and Profanis.  Bloomington: IUP, 1996, p. 84.); the following two terms (Minorities, Nomads) are oppositional categories developed in the writings Guattari and Deleuze jointly authored.
------
“The bond that ties this system to order in philosophy and even more so when it declares itself political, derives directly from what we have described as its horror of chaos; therefore the system-form is naturally the only way philosophy can conceive of the Real....Our purpose is to be able to envisage and think of politics/the political...otherwise than philosophically, that is in the system-form.(255)....The emergence, the unexpected surge of destabilizing factors for the System is the unconquered enemy of occidental theory, which calls indetermination chance or chaos.  In all Greek tragedies and epics techknè seeks constantly to compensate for tuché​[34]​ without being able totally to exclude it.” (265)

“Since the unpredictability of events cannot be eradicated, western thought develops, in harmony with its structural mode of functioning, theoretical means of reappropriating them, dissolving them to transform them ultimately, once more into System.  Plato and Aristotle leave room for chance and the Inspiration of the Subject; Machiavelli, in his Prince praising risky intervention, marks a turning point in philosophy that from then on will be allowing a growing role for the indetermination of things in political theory.” (266)






“Radical faith is prima facie conceivable as a quantum-type act of superposition, and is opposed point-by-point to the identification of belief​[35]​ that would always seek the absolute.  The quantum of faith is a sort of nonacting or nonreaction to the world, but one capable of acting by transforming the world, without therefore creating it.” (42)

“...between Christianity and quantum physics, constituting the link between them...there is a great Christian thinker...: Kierkegaard....it is impossible for us not to see in it [his thought] a sign or symptom in respect of the qualitative leap, the antidialectical and antilogical discontinuity, proper to quantum paradoxes.” (66)








“Communication...belongs to power, to the regime of signs, to despotic redundancy.... Communication is the diffusion of the law....In other words, communication is only possible on the basis of its repression of expression, it is in effect, always the same story with power.” (146)
       -- Bufalo, Erik del (2003). Deleuze et Laruelle: de la schizo-analyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé
-----
“One of the things that motivate non-philosophy is the eternal question ‘what is to be done’?  In the face of what?  In the present situation, in the face of the excess of communicable knowledge which, potentialized by philosophy become doxa, now harasses rather than alienates us.” (321)

                                          -- Laruelle, François (2012c). From Decision to Heresy, Experiments in Non-Standard Thought.  Ed. Robin Mckay.  Minneapolis: Urbanomic.  Translators various.                                                         

                                    ------
“...this essay explores the different aspects of non-communication, pushing it into the dimension of a non-action, of this minority refusal to communicate with Being, the Idea, Logos, the State that force us to speak, as they force us into temporality, meaning, memory and promise, to struggle and exchange.  Minorities of thought on the other hand are happy enough to remark and re-activate against Being this hiatus or indifference that Being is so anxious to fill up and without which, since this hiatus rather constitutes it—it couldn’t find nor prove its existence. ” (132)






“We must leave off prescribing the good choice and more generally wanting to choose; from deciphering problems in terms of decision and position, of immediate and precipitous transformation; from questioning, reflecting, assigning sense and value—this is still deciding and posing, intervening and ordering.  In the 2,500 years at least since these philosophical operations have been the routine of thought, we should have realized that they are the poison as much as much if not more than the remedy.  Let’s remove the philosophical tourniquet, with its endless rehash of alternatives, antagonistic positions, the indefinite oscillation of ‘differences’​[36]​—everything that amuses, distracts or unleashes, for philosophy is the consensus as such [comme tel] for war—we need to first of all describe and alter the order of our thoughts in function of the real—precisely to be able to begin real transformation of our historical, political, sexual, linguistic environment.” (34)

-- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One]
 ------
“What concept more shattering or crushing can there be than consensus?  This is the lazy and tired argument of  contemporaries—seen as a result even of ‘democratic discussion’ and ‘communication’.  This sanctification of what is seen as fact is really just institutional normalization and fetishization of thought..” (61)







“Ray Brassier...has leveled the criticism—especially against Laruelle’s more recent work—that it remains constrained by an unnecessary reference to the human subject, even if that subject is radically reinterpreted as Stranger​[37]​ ....on the one hand, his project of non-philosophy has systematically worked through the rejection of ‘correlationism’in philosophy...yet on the other hand he continues to use the term Man or Human (Homme) and makes use of theological materials in ways that can only appear conservative if not reactionary from the general point of view of the new realists.... (14-15)
-- Gangle, Rocco (2013). François Laruelle’s Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction and Guide.  Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2013.                                                                                       








 “…art manifests or implements the invisible real without modifying it, incarnates it without destroying it or transforming it.”

Art does this same as philosophy, except philosophy does transform it; at least since Marx reminded us, taking up where Socrates left off, in the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it.”  What Dance has in common with non-philosophy is that it does not transform the world either, considering that imperative of transformation to be another way Capitalism (=Philosophy, according to non-philosophy) persecutes us—for instance through the tyranny of its enforced algorhythm: X=X, but must become Y.  On the contrary, following the theories of our next author, P. Legendre, Dance (and the theatre he conflates it with, based on its inseparability for the ancient Greeks) more functions to keep prevailing structures of social domination and exploitation in place by providing outlets and ‘representative’ gratifications, which therefore legitimate the system by allowing their possibility, but don’t threaten it seriously by facilitating their fulfillment on any scale that would; basically how the lottery functions too (and how happy anyway are even those ‘winners’?).


‘The Invisible Real’ is an allusion to the philosophy of the function of art according to Michel Henry, a major influece on Laruelle.  Henry expanded and illustrated his views on art in a monograph on Kandinsky, Seeing the Invisible... 

“The function of art is to render it [being, Being-object], sensible [perceptible through the senses], ontologically sensible…without ever ascribing it to an object; to endow it with an absolutely universal exteriority devoid of local reference”

Ref. to Valery, “Philosophy of Dance”, Vol. 13 CW: Dance’s excess: physiologically useless movement.

Agamben: dance is any non-utilitarian movement: “...what is dance other than the liberation of the body from its utilitarian movements, the exhibition of gestures in their pure inoperativity” (“Elements For a Theory of Destituant Power”, adapted from a 2013 lecture, pp. 9-10, consulted online)—which would exclude somatics, therapy, transformation, or at least demote such to the position of byproducts…?


“…a kind of extension that passes through the space-time of Being, but is not reduced to it or content with sliding on it, as if it could not locate a foothold therein…a sort of radiation without ray, reflection without shimmer.”

“…the work of art supplies an equality which owes nothing to the levelling of a prior hierarchy….it accomplishes a kind of non-religious salvation.”





“Dance will always provoke the vigilant attention of Power, which is very much concerned with the right over the body, since dance concerns the essence of things, social divisions, and the order of pleasure [l’ordre des jouissances] (114)....Is dance also a military action? (124).... politically, dance and other technique of control [d’emprise] that make the human body speak are one and the same thing,  relating to omniscient power, in the same way as variants of religious cortege or modes of expression of the military automaton.” (129)


“Dance is a means of knowledge; as such it supposes a reference to the sovereign explainer [l’interprète souverain]…master also of knowledge of the body… The essence [la raison] of dance is not in dance, it is elsewhere, in the political, in the imaginary sense of the term.  Power embraces the soul of the body [l’âme du corps], through manipulation of an authorized knowledge, since it’s our soul that knows things....dance remains in the Occident the greatest of poetic conquests.  Even mobilized by the propaganda of power, dance draws us toward deliverance, towards the mythical place of desire.” (144-46)

“…the dog jumping at the sight of his master, is he dancing?” (153)

“In essence, dance embodies in our times the possibilities of a smothered mythical thought [pensée mythique étoufée]” (160)

“Nothing could be more directly threatening for the Occidental and Christian industrial organization than the unleashing of dances and the subversive theorization, which would by dint of this fact, necessarily follow.  In this sense we may regard as essential the swing [bascule] of the choreographical systems toward the most easily controlled forms of theatre.  A theatre is a place of power in all the meanings of the word; it’s even the place where there can be organized most readily the ritual of a political celebration: on the one hand those who dance, on the other those who watch.” (179-80)

“If Occidental legalism has repressed, if not totally rejected the Dionysian dances...[it’s because] Our ways of masking eroticism or even deny it totally are at the very heart of our choreographical system.” (207-08)


“...the dancer becomes a body eloquently speaking in the name of; and what there is behind this name is a lost word found again, the omniscient impossible word, which can be uttered by the body only when it is not itself but another.  The dancer finding him or herself, as Cunningham says, beyond their limits.  This miracle is the ordeal itself, the proof that God is speaking [Ce miracle est l’ordalie même, la preuve que Dieu s’est dit.].” (252) 

“Finally lets admit that dance can’t really be any kind of dialogue.   No kind of lesson [maïeutique] can be inscribed into choreographical products, since its signifying provocation is aiming at something else.  While scenes of love can be plays, a poetic merging [étreinte], where it seems like something real is invested, but no, here everyone is working on their own, reality has been properly speaking removed.” (276)

“...Dorothee Günther noting that for the dancer dance is always destitution (Enthebung), entry into another world--Der Tanz als Bewegungsphänomen [Dance as Movement Phenomenon], Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1962, p. 25.” (276 note 10)

“If modern dance seems to be going in all directions at once, if it seems insane to many, without any clear orientation, or totally wild, this is because industrial humanity is seeking to escape from a prison, one more intolerable than those of the past, since we know, through exact science and by way of the technologies of massacre, that such a prison is the work of humans and that the persecuting gods are here below, simple human bodies too.” (299)

“The critique of aestheticism, even springing from revolutionary liberation and destruction of classes, would not, in the context of the market, where meaning is assigned, evade the institutional code of dogmatic surveillance.  Dance can, from time to time, become an arm in the confrontations of civil war or as a propaganda trump card all regimes know how to play (cf. Nazis and the waltz); but from here it doesn’t look like dance today can constitute a privileged means of shaking up society [bouleversements sociaux], for the simple and sufficient reason that it remains framed by the rule, until now untouchable and unanimously respected, of the mythic principle of hierarchy.  Dance has been inscribed as dictated knowledge [savoir dicté]....since neither the breaking-everything [danses à tout casser] or subversive dances have breached social classification...nor the possibilities offered by the exploration of the limits of dance or the poetry of Non-dance budged in the slightest the institutions defining the legal spaces of expression [la parole]....Lets return for a moment to the fundamental division: dancers/non-dancers....meaning first of all that dance strictly concerns all politically indexed subjects, those whose social identity has been inscribed as true subjects, in other words everyone, subjects of a Law that speaks for all subjects in its authentic social version, so consequently having nothing of themselves to say.  This implies necessarily the regulation of dance, with the consequence that entry into this ritualized space where the discourse of desire can find fulfillment cannot be accomplished in an anarchic way, one lacking in control.  Aesthetic theories on authorized creativity serve notably to control this entry.” (316-17)

“The theatrical space of the choreography-spectacle is thought to be magic, entrancing and charming, because this space is constituted so that we thrill [qu’on y jouisse—meaning also orgasm] with its discourse, and because simultaneously this space is authorized, being the designated place for the subjects to say Love Under the Law and reveal [s’afficher, named as someone’s lover] themselves narcissistically, but under control.  The dancer somehow is making love in the name of others, of those others-there of the spectacle who have paid to see that.  Behind the theatrical concept is profiled the object of the myth and of love, fantastically revealed as divine object par excellence, the very fount of meaning.  The authority of beauty as authority enters there, and the aesthetic discourse is adjusted in such a way that we know exactly where to locate the truth of the institution: in a higher place, celestial redoubt or seat where ceaselessly everything that can be known is to be found.” (321)
                                         
                                              -- Legendre, Pierre (1978, 2000--edition with preface) La passion d’être un autre: Étude pour la danse, Paris: Seuil.  [The Passion of Being Another, a Study of Dance]
                                                -----
“ ‘Dionysus... was...[sic] not actually present at first’...nor, let us add, will he ever be.  The original being of the god is confounded with ‘those forces, merely felt and not condensed into images,’ so that the experience of those forces is the experience of the god.  This is why the Dionysian experience originally consists of the release of forces, in the ‘excited Dionysian throng’ and its frenetic dances.  It is not however the simple unfurling of these forces but precisely their experience, the intoxication of their passion, that also constitutes the being of the god and his ‘inspired’ servant.  That is why it is said that ‘in the dance the greatest strength remains only potential but betrays itself in the suppleness and wealth of movement’” (267-68)​[38]​

--Henry, Michel (1993).  The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis.  Trans. Douglas Brick.  Intro. François Roustang, “A Philosophy for Psychoanalysis?”.   Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press..       
  -----

“The vision of the invisible is the invisible becoming conscious of itself in us, exalting itself, and communicating its joy to us.
    Dance is the art that opens us to the mysterious reality of movement.  Dance can only touch us because it puts us in the presence of ‘abstract’ movement, stripped of its extrinsic purpose and objective shell.” (44)

--Henry, Michel (2009).  Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky.  Trans. Scott Davidson.  New York: Continuum.  Orig. pub,  1988: Voir l’invisible. Paris: François Bourin.
---
“Dance is an exciting venue for exploring NRT [Nonrepresentational Theatre] because ‘dance eludes rather than simply confronts or subverts power through its ‘capacity to hint as different experiential frames,’ different ways of being that cannot be written or spoken’ (Nast quoted by Revill, 2004: 201).​[39]​  Within dance ‘the volume of the body careening through space is a primary source of knowledge’  (Somdahl-Sands, 2006: 201).​[40]​ Dance uses the physicality of the body to articulate complex thought that cannot (easily) be put into words (represented).  This idea was encapsulated by the modern dance icon,  Isadora Duncan, when she stated, ‘If I could tell you what it means I wouldn’t have to dance it’ (Lewis, 2010)”​[41]​ (276-77)







“De-growth is violence done to philosophers, a wound and a humiliation, worse than nihilism which always can be relieved or recovered, while there is hardly any way of opposing de-growth there, since it is not a dialectical movement.” (112)

--François Laruelle. En dernière humanité: la nouvelle science écologique.  Les éditions du cerf, 2015. [In Last Humanity : the New Ecological Science]
------
“To claim that I harbour some sort of preontological understanding of my own being-human is to plunge straight back into Heidegger’s hermeneutics of Dasein....Worse, this ultimately arbitrary identification of the real with the human individual threatens to reduce Laruelle’s vaunted non-philosophical radicalism to a transcendental individualism wherein each human self becomes the ultimate determinant of philosophy; a position all too redolent of Fichtean solipsism to be convincingly described as non-philosophical.” Here, according to Ó Maoilearca (John Ò Maoilearca,  All Thoughts are Equal: Laruelle and Nonhuman Philosophy. UMinn, 2015.), it is “Brassier who has an overtly anthropic standard of knowing....Brassier practices epistemology—rather than Laruellian science—and so knows what knowing is....This must be opposed to not-knowing...what the human is, according to non-philosophical posture.  This not-knowing is no more ignorance, nor even the romantic notion of a negative capability.  It is an active ‘degrowth’ (unknowing) of epistemology by the Real—a de-philosophizing of the philosophy of knowledge.” (286)







“The purpose of non-philosophy is to introduce democracy into thought and to question the the traditional rapports of hierarchy between philosophy, on the one hand, and science, ethics, art etc. on the other.” (Statement following title page, of Bibliothèque de Non-Philosophie)

-- Moulinier, Didier (1999). De la psychanalyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé.                      
-----
 
“[according to Nietzsche]There is no ‘original social bond’ and there[man] is a radically non-political animal.” [22, bold sic, section heading]

“Man is at once and the same time a political and a non-political animal [in and outside of society]” (30, ital sic)

“The political pole ends by prevailing over the non-political.” (63)

“From the panoramic point of view, Nietzsche repeats the schema of the invariance of the political philosophy of the west.  He thinks of politics from the angle of non-politics, but still always under the primacy of politics.” (67-8)

Basic to philosophy is the idea of the social bond.  “Freud is the first who thinks of the political phenomenon from the opposite point of view.  With the notion of ‘the death drive’ he touches on a blind point of all political philosophies, which is the problematic of the ‘non-bond’.  In Freudian thought and anthropology, we can find a rich source for developing a politics of ‘resistance’, or even a non-politics.” (94)

[with Freud] “The modern formula of ‘unsociable sociability’ attains its summit....man is torn in two directions: on one side constituting himself ‘as one (making a community) and on the other hand maintaining the privileges of the One.’” (97)

Citing H.Rey-Flaud, “Les fondements metapsychologiques de Malaise dans la culture.”  In Autour de La Malaise dans la culture.  ed. Jacque le Rider.  Paris: Puf, 1998. [“The Metaphysical Grounds of Culture and Its Discontents (Freud), in About Culture and Its Discontents].  Freud’s porcupines come to mind as navigating between the Scylla of sociality and the Charybdis of individuality : huddled together when need be for warmth, they have their sharp quills all the same to keep others at a distance....


“E. Enriquez has rightly insisted that the beginning of politics is not a ‘Yes’ to the Master but a ‘No’ to submission.” (117)

non-politics as a “condition for the possibility” of politics (124)...  “non-philosophy is fundamentally a non-politics.” (127)

“What Laruelle and Deleuze want to establish is that this non-political force is always immanent to all political formations....The Master is a ‘transformation’ of the Rebel and they are identical in the last analysis.” (138-9)

“Laruelle is obliged to confront this dilemma: how to develop a non-political  and non-authoritarian theory of ‘political philosophy’ without becoming a ‘political philosophy’?” (146)

“ ‘Can we define the parts before the Whole and independently of the whole (...) minorities before the State and independent of the State?’” (176)​[42]​

FL and Rousseau both agree about the primordially non-sociable, not socially-contracted man (181)

“A philosopher is a politician who doesn’t know he is one....philosophy means only ‘transcendental eugenics’ for the miserable being who is ordinary man.” (189)


 “[according to FL]...in terms of the social contract the One—the essence (of) man stays always in the state of nature, and what enters into the civil state is the subject-Foreigner.” (200) 

“ ‘The philosophical subject is also a political subject: he runs in circles with the mechanism of his subjection’” (200)​[43]​

“There is no such thing as universal suffrage in the ‘democratic’ regime of philosophy...with Laruelle, ‘real and direct democracy’ means that it’s ordinary people who have the power to act and to speak without any form of determination in the last instance.  Democracy can only be direct.”  It’s presupposed, not waiting for any contract. (200).... 

Chien-Chang demurs from what he calls S. Lesueur’s​[44]​ “ultra-critical [of Capitalism and Philosophy] version [inspired by the French Revolution] of the political thought of Laruelle, turning it into a weapon meant to be “ultra-efficacious against all the ‘decisions’ of political philosophy.” (241); he prefers rather a less confrontational ecological version of non-philosophy, centered on “the non-political individual who lives in a non-political state of nature before the civil state” (243), seen to be always already there, coexisting with the subject of the social contract and the state—to the more strident claims of Lesueur for ‘real democracy’, meaning direct, non-representational, implying militancy to bring that to pass...(242)








“DLI (Determination-in-the-last-instance) refuses the...division between cause and effect because such a division is unthinkable from the radical immanence of the One....  ‘Last-instance’ means that the One is the real unique cause, whatever the distance of the effect or the mediations that separate it from the One might be...—this is the radical perfomativity of immanence’”(44-45, citing FL, Dictionary of Non-Philosophy, Adkins trans., 2013)
 
--Smith, Anthony Paul (2016b). Laruelle: A Stranger Thought.  Malden MA and Cambridge UK: Polity.                                   
.                                                                                                                                                   
                                                 -----
“Immanence, such as it has been conceived by...the philosophies of Spinoza and M. Henry​[45]​, turns out to be incapable of giving to the determination-in-the-last-instance its true non-philosophical force....since it is always coupled with a transcendence....The One-everything (Spinoza) or life and auto-affection (M. Henry) remain captured in the philosophy/transcendence/immanence mix, consequently conserving the convertibility of the One and of Being and representation.” (128)​[46]​

 --Mollet, Eric (2003). Bourdieu et Laruelle: Sociologie réflexive et non-philosophie.  Paris: Pétra. [Bourdieu and Laruelle: Critical Sociology and Non-philosophy]                                                                             

      -----
“Determination-in-the-last-instance was invented by Marx-Engels for Historical Materialism, but they did not give us the adequate conception of it, capable of producing  all the simultaneously theoretical and critical effects possible for it.  It has been understood in far too empirical a way....It concerns a causality that we could say is unique but which calls on or assumes another, as if it were the only but nevertheless insufficient causality.”  (41-42)

--Laruelle, François (2015d). Introduction to Non-Marxism.  Tr. Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal.  

                                                  -----




“When the paltry thinker, but this threat also concerns the artist, comes to believe that their task is a metier, when they abandon themselves to the facility of being taken care of or not living their vocation as a risk, they alienate their critical spirit to an authority.  They are only spokesmen and women.  They submit the altruist care for democracy they should be supporting, to the egoist concerns of an elite.  We see in this fear of assuming their foreigness the principal cause for the incapacity of intellectuals to be capable of insecurity, and of their always more grotesque separation from reality, and of their aimless wanderings between  paradox and the commonplace. ” (116)






“Non-Philosophy=Non-Photography=Non-Newtonian Physics=Non-Mandelbrotian Fractal Geometry....Laruelle calls this ‘Idempotency’...in Non-Newtonian Physics it has the quantum mechanical phenomenon of ‘superposition’ (where all possible states of a physical system coexist, including mutually exclusive ones.). (152).... And in ‘non-cinema’ has the feature of ‘montage-thought’” (n.50, p. 167, referring to JM’s own Philosophy and the Moving Image, 2010.)​[47]​

-- Mullarkey, John (2012).  “The Non-Consistency of Non-Philosophical Practice”, 143-68.  In Laruelle and Non-Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press.                                                                                                        

                                          -----
“For any phenomenon, we should be able to propose a multiplicity of equivalent interpretations....an infinity of equivalent philosophical decisions for the same phenomenon to be interpreted.” (italics sic,167n.24, citing FL, Philosophie et non-philosophie (109).”





“...non-philosophy is also an ethics...: an ethics without philosophy, because non-philosophical; an ethics no longer articulated as a decision on the Real or on Man, who has only been articulated and philosophized infinitely for subsistence for thought, the world, culture, morals, society, education, civilization, in short for the other than Real or other than human....Non-philosophy is the non-thetic ethics of essence, real before all thought, given without any giving, of Man.  In this precise sense non-philosophy is an ethics without ethicity, without mélange of the worldly and the human, without ethi-city.  Rather than an ethics non-philosophy is the ‘non-ethics’ of the nothing but real man.” ​[48]​ (19)

-- Bufalo, Erik del (2003). Deleuze et Laruelle: de la schizo-analyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé.
      -----                                                                                                                                                  
“Legitimization becomes a problem when the problem of legitimation is no longer legitimate....A legitimation of ethics by a regressive return to something like a basis, an ontology, a theology, a Christian or transcendental humanism, a formal or material practical reason, the ‘rights of man’ etc.—all of that is excluded here....because all of these possibilities are entirely ‘dead’.  Not in the sense that they have disappeared from our present historical horizon (repetition compensating this loss is always possible), but on the contrary because they have fused with this horizon and are now part and parcel of our most  immediate conditions of existence.  There is no return of love, justice, reason, values, the person; they are rather too much there than not enough, and you really must be very ignorant of the meaning of ‘repetition,’​[49]​ to believe you’re really repeating—while all of that has long since already returned  and does not cease to return.  Returned and therefore over with, one could say over with forever, end of story.” (145-46)

“Ethics having only begun, in spite of its specificity, as a particular mode of metaphysics, its decline shadows that of ontology, its deployment ends in the form of the universal fusion of ethos and technologos, through the conformation of all the historical forms of ethics with the conditions of existence and thought massively ordered by technology...From that results a tragic outcome at once for man and ethics, engaged in a reciprocal, unhappy struggle for domination, but both ruled by the supreme violence of etho-techno-logique Difference​[50]​.... On the one hand ethics is condemned to lose slowly but surely its transcendence, to reinforce the coupling of man and rule to the point they become one.  On the other hand the Law, which was supposed to be liberating, is condemned to enchain man as an increasingly ‘subjugated’ subject, bringing him ever more servitude.  Man is forced to confound his essence with the effective conditions of his existence, in a web of rules and norms, each and every one of which has economic, political, ideological, sexual, linguistic, and ethical etc. implications....this modern individual, conditioned by these rules that are more and more immanent, whose existence is that of a mummy bound with wrappings as  by its protheses.” (148-50)

“The lack of a possibly radical ethics, and especially the extension, even the intensification of this lack, results in a universal experience (vécu) of the void—coextensive with the expansion [intensification] of technological potentialities..... A softening of the categorical imperative,​[51]​ becoming at once immanent and universal is an even more serious product of this same global phenomenon.  It fragments, is disseminated, losing transcendence and ‘rigor’, as well as formal purity, becoming plural in the emergence of a micro-ethics of daily life filling all space formerly left empty or excluded as ‘pathological’ (Kant​[52]​) by the rational modern ethics.  Profession, sexuality, information,, culture, health etc. are all imbued  with a more and more micrological ‘you must’, ‘you should’’, and of a ‘you can’, as well as a ‘you should have’, and a ‘I’ve the right to’—fragmentation and universal extension of responsibility, in the guise of a soft ‘responsibilization’ and ‘imputation’, extending into all compartments of existence.  This unending fragmentation of tasks, goals, responsibilities is the true message of the abstract and vulgar slogans of the day, like ‘no more sermons’ and ‘forbid forbidding’ etc....” (150)

“This man who must still decide, but who can no longer manage a decision that transcends radically his existence, one that is not only based on facts....feels daily the tightening of the tragic knot entwined by the lack of legitimation of all ethics and the excess of responsibility that weighs on the most spontaneous decisions.... This is the man ‘conforming’ not only to a state, a land, a culture, or even to himself, but to Conformity itself.  Incarnated and become flesh-of-his flesh this is the human type of conformity.” (153-54)

“Being moral is not only obeying a law, a principle, a general obligation, it is also and simultaneously to transcend/dominate, transcend and dominate oneself, become master of self and of nature (physis) in oneself.   Philosophical ethics (particularly those of Stoicism and Kantism) have accustomed us to this conception and this credo that this mastery and domination belongs to all ethics.  However it’s enough for example to compare the more phenomenological ethics (Max Scheler, Bergson), or even those of Jewish provenance (Levinas) to understand that what they convey thereby is a political will to domination, mixing genres and domains, confounding ethics and politics after having confounded ethics, science and technology in a certain ‘naturalism’.  What would be an ethics which would abandon all idea of transcendence [dépassement] and mastery, without arriving like Levinas at an ethics of ‘persecution’ or ‘the hostage’?​[53]​  Doubtless there can be no ethics without transcendence and universality (its minimal kernel) but all transcendence and universality does not necessarily comport the form it has in philosophy, where it is confounded with the will to domination (including the subjugation of the self or the I by the Other, etc.)” (174-75)

“The complexity and ambiguity of the Kantian vocabulary (combining Intention, Purpose, End, Ultimate and Highest​[54]​), manifests an intrication of metaphysics and moral philosophy (morale), and the impossibility of distinguishing between them, between a metaphysical end and a moral one that mutually overlap.  Different modalities—finality, duty, obligation, interest—comprise a system in a general style that is the core essence of ethics or reason as organon of the MM [Metaphysics of Morals].  When Kant isolates duty as the principal object of ethics, he is only highlighting this spirit of the command to obey or to interdict that is its practical outcome.” (177)

“If ethics is to be ‘based’ on something adequate to the essence of man, it must exclude any idea of a unitary and transcendent essence.  Man is possibly not an ego-subject structured by a supposed ‘human nature’, but, for example, an Ego and a ‘Stranger’, dual and non-unitary structure and which destroys at the root all that Philosophy maintains in its concepts of evil— naturalism, juridism [juridisme]​[55]​ and rationalism, historical positivism also, engraved into ethics.... A non-philosophical ethics, understood in this way, does not define man as a being subject to morality as a verb is to a predicate, nor even as being or horizon of morality....Philosophical morality is not very human, but made by and for the physis, the polis, the cosmos etc., and is only the process or procedure of the insertion of man into these frameworks and his subjugation to these Authorities.” (181-182)
-- Laruelle, François (2000). Ethique de l’étranger: du crime contre l’humanité.  Paris: Kimé. [Foreigner Ethics : Of Crimes Against Humanity]                                                                                              





“...assuming the existence of a body of truth as constituted around a primordial statement, itself the trace of a vanished event...an event is a perturbation of the world’s order (since it locally disrupts the logical organization—the transcendental—of this world), as the raising up of the inexistent attests.” (91)

-- Badiou, Alain (2009).  Second Manifesto for Philosophy.  Trans. Louise Burchill.  Polity: Cambridge UK,

For Badiou the event, like the development of a negative in a darkroom brings the inexistent into existence, as the revolution (and class struggle leading up to it) creates the proletariat (‘we were nothing, we shall be all’, in the words of the Internationale). 
                                                                                                         
                                        ------              
 “From the philosophy-Event to the non-philosophical Advent [heading]
Can we identify, according to the general non-philosophical conditions of the One or the Real, a structure of thought incorporating the donation of the philosophy-Event as object at once universal in form, and contingent and variable in content? In other words, the non-philosophical Event​[56]​ we seek under the name of the Advent should, in conforming to this structure, distinguish itself from its object whilst relating to it in the manner of cognition, but also relate to it transcendentally in the manner of a philosophy.” (184)

 “The Advent, we now know, does not lie at the world’s horizon and is not the other side of that horizon (Heidegger). But neither can it be said to constitute an infinite of reverse verticality, of reverse transcendence which would pierce or puncture the horizon (Levinas). The Advent comes neither from afar nor from on high. It emerges as a radical solitude that it is impossible to manipulate, to dominate, to reduce, like the solitude of great works of art...” (186)

“The Advent is not more absolute than the philosophy-Event, which is already absolute, but it is radical. It is not more ‘originary’ in some vague manner, it is archi-originary or radically first, that is, unioriginary, or determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real-One. It is rid in its essence of every primary, ontic or ontological, historic or historical content, which remains merely of the order of the variable.... Consequently, it is not an ‘event of thought’ but the Advent of thought [la pensée] in its identity, that is to say, of the ‘force (of) thought’...” (187)

“The Advent is the manner in which the philosophy-Event presents itself when it is determined-in-the-last-instance by the solitude of the One. If the event constitutes a flight beyond the World, or a line of flight at best, the Advent is a way of making the World and its philosophical form come forth [advenir] to the One or the Real. There where the Real is, the World in its form as philosophy must come to be [advenir] according to the modality of the Advent.” (188)

“The Advent is radically alien to the World on account of its cause which is only of-the-last-instance; and relatively alien to the World on account of the material which it draws from the latter. It is bound by the World; but only in the sense of drawing its materials and its occasions from it, rather than in the sense of requiring a foothold within it. At the same time it comes from elsewhere,​[57]​ rather than from the World.” (188)

“[This] is a theory without a primacy of the theoretical. It is, on the contrary, anti-idealist and anti-theoreticist because it is subordinated to the primacy of the Real which, in this context, has never been of the order of cognition or even of thought, of consciousness, etc....This type of Real excludes realism. In virtue of its nature as a radical identity, it is more of the order of a kind of performative, or more exactly, a Performed-without-Performance. Non-philosophy is a theory, but one which is practical-in-the-last-instance or determined by such a practice.” (188-89)






“Philosophy has its concepts of evil—radical evil, the war of all against all, universal capitalist exploitation, wickedness (non-diabolical), fallibility and impurity, etc.​[58]​—but also its congenital idealism, the priority it accords to thought, or to Reason as the will to happiness, or to Law, as consent, affirmation etc. renders it incapable of conceiving of human history from the perspective of evil and destines it to transcendental illusions of hedonism and optimism, and the stupefactions of rational ‘beatitude’, consuming itself in a final ‘pan-happiness’ and its technological prostheses.  The true misfortune of philosophy, ethical failure and more-than-ethical, lies in its incapacity to respect evil or its identity.  It represses it through rational fetiches, even the ‘radical evil’ of Kant still plays partially this role, not to mention the transcendental malum, the dialectics (Hegelian dialectic of the unhappy consciousness)​[59]​ or psycho-hermeneutic variations internal  to ‘resentment’​[60]​, and ‘bad consciousness’ [mauvaise conscience​[61]​] which are only the ultimate philosophical rationalizations and in the end optimistic ones of human misery....These integrate evil into the system of philosophy instead of thinking of philosophy and ethics from the perspective of radical evil....the property of non-philosophy in general and non-ethics in particular is not to reduce or level, but to acknowledge the reality of these phenomena, refusing to dilute evil in ethics and reciprocally.” (191-93)
                                         -----
“Even in the camps or whatever other killing grounds in the name of ethnic purification, evil in itself is indiscernable, it is already philosophized and philosophable, by the victims and the executioners, and inversely is already contaminated to the core by evil....The thesis that ethics is a figure of thought that belongs in the most intrinsic manner to evil is meaningful makes sense only from a non-philosophical point-of-view, philosophy and its ethics being satisfied with ‘opposing’ evil and with treating it like a foreigner or a simple object.” 132-33)

-- Laruelle, François (2000). Ethique de l’étranger: du crime contre l’humanité.  Paris: Kimé. [Foreigner Ethics : Of Crimes Against Humanity]  
-----





“Instead of limiting knowledge to make room for faith, as Kant did in his Critique of Pure Reason, Laruelle instead limits faith to make room for lived knowing.” 
(108)






[A goal of a] generalized fractality is a “new approach toward knowledge or thought, intended to liberate them from philosophical authority.” (46)

Suggested by, but distinct from Mandelbrot, whose fractality Laruelle sees as still under the domination of philosophy, this is “One of the other possible names...of non-philosophical representation.” (FL et Collaborateurs, Dictionnaire de la non-philosophie.  Kimé, 1998, 79).  ‘Generalized’ should be understood in the sense of ‘generic’, as for a product like a medicine that becomes more accessible for general use, after it has been released from the propriety and property of a brand name.  See FL, Introduction aux sciences génériques.  Petra: Paris, 2008.

I’ve wrestled a bit with this “Fractal”, which I find a hard notion (for me) to get a handle on, much less in the ‘generalized’ avatar of Laruelle.  What it amounts to (for me) so far is challenging the necessarily conclusive nature of rational,  quantitative knowledge; from an example, for instance, of only a segment of a circle the whole arc is conceivable, likewise from a little bit of conversation all you may need or want to know about your interlocutor.  That in fact, for instance, snap judgments, made on the basis impossible to justify rationally or objectively can be more helpful guides to behavior than long engagement with accepted epistemological procedures (like polls to find out what people think); ‘generalized fractality’ then meaning releasing it from subservience to and domination by specialized domains, whether scientific, mercantile, pedagogic, mathematical or even artistic, making it available as a resource, really more of an attitude making of life in our planned societies of surveillance and control more of an adventure, even an insurrectionary one...

“...generalized fractality...will complete the break contemplated in contemporary thought, not only with ‘metaphysics’, presence or representation, with ‘logocentrism’ and its modes​[62]​, but with philosophy itself.  The break will be with the logic of continuity, and the semi-singularities it allows.... This will be a true fractal opening, ‘beyond’ philosophical closure and teleology....” (169)

“Philosophical [as opposed to nonphilosophical] fractality...proceeds by redundancy...by tautology and accumulation of cultural and knowledge capital rather than by poverty, order and simplicity.” (219)

“Generalized [nonphilosophical] Fractality  is an irregularity or an interruption compared to an apparently more widespread philosophical logic, a ‘rapport’ of inadequacy to philosophical intelligibility and its processes of continuity.” (174)

“Fractality appears and surges always newly...’each time’ for the first and only time.... intrinsically unique and solitary...” (175-76)

“Generalized fractality, its type of pertinence, is consequential aesthetically: Its affinity with literature and poetry would be closer than with painting​[63]​; but really all the arts are equal for it, since all had to be mediated by philosophy (virtually be grist for philosophy [philosophable])” (231)

“Science—precisely by way of its fractal nature—frees thought from all ideal of specular resemblance—sometimes more or less deferred—from supposedly given objects and their horizons: World, History, Power, Philosophy.” (307).







“Let’s not say language always betrays the One....This sort of thinking postulates that language is a specular reflection of the one, that it even has the same structure as the One....[but, on the contrary] language can describe the one without having the same structure, without reflecting it exactly or reproducing it....​[64]​Unlike the postmodern idea of fragment that essentially implies the fragmentation of the whole of a certain existing philosophical universe (or cosmos), the non-philosophical concept of singularity lays the ground for a ‘debt-free’ (in relation to any previous doctrine), truly non-systemic system of thought.....the real and the one are synonyms variously naming the same instance, the same thing: the singularity of the theorized reality as well as the stance of theorizing..” (96)

-- Kolozova, Katerina (2014). Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy.  Foreword by François Laruelle.  New York: Columbia UP.                                                                         

------
“...starting with L’Entretien infini [1969], basically Blanchot proceeds with a deconstruction of  philosophy (or of metaphysics).  Deconstruction: this term designates two actions required not only by Derrida but also by Heidegger, Levinas and François Laruelle.
    The first action is narrowing philosophy, identifying it by its invariants, and opposing a radicality to it.  This opposition could be that between a being and being—or more exactly the confusion between being and beings and ontological difference (Heidegger), the Same and the Other (Levinas), presence and differance (Derrida), or even of the mix​[65]​ and the One-without-unity (Laruelle).  This opposition, at least in L’Entretien infini is that between the One of Unity and the neutral.
       The second action consists in promoting a new way of writing...a mode adequate to this radicality (being, the Other, differance or the One).  This action is...very clear in Derrida and Laruelle, who themat-icize and deploy in effect a non-philosophical practice of philosophical language....With Blanchot, it’s the invention and deployment of fragmentary writing​[66]​ that arises from this second deconstructive action.  In effect, Blanchot writing in the form of fragments is a clear consequence of his rupture with unity as the constitutive essence of philosophy.  A rapprochement is possible  also between this fragmentary writing and the writings of Derrida, Levinas and Laruelle, remarking how the Blanchotian fragments work, in order to shed philosophical language, and the couples of contraries that constitute it: like differance, the face of the Other or the One, the neutral is described as being neither present, nor absent; neither visible, nor invisible, etc.” 






“Generic postures are not for us the four ‘procedures of Truth’ (Badiou),​[67]​ too branded from our point-of-view with a particular philosophical decision, a Platonizing one.  The generic, if it is not disengaged in its universality as an apriori, risks being thrown back on the specific, on a positive mathematical  and set theory determination....This equally for all the generic procedures  of truth: art reduced to the poem, politics to intervention, science to mathematics and the latter to set theory.  At once and on the side of the Real, the consequence of badly distinguishing the generic from the specific would be that Being as universal would be considered the true Real, in other words a fall back into Platonism.” (107)
-- Laruelle, François (2008a). Introduction aux sciences génériques.  Petra: Paris
-----
“The new slogan for generic being is ‘We have no demands’ or ‘Withdraw, and leave being behind,’  The mission is no longer to identify and legitimate new subject positions, as in the socially visible monikers of woman, proletarian, queer, and so on, but to slough off the very apparatus of subject formation that obliges a subject to assume such a position.” (42)

“Generic being refrains from forming relations both with itself (the transcendental) and with outside objects or the outside world (‘prehensions’ in Whitehead’s lexicon).”  (42)

“Indifference is incompatible with ‘the philosophies of difference’....These philosophies have always been driven by a therapeutic aim....They inaugurate the great therapeutic crusades: Marxism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, or identity politics.....The vital question today is not to rehabilitate being, and certainly not to protect and promote new ‘health mandates’ or ‘medical inerventions,’ but rather to demilitarize this life, to stand down, to de-organize and unmanage it into a condition of indifference rooted in indecision.” (85)

-- Galloway, Alexander (2014). Laruelle Against the Digital.  Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press .  

                                       ------
“Laruelle moves forward with his thinking of the undocumented as a name for generic humanity.  Not a subtraction, but a generalization or broadening of human identity outside the coordinates of recognition by the world or State.” (108)

“Laruelle valorizes and names the blackness of the universe because it is more generic than light, it is less than light—as a visual metaphor within philosophy, which has social consequences, it is valued less than light and thus it is named and celebrated by non-philosophy.  From the universe to the breaks in the social world, it is blackness that names the radically lived and unrepresentable.” (130)







“For the quantum gnostics, there has never been a creation of the world or in the world—it is the world—it is the world that is ‘wicked’ or ‘evil,’ and consequently also the God who claimed to have created it...” (210)
--Laruelle, François (2015a). Christo-Fiction: the Ruins of Athens and Jerusalem.. Tr. Robin Mackay.  New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 
-----                                                                                            
“...the historico-critical approach that attributes to each culture its gnosis, leads to drowning gnosis in culturalism instead of elucidating it as cultural rebellion (understood as incessant struggle against all culture). (59)

“...against the agnosticism of ‘two fusing into one’...gnosis supports the materialist power of the Two, of the incessantly re-launched division of One into Two, which, endlessly leads the form of the Real back to its crucified matter.” (my bold, 95)
                                                
       -- Grelet, Gilles (2002). Déclarer la Gnose: d’une guerre qui revient à la culture [Declaring Gnosis: a War of Culture]. Paris: Harmattan,                                                            


This is harkening back to a bedrock of Western philosophy, the concept of Being as One of Parmenides, from which the Two (or more) descend—since different entities manifestly are—then arise, then thought to fuse back into the One.  The particular point focused on in the process, whether the Two fusing into One, or the One dividing into Two, is immensely consequential; the former betokening Hegelian harmony, or synthesis of opposing thesis and antithesis; the latter endless struggle, Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, another avatar of which would be class war and ‘permanent revolution’, Grelet here certainly espousing the insurrectionary Way of the One dividing into Two.  Alexander Galloway, in Laruelle Against the Digital (Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press, 2014). xxxixff., provides a vivid, philosophically and politically informed exposition of these issues.

------
 “Gnostic knowledge is spontaneous ‘revolutionary’ and doesn’t need to twist on itself like philosophical knowledge, always a little Mobian.​[68]​  The immediate fusion by  superposition of knowledge and ‘simples’,​[69]​ the subtleties of theory and of the lived, we well know is the clear enemy of States and Churches, but also of philosophical Systems and disciplinary Domains, of their experts whose greatest fear is this power grab, as they think of them, by the ignorant.  They never leave off surveillance of this knowledge become generic, mediating it through institutions, thrones and dominations, so as to reestablish the principle of the continuity of power and its exercise.  For ages this fusion has had its martyrs, its persecuted and excluded, among others, mystics by reason of their ‘experimental science’ of God, gnostics for their discovery of a science of salvation, heretics of all sorts that skip steps...” (151)

 “If we need to justify our endeavor, we’ll prefer saying it’s a matter of knowing generically, in view of our human undergoing, the gnosis constituted by basic knowledge that we are without knowing it; for this, philosophy alone is insufficient and even opposes.  Another knowledge, at once scientific and philosophical in type is necessary, without reflection, but by superposition of quantum with philosophy.” (493)

“Gnosis is another rapport with disciplinary knowledge and non-philosophy, which uses them as means without appropriating them.  It’s a subtler relation than its Platonic and religious version of a ‘knowledge that saves’.  We are this knowledge without having it, or which we have without knowing.” (500)










“Empty yourself for God was the ancient way.  Empty yourself of God himself—and  thinking in terms of-the-Emptied we are is our new practice.” (42)

“The heretical principle, which we derive from religious gnosis, one of its models, the being-separated of Man and his primacy over God.” (85)

“Radical identity is heresy because indefinable, unrepresentable, un-demonstratable, not only in philosophy and theology, whether affirmative or negative, but intrinsically and therefore only half presentable.  This is not a simple deviation of dogma or the attempt to found a new Church....However since the being-separated of Man is indefinable in the terms of the ancient mysticism, it is capable of creating a new theoretical usage, which also, in identity in-the-last-instance, a [new] human practice.... (89)  Rather than a new categorical and onto-theological meaning, a practice lived as identity in-the-last-instance?  The condition for not simply ‘believing’ or not in God—the true problem...is rather to avoid this alternative--, it’s to substitute for its mystical-philosophical usage a simple theoretico-fictional one.  We use God without believing or not believing....We ‘speak’ God.” (96)







“The radical disabling of any validity of the ’universe of thought’ with respect to the ‘universe of the real’ speaks of our irreparable helplessness in face of the absolute power of the real.” (112)

-- Kolozova, Katerina (2014). Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy.  Foreword by François Laruelle.  New York: Columbia UP. 
-----
“In suffering there is announced, as being identical to its essence, the helplessness of feeling...[which] has nothing to do with what we ordinarily understand by a ‘feeling of helplessness’....That the course of events come to change, subordinate themselves to the desire of the subject or to his projects rather than force him, this is where a new tonality, a feeling of power or of joy, occurs.  The possibility of its transformation into the contrary modality is inscribed in the feeling of helplessness...the prisoner can always dream of his escape.” (473)

                                    --Henry, Michel (1973).  The Essence of Manifestation.  Trans. Girard Etzkorn.  The Hague: Nijhoff.  Orig. pub, 1963: L’essence de la manifestation.  Paris: PUF.                 
                                                                        





“The philosophical source of generics is Feuerbach’s ‘generic man’ which breaks with the ‘philosophy’ whose proper name is Hegel, symbol of the idealist absolute system..... The generic also introduces a revolt—albeit of a religious essence—against the philosophy of the system and does not simply prepare the passage to Marx. Perhaps we forget too often that these ‘religious thinkers’, now effaced in the continuum of the ‘history of philosophy’, were accompanied by a tradition of revolt crushing the tradition of the philosophers of systematic Reason. As minoritarian or minor thinkers, they have opened a wound in the flank of ‘grand rationalism’ that refuses to heal (Michel Henry, cf. his Marx).”​[71]​ (39-40)

In his Marx (Gallimard, 1976), Henry’s take on Marx is humanist, emphasizing the focus on the individual—of the early writings, and  going against the dominant structuralist anti-humanist current of the time, that of Althusser​[72]​, who discounted the ‘subjectivity’ of those (unpublished until the 1930’s) early works, coming before the break or breakthrough into the objectivity and science of the later ones, starting especially with Capital.  

-- Laruelle, François (2015d). Introduction to Non-Marxism.  Tr. Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal.  

                                             -----
“The study of philosophizing and its limits leads us, to approach the One (but in reality the One cannot be approached, nor even be considered as distanced!), to survey a philosophical perspective privileging heterogeneity or radicality of the rapports, or even the specific and singular immanence of man over the transcendence of the world.  This current, which seems to traverse the history of philosophy—even in a ‘minoritary’ as Laruelle calls it--, assembles the thinkers of human heterogeneity, we could say, according to whom man does not designate in himself the condition, principle or fundament of the world, bringing it meaning, value, truth—but instead a strictly specific moment that in a way has nothing to do with the world or which would be nothing-but-human.  Seemingly in this philosophical current are thinkers like Maine de Biran, Marx, Sartre, and, especially, in contemporary philosophy, M. Henry, with his thought of Life.  All have found in man a qualitatively specific experience or trial, stripped of worldliness or transcendence.  Particularly the man or Life of Henry is established in an immanent test, in-visible and in-ecstatic, radically deprived of all ecstasy, distance or transcendence....” (26)

-- Choplin, Hughes (2000). La non-philosophie de François Laruelle.  Paris: Kimé.     

 -------
“ ‘Non-philosophy’ designates a rigorous discipline....risen on the terrain of radical immanence discovered by Michel Henry,  from which it also is distinguished, non-philosophy’s object being a theory of and for philosophy—deploying philosophically inconceivable new categories and a hitherto unknown method.” (14)

Non-philosophy’s critique of the philosophies of immanence of Deleuze, Spinoza and Henry is that they remain, in effect, transcendent; non-philosophy’s immanence being one without transcendence. (283-84)

-- Mollet, Eric (2003). Bourdieu et Laruelle: Sociologie réflexive et non-philosophie.  Paris: Pétra. [Bourdieu and Laruelle: Critical Sociology and Non-philosophy]   
 -----
“That Man-in-person can no longer be an immanent auto-affection (Henry), an ipseity or transcendental ego or ecstatic auto-affection that is the condition under which he summons the world ‘in-person’ rather than its philosophical images and particularly its image degraded or scorned by the transcendental Ego as auto-affection (Henry).  Hereby we call Man-in-person radical immanence insofar as it is without ipseity or transcendental ego, and auto-affection, but animated by a virtual messianic flux; this is certainly a lived without life, an Erlebnis [experience] without Erleben [experiencing], without noetic, pathetic, intellectual or affective content—so as to not revert surreptitiously to an absolute grounds for the world, under the pretext of radicality, to a secular substitute for creation.​[73]​” (476) 

-- Laruelle, François (2008b). “Pour une science non-politique du pouvoir”, Revue de Métaphysique et de la Morale, #8, 2008: 473-87. [“Towards a Non-political Science of Power”]                                            
 
                                                        ------
“Laruelle’s own work owes much to the way in which Henry unpacks the standard interplay of transcendence (the essence of phenomenological distance, according to Henry and Laruelle) and immanence in The Essence of Manifestation​[74]​ .  This interplay...inscribes within itself an impossibility of ever thinking immanence since it can only be thought in relation to transcendence....what Henry then aims to do is think immanence, without relation to transcendence at all, a process he comes to name auto-affection....This conception of immanence is ultimately a conception of immediacy in a technical sense: ‘Where there is no transcendence, there is neither horizon nor world.’ (The Essence of Manifestation , p. 281).  In other words, Henry’s sense of immanence is radically non-worldly, and this is taken up by Laruelle as a new conception of essence or identity.  The immanence or immediacy of a thing is its uni-lateral determination or constitution, meaning that it does not dissolve itself and is not dissolved by something else into the World of mediation.” (ibid, 273-5)
       Laruelle’s conception of immanence as ‘radical’ retains from Deleuze’s Spinozoist One-All a sense that this immanence is real, i.e. is not simply a concept or a construction of philosophy, but also retains from Henry’s philosophy the idea that immanence is manifest as entities without any distance between those entities and some horizon of an ‘All’.​[75]​  Immanence is not a thing which another thing, like a person, relates to; rather, radical immanence refers to the very manifestation of that person without any difference existing between that manifestation and the person.  This is what is meant by the idea of the ‘Given-without-givenness’.” (24-5)


“The force-(of)-thought may appear to a reader familiar with Henry to mimic auto-affection, since both appear to be a kind of action that issues from something with a special relationship to the term radical immanence (the One, the Ego, life, etc.).....However, there is a major difference between force-(of)-thought and auto-affection summarized by Laruelle as follows: ‘Auto-affection is in one case assumed to be already the very content of the Ego, which is thereby reduced, while in the other the force-(of)-thought infers itself from the Ego which determines it.’​[76]​  Laruelle rejects the over-determining nature of the focus on immediacy in Henry’s epistemology (as well as rejecting his anti-science extremist stance).   The unified theory of philosophy and science as a non-philosophical epistemology proposed by Laruelle is not a philosophy of immediacy; his recognition of something like the Ego underlying knowledge in phenomenology is a recognition of a philosophical projection of the One that leads to a confusion, either through immediacy or a reductive mediation, of the One with philosophy’s im/mediations.  So against the kind of nostalgic protection of a hallucinated and idealist essence of the human as auto-affective life, Laruelle instead posits a radical immanence of the Ego as modality of the One or the Real which is foreclosed to thought.” (60-61).







“Laruelle expressly links his heretical understanding of the Christian subject, as one modeled according to the figure of Christ, with the Marxian idea of struggle: in his attempt to explain the ‘immanence of struggle without goal’ (Laruelle, Future Christ, 2010, p.2), he declares he will rely on Christianity, Gnosis and Marxism.” (ibid, 2,5,9)
-- Kolozova, Katerina (2012).  “Theories of the Immanent Rebellion: Non-Marxism and Non-Christianity”, 209-26.  In Laruelle and Non-Philosophy.  Ed. John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul Smith.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press..                                                                                                         

 -----
“Another type of decision is necessary ‘in the face of’ the World-thought, a decision unknown by the philosophical discourse of the Ancients, as well as the Moderns and Postmoderns, and which, without being of a religious or scientific nature....we have called by its Greek name, ‘heresy’”. (12)

“Heresy being neither especially Greek nor Jewish, it is not about the thought or the discourse of the Other.” (15)

“It only of the heretic, the Stranger, in the radical sense we understand it, of whom we can say that he does not have to ‘leave’ philosophy, being he never ‘entered’ it, feet and hands tied.” (16)

“Heresy is profoundly the most dangerous enemy of churches; they limit, keep under surveillance and control sects, but they burn heretics, they burn them flesh and bone, even further, they burn them as flesh and bone.” (18)

“In the fields of knowledge, non-philosophy is an activator of rebellion, not of revolution: prompting revolt and separation, not resistance...In effect heresy is closer to a posture of radical fiction, non-fictive fiction, of imagination delivered from images, discovery and invention of thought for thought’s sake.” (20)

-- Laruelle, François (1998). “De la non-philosophie comme hérésie”: 7-24. [“Non-philosophy as Heresy”].  In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion (1998). Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]       
 
For FL, revolution is a pejorative, reinstalling a waning or challenged Authority, whose name may have changed, but not its nature; so is resistance, which insofar at is resists legitimizes the Authority it ‘opposes’.

------
“Generally, my approach is not at all ‘revolution’, the ‘revolutionary style’, since ‘the revolution’ is a philosophical object, it’s a return, sometimes a displacement.  I prefer Heresy.  Heresy is a radical break, but insofar as coming from multiple individuals. There are multiple individuals on one side, ‘Churches’ and ‘States’ on the other;
and even this formula is insufficient, too little heretic and too much philosophical.  The multiple individuals are not on one side and the World on the other: there is only one side, that’s the World.  This is precisely another, subtler meaning of the term ‘unilaterality’; there is only one side.  Philosophy thinks always with two sides, I’ve tried to simplify thinking in thinking with only one side.
     My project is not to introduce the ‘heretical’ experience into philosophy, but to introduce philosophy to the heretical experience.  From that the interest I don’t hide at all I have for gnostics, dualists, millenarians, ‘fanatics’, that is to say all these individuals who protest fundamentally from their individuality against philosophy rather than against its margins​[77]​.” (225)

-- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One]                                                           
 
------
“All philosophy and theology think in a manner that is nothing more than capital-thought.  This is why we call ‘World’ such a globalizing style of thinking and ‘Hell’ its power of alienation....Mystics... alone has some chance of disalienation from this fascination.  Why would it desire the God-world and servitude under God...?  Wouldn’t God in his turn, want a desiring and mystic God, one not subjugated to Man...?” (my bold, 56)

‘Mystics’ in the singular, because referring to an attitude toward an immanent Real Laruelle attributes to the great mystics (Boehme, Eckhart, Saint Teresa), rather than any ‘other worlds’, past, future, or present, or levels of reality they ostensibly believed in.  Michel de Certeau, the Jesuit philosopher, probably had as much to do as anyone with creating, developing and pursuing this ‘field of study’, Mystics...

“We substitute for the philosophical struggle against representation and the dialectical one against positivity, with which mystics is often confounded, the heretical struggle against the World...” (87)

“Radical identity is heresy because indefinable, unrepresentable, un-demonstratable, not only in philosophy and theology, whether affirmative or negative, but intrinsically and therefore only half presentable.  This is not a simple deviation of dogma or the attempt to found a new Church....However since the being-separated of Man is indefinable in the terms of the ancient mysticism, it is capable of creating a new theoretical usage, which also, in identity in-the-last-instance, is a [new] human practice.” (89) 
    -- Laruelle, François (2007b). Mystique non-philosophique à l’usage des contemporains.  L’Harmattan. [Non-philosophical Mystics for Contemporaries]                                                                         

             -----
“Heresy that is immanent to non-philosophy originates not only from the non-orthodox stance vis-à-vis philosophy and the practice of philosophizing, but also from the epistemic and political radicalism characteristic of Christian heretic mysticism.  For example, Laruelle’s human-in-human suspending philosophical decision resembles Marguerite Porete’s ‘soul which annihilates will’ to find herself in the ‘abyss of her humility’​[78]​ (the human-in-human in his or her radical vulnerability).” (106)





“Science unseats philosophy from its position of surveillance, mastery or of coextension, which had been also anticipated by theory.... theoretical knowledge is absolute immanence....and this immanence...obstructs any hubris of anticipation or nostalgia of retention.” (190)
                                              
                                                -- Laruelle, François (1992). Théorie des identités.  Paris: PUF.

-----
“The spirit of non-philosophy....is the spirit of radical immanence....Man is this being from Nowhere that haunts the World rather than the World haunting him.” (145)

-- Laruelle, François (2012g).  Struggle and Utopia at the End Times.  Tr. Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal. Orig. pub. Kimé, 2004: La Lutte et l’Utopie à la fin des temps philosophiques.                                                                                                                              -----
“Suffering forces the thinker outside of himself and to think....Since suffering means the vacillation of all certitude, the powerlessness of thought, the negation of thought, it involves grappling with an event and an experience that allows ending with a will, whereby man confounds himself with the event.  This is immanence.” (132)

-- Nadot, Laurent (1998). “Du rire aux larmes”, 113-36. [“Laughing till You Cry”]. In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]
------
Pain as structurally immanent: “ ‘If the pain were really in the place of the organic body where it is situated, we could withdraw from it as the sea withdraws from the beach, we could leave it there in front of us, innocuous and taken note of by us as by a foreign spectator....: the pain would be transcendent.’ ” [citing Henry, Essence of Manifestation, p. 621]....here is the rub: contrary to Henry’s depiction of the impossibility of transcendent pain, people can in fact withdraw from their own pain (this is empirically exhibited through meditative practice, for instance).” (80-81)

  -- Mullarkey, John (2006). Post Continental Philosophy, an Outline.  N.Y.: Continuum.
      -----

“The immanence before-the-first​[79]​ has suspended as far as it’s concerned the action of transcendence and can therefore act on the latter and can be acted on, not meaning that it acts as God or a model-Idea, but only in the sense that it is a non-acting that is not ruled as by an external shock.  The science-subject doesn’t react to the action of the world, but however finds the means of acting.” (338)

-- Laruelle, François (2010a). Philosophie non-standard: Générique, Quantique, Philo-fiction.
-----
“For Deleuze, the principle of immanence is coterminous with Artaudian cruelty, which involves...a cruel—in the sense of rigorous or disciplined—attitude towards the self.  Deleuze opposes this cruelty to the ‘supplice infini’ (infinite torture) of the doctrine of judgement....Artaud combats the Oedipal form of judgement (the judgement of  Freud or God) by engaging in a process of ‘abreaction’ [acting out] in which he precipitates the judgement and brings it down on himself in order to have done with it...Augusto Boal [Brazilian radical theatre figure]’s theatrical exploration of the ‘cop in the head’ syndrome in his forum theatre experiments would be a contemporary example of a response along these lines.” (47; last sentence, note, p. 53)
  
--- Scheer, Edward (2009). “I Artaud, BwO: the Uses of Artaud’s To Have Done With the Judgement of God.” Deleuze and Performance (2009).  Ed. Laura Cull.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press
      -----
“the essence of immanence is not separated from its content.” (232)

“...why cannot the table, as Heidegger says, ‘touch the wall’?  Because neither is capable of ‘surpassing itself toward’ that with which it would be able thus to maintain a ‘relationship.’....What is this ‘relating oneself to’, in what does the possibility of transcendence itself consist?....The original auto-revelation which determines in  its intrinsic possibility the movement of ‘bearing oneself close to’, namely the ultimate possibility of transcendence which constitutes it in its essence as the act of ‘relating itself to’, is immanence....The table does not touch the wall.  But what about man?  We still know nothing, it is true, about what he is: May he not be precisely that being capable of surpassing himself and of thus finding himself outside, in the light, ‘man among men, then among things’.  This possibility for man’s surpassing himself and of thus rediscovering himself outside himself in the milieu of the world is certainly remarkable and worthy of note.” (254-56)​[80]​

“The immanence of the essence to the effective content of experience and, for example, the immanence of real knowledge to natural knowledge, attests to the impossibility for thought totally forgetting what is hidden under such a relationship, namely the immanent revelation wherein the essence originally gives itself to itself in the action whereby it renders itself present, whereby it renders itself capable of acting.” (274)

“...the essential contribution of the thought of Eckhart...is the fundamental ontological presupposition according to which the internal structure of immanence is that of revelation.” (326)

“ ‘There is no sphere of immanence, no realm in which my consciousness is fully at home...no interiority of consciousness’, and this because consciousness, in the process of seeing, for example, “is not in possession of itself but rather escapes from itself into the thing seen.’  Such is the universal structure of existence as understood by thought in such a way that even the body, against the background in it of this structure, ‘never quite falls back into itself’, that ‘Bodily existence is never self-sufficient.’” (387)​[81]​

“Speaking of the sensible things which surround me, this paper under my hand these trees beneath my gaze, Merleau-Ponty further says that ‘my consciousness takes flight from itself and in them is unaware of itself’.  The definition of existence as escape from self implies what it denies, immanence is its conscious presupposition.” (391, citing ibid)
--Henry, Michel (1973).  The Essence of Manifestation.  Trans. Girard Etzkorn.  The Hague: Nijhoff.  Orig. pub, 1963: L’essence de la manifestation.  Paris: PUF. 
---

“The generic orientation, human but not humanist or philosophical, is centered on the notions of ‘Man-in-person’ and ‘Victim-in-person’, notions meant to avoid the classic definitions of man such as ‘rational animal’,  ‘political animal’, ‘metaphysical animal’.  It is a reduction to a phenomenal immanence...subject to a quantum principle of superposition....As for the quantum-oriented procedure for the treatment of humans, it calls on a matrix of organization through a superposition of opposing givens, dialectical or not, treated as variable, and in the end, as vectors....Opposites (being and appearing, Being and being, nature and culture, etc.) have not vanished completely; they and their (macroscopic) relations reappear in the flowing course of superpositions....It is obvious that the superposition of being and appearing, or even... of criminal and victim, or persecutor and persecuted, strictly speaking has no empirical sense ” (xiv-xvii)

--Laruelle, François (2015c). General Theory of Victims.  Tr. Jessie Hook & Alex Dubilet.  Polity, 2015 (Théorie générale des victimes. Fayard 2012).
---
“The province of non-philosophy or of non-standard philosophy is the One....but this is not the metaphysical One or the duplicity of the One-of-the-One but as radical immanence of the One-in-One designating nothing other that quantum superposition or Reason-in-person.” (79)
       --Laruelle, François (2015b). En dernière humanité: la nouvelle science écologique.  Les éditions du cerf.. [In Last Humanity : the New Ecological Science]   
                                             ---
“Laruelle proposes l’Un (‘the One’) as one among a series of names for the non-conceptual immanence which simultaneously determines and suspends philosophy.” (119)
-- Brassier, Ray (2007). Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction.  Palgrave Macmillan.







       “The Real is in-different (and so One or identical) to all decisions....this is Laruelle’s hypothesis or axiom.  This axiom itself, of course, can be taken as simply one other decision—such is the philosopher’s prerogative and even essential trait.... (8)  This ‘axiom’ is necessary, he says in order to avoid the usual circular arguments of philosophers: their resultant representations (captures) of reality being always premised in a question begging fashion on their chosen method of thought (whatever it may be)....this axiom also implicates Laruelle’s own thought...such that any transcendental insights it gains are only  momentary....Hence the form of non-philosophy must always mutate—it can never stand still, it is open-ended....non-philosophy is an action, a doing and a showing, rather than a saying or a representing.  One might say it is a philosophy of the look rather than the book (hence, its rejection of Greco/Judaic claims on the exclusive power of thought).” (9)

  -- Mullarkey, John and Anthony Paul Smith, editors (2012). “Introduction.” Laruelle and Non-Philosophy.Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press..                                                                                                         
 -----
“The power (potentia) of the last instance is a non-acting and therefore an abasement of power.” (65)
     -- Laruelle, François (2015b). En dernière humanité: la nouvelle science écologique.  Les éditions du cerf.. [In Last Humanity : the New Ecological Science]                                                            
    -----
“The only response is to no longer respond, no longer upset the hierarchies, invert the order, no longer fall back into line through the excuse of ‘Difference’, or into Unity by the ‘door of the Other’.” (116)

“The subject’s precession on his/her works is irreversible.  The latter do not prolong him, he is not alienated therein.  That is to say that in reality he is not his own work, neither does he have works in the World.  Her/his only work is ‘non-action’ [non-agir]...” (167)
   --Laruelle, François (1985).  Une biographie de l’homme ordinaire: des Autorités et des Minorités.  Aubier. [A Biography of the Ordinary Man: Authority and Minority]                                                  
                -----
“...offering no reactive opposition of mastery but one that is purely passive.” (211)

--Grelet, Gilles (1998). “Un bréviaire de non-religion”, 182-216. [Brevary of Non-religion]. In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion
-----
“...the (dis)engagement in the world that non-philosophy seems to profess may be interpreted as political defeatism, as affirmation of human’s radical impotence in reshaping the world.  However, such an interpretation is in direct opposition with Laruelle’s idea about immanent revolt nesting in the real of every human-in-person, stemming from is radical vulnerability always already interpellated to revolt.” (141-42)​[82]​
-- Kolozova, Katerina (2014). Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy.  Foreword by François Laruelle.  New York: Columbia UP.                                                                         
       -----
“Let’s suppose a difference absolutely indifferent to Being, indifferent even to the indifference par excellence that is Being.” (93)

“The individual, understood as such, of course, is indifferent to the environment.  Since by definition he exists in his essence without need of great attributes like sex, language...[sic]he will necessarily push away [écarter] the world.  Because of his very existence he keeps his distance from the world in an irreversible or ‘unilateral’ manner.  This separation from everything I call the (non-) One—the parenthesis to suggest it’s no longer the nothingness philosophers  ponder with and from Being, but a softer nothingness, the abyss indifference is capable of by dint of the absolute sufficiency of the individual.” (219)

--Laruelle, François (1981). Le principe de minorité.  Paris: Aubier. [The Minority Principle 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                              
                                                           
    Individual 

“...I tried to suggest​[83]​ that anthropology is a falsifying and coopted image of man, a kind of detachment of philosophy in respect to the individual in an attempt to reinsert him into the great universals: State, Society....The general thesis I maintain here is that there is a specific and positive essence to man as an individual.  This is a thesis that philosophy denies, since it can only think of the individual as mixed with other things, with History as a historical being; with the World as a worldly empirical one, of language...[sic]....I had to invent a vocabulary to articulate this thought of the individual.  The first term was ‘individual’ and not ‘individuel’.  The term ‘individual’, which does not exist in French except in the form of ‘individuality’, indicates that the individual [individu], without constituting himself—would be still a philosophical thesis.... The second term I had to introduce was ‘minoritary’​[84]​ [minoritaire].  I needed to re-forge this concept against recent usage that is still, as was traditional, in correlation or rather in opposition to a majority.  I understand ‘minoritary’ otherwise in an entirely positive way, in the very possibility that the individual exists as an individual....The third and most curious term is ‘state-minoritary’ [étatico-minoritaire].  I needed to distinguish minorities from state minorities. By ‘state-minoritary’ I mean the concept, at once philosophical and contemporary of minorities...which you find for example in Deleuze.  I wanted to indicate thereby that minorities as philosophy could in the best of cases conceive them, were not as radical as they should have been, but form ‘mixtures’ [mixtes] with the State and would not only diverge, but also in the long run—fuse, converge with the State or with Society....My final term the ‘Authorities’ is an old concept out of the political and moral tradition that has been forgotten by philosophy; I took it up to designate the universal structures in which philosophy has always situated man.” (210-12)

“...to think with rigor there needs to be some kind of radical suspension of the World....From the depths of his solitude, since what grounds the individual is his solitude and finally his indifference to the World, the individual entertains only rapports of indifference, that is to say the absence of rapports to the World that solicits him....It’s on the basis of this indifference and as if inside what I called the (non-) One  that the individual acts on the World....resentment of the individual is the primary characteristic of the World and philosophy.” (220-21)






“It’s first of all as interpreter that we can relate to texts, then to create metaphors out of them.  It’s thereby that we approach the non-poetic pole of the third kind.​[85]​  The text of François Laruelle is here considered as un-interpretable.” (147)

“We should think of naturalization as the exhaustion of any possibility of any back worlds​[86]​ for language.  Language conveys no longer any meaning of a psychological or material order, it no longer is a means to target a reality, nor the reality, nor the reality of the means;  it possesses no world of psychological, physical or tool using content.  In other words we need to abandon any meaning or psychological back world of language and any sensation of it, that is to say any reference to an empirical reality, inadequate for the language of theatricality​[87]​ of our non-poetics....By reason of the exhaustion of sense, language becomes inadequate to its reality postulated in its naturalization.​[88]​  How is this inadequacy conveyed?  It presents itself as the impossibility to clarify exactly what one is talking about; consequently the impossibility to evaluate the truth of what you’re saying.​[89]​” (152-53)

-- Bertocchi, Alessandro (2006). Philosophie et non-philosophie du poétique.  Houdiard: Paris,.
-----

“Without radically ignoring the world, without inversely relating to it directly—and philosophically, the non-philosopher considers it from a distance, farther off than the philosopher or rather from a logic that distances philosophy (from an essential point-of-view), and consequently the world.” (80)

“...what is therefore the interest, the meaning, or even the goal of the non-philosophical enterprise?  You wouldn’t find answers on the side of the world or worldly problems.” (83)

“What non-philosophy produces in its own mode (...) has no meaning intelligible for philosophers, not because it’s meaningless or absurd, but because it falls definitively outside of the realm of meaning.”​[90]​ 

“Should we not consider  that it‘s only in deploying concretely unilateral​[91]​ thought on diverse materials that Laruelle tests this way of thinking, conferring it a consistency, a power and a dignity comparable to that of philosophy—and of such a nature as to assure it definitively the right to ‘make thought function otherwise than philosophically’?” (89)​[92]​






“THE FACELESSNESS OF THE ESSENCE [rubric].  To the extent that it does not manifest itself in the world, the pure milieu of visibility...the essence is invisible....That the foundation cannot be grasped and escapes all knowledge, that it envelops itself in the night and remains therein, that it is the Abyss, results from its essence.  The power of the night is the power of the essence, it is the invisible which it realizes and accomplishes because of what it is.
     That which the essence realizes, that which it accomplishes because of what is, is revelation, the original revelation of self where its reality resides.” (438)

“...the invisible is nothing which might be beyond the visible, it is nothing ‘transcendent’, it is the original essence of life such that, since it takes place in a sphere of radical immanence, it never arises in transcendence and, moreover, cannot show itself in it. (453)
--Henry, Michel (1973).  The Essence of Manifestation.  Trans. Girard Etzkorn.  The Hague: Nijhoff.  Orig. pub, 1963: L’essence de la manifestation.  Paris: PUF. 

-----
“The concept of the phenomenon undergoes a decisive transformation when it ceases to submit docilely to the injunctions of the visible and enters into relation with life, with the invisible.” (8)

“So, let us take the risk of stating two seemingly mad ideas:
1.	The content of painting, of all paintings, is the Internal, the invisible life that does not cease to be invisible and remains forever in the Dark, and
2.	The means by which it expresses this invisible content—forms and colors—are themselves invisible, in their original reality and true sense, at any rate.” (10)

“All of Kandinsky’s creative activities...seek to promote and illustrate the essential truth contained in On the Spiritual in Art (1912).  This truth is that the true reality is invisible, that our radical subjectivity is this reality, that this reality constitutes the sole content of art and that art seeks to express this abstract content.” (21)
 “The work of art is no longer situated in the world but in a radical elsewhere to which it introduces us.  Concerning this elsewhere, abstraction has taught us at least one thing: it does not belong to the realm of the visible but to the invisible.  It is Life.” (92)
“...one should recall Kandinsky’s remark that what is concealed acts more strongly than what is clear.” (99)




“Non-philosophy​[93]​ is therefore the art of irrationality [déraissoner], the art of inventing the irrational that is nevertheless latent at the heart of certain areas if reason.  You’re grafting onto philosophy what at the beginning of the century [20th] one granted to the arts, surrealism etc.  Admit it’s a little late, no?....In fact reason is a fiction that has possibly passed its time....Undeniably there is a link between the first stirrings of the artistic universe of the 20th century (now with something heavy and tired about it) and non-philosophy; but non-philosophy is not tied to images, or mythologies, even those of the avant garde” (27, 29)

“In the philosophical universe one supposes a space at once transcendent and immanent where objective truth rules, a truth as object; likewise presupposing a subject and discourse, a logos....Its validity will be put into question by non-philosophy, which will be suspicious of accords made in the name of the principle of objectivity.  In effect in non-philosophy there is no longer any objectivity.” (34)

     -- Kieffer, Gilbert (1998). “La Non-philosophie, mode d’emploi”: 24-39  [“Non-philosophy, Instructions for Use”]. In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]      
-----
“God and the rose are said to be ‘without why’ by homo ex machina,​[94]​ but the heretic knows this immanently without needing to know the why of this without-why....Mystics-fiction will not take the risk of wandering on the ways of ethical finality, technological instrumentality, scientific positivism or materialism.” (155)






“Philosophy believes through a congenital empiricism that the One, not ceasing to be expressed in language, is determined in its essence by language, or else language fails to determine its essence.  The ruinations of this hallucinatory belief is the bedrock of non-psychoanalysis.” (188-89, “Principes de la non-psychanalyse”)

--Laruelle, François (1995).  Théorie des étrangers.   Paris: Editions Kimé.  1995. [The Theory of Foreigners]        
-----
“We’ll need to find or at least pose the question of the conditions of the possibility of a language that ...functions from painting without reducing it to a function of language...A functioning language not a function of.  This language will possibly not be ‘aesthetic’.....a language that is not a function of painting (aesthetic reversal) but a language, a verbalism, a word ‘from’ and ‘according to’ painting.  Can the real (of) painting produce an effect of compossibility on the word, whereby its logics, gestures, effects will no longer be antagonists, hegemonic.  This compossibility is not to be envisioned without the assurance and the affirmation of the indifference of painting to language and its primacy.” (underlining, italics sic, 142)

--Leboeuf, Mathias (1998)“La Peinture telle qu’elle,” 137-68. [“Painting As Such”]. In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]
-----
“The only way to enact the loss of mastery of to pass by way of language...”(16)

“We account the Nietzschean critique of the cogito as the basis of the modern ratio cognoscendi,​[95]​ at once its critique and its foundation.  This critique is not limited to affirming that the proof of the existence of the ego, like that of God, is not conclusive.  The existence of God and of an ego are based on the metaphysical idea of there being a subject responsible for each act.  If thought has effects, there must be a subject who has caused them.  This belief is based therefore on a grammatical habit, it is only a simple effect of language.  Linguistic habit allows the metaphysician to believe this with no grounds and thereby compensate for the lack of rigor in proof.  The critique strikes at the ontological choice that is at the very basis of the lack of rigor: there is even less basis to postulate the existence of a subject than for example that of a network of forces.  From that Nietzsche fashions the real genealogy of the idea of the subject as the expression of the will to negative power.” (75)

“...music incarnates the ultimate materialist hypothesis, since music is the most foreign of all languages.  It is and is not a language.”  (120)

“We’ve attempted to define the problem of contemporary philosophy.  This is the discovery of the crisis due to the consummation of language by language.  From this consummation meaning dies.” (170)

--Bertocchi, Alessandro (2006). Philosophie et non-philosophie du poétique.  Houdiard: Paris.
-----
“To be liberated from the orders of language life must become foreign, become crazy become the mob, slurring the commandments, syntagms, the despotic meaning that subjects it to the language, to the letter...  ‘Become a foreigner to his own language’​[96]​,  means open oneself to the schizophrenic and rhizomatic field of immanence; it means open the being of the Real to the infinite...” (153-54)

--Bufalo, Erik del (2003). Deleuze et Laruelle: de la schizo-analyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé. 
-----
“The confusion of language with the real constitutes the principal prejudice of philosophy.” (note, 13)
--Moulinier, Didier (1999). De la psychanalyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé.   
-----
“Laruelle has been able to denounce (in regard to language) the ‘philosophical postulate (...) present, but hidden in classical metaphysics but whose thematization as such constitutes the obsession of the philosophy of the 20th century, the presupposition that language is the co-determinant or co-constituent of the real.’ ​[97]​(footnote).  However that language and time have been neglected by metaphysics, so that it’s important to re-evaluate them is one thing—to conclude  that no reality can be conceived apart from them is quite another.  In effect, the constitution without language and without time of the One signifies precisely—as paradoxical as it may seem in the eyes of contemporary thinkers—that there is a Real that has no need of language and of time, nor therefore of denying them, to be constituted, a Real that is, in other words, too autonomous or too much in itself to engage in it these attributes (even if in the mode of an inexpressible appeal or an immemorial past).  Laruelle marks therefore a stop sign in contemporary philosophy: he limns a reality of a third kind—a Real-without-mix-Real/language and without-mix-Real/time.”(54)

“Insofar as the One and the non-philosophical universe are constituted in a radically non-language manner, the problem of Laruelle cannot be , as for Levinas, to express or attest, one way or another, to the inexpressible.” (185)

--Choplin, Hughes (2007).  L’espace de la pensée française contemporaine à partir de Levinas et de Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [The Terrain of Contemporary French Thought, with Focus on Levinas and Laruelle] 
                                              -----

“For philo-fiction you can give ethical, political or religious objectives...but also artistic ones....the original intentions of non-philosophy were its obsession with liberation from all languages serving philosophy, religious experience included.  But artistic mutations, in particular the liberty of painting and music were as weighed down psychologically as much as theoretically.  What was needed was a more theoretical and stable principle of mutation of their usage, in view of creating a systems-crossing language, one immanent-al rather than transcendental.  The first phase​[98]​ was non-philosophy interiorizing the non-Euclidean model and that of abstract art as well as dodecaphonic music. Thereupon there developed a more powerful means of liberation in psychoanalysis and the more radical forms of the deconstruction of representation, as well as on the side of the ‘Real’ as impossible or foreclosed to the language of thought.  Then the directing model became religious, heretical and messianic, while also philosophy was pushed, systematically and technically, more toward heresy and messianity, making of messianity a quasi-transcendental principle.  However, messianity really can be neither principal or transcendental, shaking up the philosophical edifice too profoundly for that.  It must be ‘grounded’, instead in a non-epistemology, meaning also an episteme-fiction or a science fiction.  The quantum effect achieves at least provisionally this superposition of models.  The force of generic messianity is force of thought, of invention of a new usage of philosophical languages and forms, invention that is another side of deconstruction.  Liberated from disciplinary norms and forms of thought, we were obliged to invent our own language—an initiative that was most unwelcome—especially by reified philosophers who may be able at the limit to admit a change of doctrine or object, but with much more difficulty a militant intervention in the language of thought.” (458)

--Laruelle, François (2010a). Philosophie non-standard: Générique, Quantique, Philo-fiction.  Paris: Éditions Kimé. [Non-standard Philosophy: Generic, Quantum, Philo-fiction]                    
     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Levinas
“Levinas develops in effect in Totalité et Infini [1961] a formal concept of the immanence of the I and of its autonomy—in regard to its face-to-face—which foreshadows that developed by Laruelle in the One.  The following analysis of the me, separated (in its joy) [jouissance, orgasm] from the I, would come very close to the One [of FL]:.. ‘In joy, I am absolutely for myself, Egoist, without care for the other—I am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone.  Not against others, not ‘as to me’—but entirely deaf to the other, outside of any communication and of all refusal to communicate—without ears like a hungry belly.’​[99]​” (111-12)

“In regards to writing properly speaking a parallel might be established between the unilateral-ization of Laruelle and the hyperbole-ization of Levinas: both showing how these authors are engaged in a ‘combat’ (we’re borrowing the term from the painter Matisse) with philosophical language, combat determined by the ‘heterogeneity’ between language and the non-philosophical dimensions that are the One...or pierced man​[100]​, in function of which you write (or ‘describe’ or attest).” (198)

--Choplin, Hughes (2007).  L’espace de la pensée française contemporaine à partir de Levinas et de Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [The Terrain of Contemporary French Thought, with Focus on Levinas and Laruelle]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Machine
“...our resistance is to the philosophical order, that is to say an Artificial Machine or Intelligence that generates knowledge mechanically, presenting itself as if all-knowing.” (82, ital sic)
-- Borie, Mariane (2005). “Psychanalyse d’une critique ordinaire”, 59-88.  In Homo ex Machina .  Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: L’Harmattan.                      
 -----
The affinity of the machine with non-philosophy lies in fact that no philosophy or Real is privileged for the machine (92)

“The machine is the most fervid of believers.” (100)

“Authentic is that which cannot be doubted.   Only for the machine of non-philosophy doubt is always possible.”  Except for the Real, the given without (ever) having been given. (142)
--Lacrosse, J.M. (2005). “Pensée radicale en l’Homme”, 89-151.  In Homo ex Machina.  Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005
-----

Machine needed to be released from being a servant of God to become one of man for its modern avatar to be possible (177)
 
“Sciences are possible only because they explain the real that they construct, the thought-machine is possible only because it explains the thought that it constructs.  In the former case the sciences allow the substitution for an un-exploitable real a reproducible created real that one is master of; it’s the same in the other case where the thought-machine allows a partial substitution for human, singular thought in favor of a reproducible and universal thought, the goal being so as to no longer have to think at all, like a philosophical system promising to be the last one, so as to have no further need of philosophizing.” (210)

-- Tousseul, Sylvain (2005). “L’illusion de la pensée-machine, ou comment les science sont-elles possibles?”,  173—216. [“The Illusion of the Thinking Machine, or How are Sciences Possible?”].  In Homo ex Machina (2005).  Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
-----
“The machine is the...the consciousness of the thought of its own overtaking; in other words, Man designating as machine the fact of being capable by reflection of exceeding his condition—and the fear this gesture inspires in him....On the other hand, a thinking machine would clearly be a threat to philosophy first of all, for isn’t our pride the construction of reason?  If we succeed in creating a logical and autonomous being, in a double sense, at once insofar as it has never ceased extending its thought, and also that it would not be subject to the errors and temptations of sensibility, would it not in fact be an accomplished philosopher, capable of replacing us?” (221)

“Many believe that whatever appears on their screens is necessarily true.  The automatism of the machine lessens our essential vigilance, the fact that it’s up to us in the last analysis to assent or not.” (222)

“After having long represented the means of the bypassing by Man of the alterity that is Nature, the machine from hereon presages a bypassing of Man by an even more radical alterity to Nature, but just as foreign to him, even if invented by him—called in alternation robot or computer.” (223)

“To sum up: the radical immanence of non-philosophy is guarantee that the machine of thought will leave off once its task is completed.” (230-31)

“The function of what we’re calling force of thought is to establish a relation whereby the One operates on the World without being alienated in it....Force of thought​[101]​ is possibly only a tool finally, that is to say the contrary of a machine, not something that gives the illusion of power, through the absolute or sublime, transgressing the nature of thought, but simply making it advance by making it conscious of its alienation.  The non-philosophical gesture is therefore a poesis​[102]​ [creation] made for theory and acting at its core.” (236)

“Technical progress, rather than liberate humanity for works that make better use of his own qualities, makes it sink into an epoch of pernicious indolence where only ignorance and diversion prevail.” (221)

-- Dussert, Jean-Baptiste (2005). “La fonction du trait, ou différence de l’appareil et de la machine,” 217-36. [“The Function of the Trait, or the Difference between the Apparatus and the Machine”].  In Homo ex Machina (2005).  Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: L’Harmattan.
-----
“...in the case of despair, as Scheler​[103]​ has forcefully noted....it manifests itself as fundamentally indifferent to the circumstances which surround it....The same remarks hold for happiness, which does not depend for its existence on the alternating of its joys and pains....;just as despair could not be produced, so neither can happiness....The ensemble of techniques whereby men transform the world and ‘domesticate’ it.... are absolutely useless....; it leads to the ceaseless invention of new techniques of happiness whose senseless proliferation in the modern world manifest only their total helplessness with regard to the desired result.” (492-93)

-- Henry, Michel (1973).  The Essence of Manifestation.  Trans. Girard Etzkorn.  The Hague: Nijhoff.  Orig. pub, 1963: L’essence de la manifestation.  Paris: PUF. 
-----                
“The guarantee underlying the ‘thinking-machine’ as force of transcendence finds its surest support in the whole philosophical system.” (244)

“The logic of the separation and transcendentalization of nature must lead to the belief that man does not belong to nature, to assure his power and mastery.  This fundamental belief is affirmed in the Heideggerian operation whereby it is affirmed that ‘what is essential about modern technology is that it is of purely human fabrication, whereby actual man is provoked by an exigency to provoke nature into mobilizing.  Man himself is summoned, he is submitted to the exigency of corresponding to that exigency’​[104]​” (246)

“First Hypothesis....:Philosophical thought in politics intrinsically appears in the form of Tyranny.  We call this particular configuration of philosophical thought ‘the machine’.” (255)





“In his whole project, F. Laruelle remains in contact with the only real that  preoccupies him, and which is  that of man, not at all as an object of knowledge, but as a primordial given, radically different from all his possible associations with history, politics or society.” (107)

“We understand how non-philosophy is distinguished from the Fichtean project.  It subordinates anything that through the intermediary of philosophy wanted to recuperate man to make of him a part dependent on a whole, such as history, society, ethics, religion or even technology.”  (121-2)

-- Dennes, Maryse (1995). “Fichte et la non-philosophie”: 107-24. In Fabriques de l’insécurité.  Ed. François Laruelle.  Harmattan, [Manufacturers of Insecurity]
-----
“[For FL] Man is not the object of science, or even less so the ‘subject of science’, nor a universal identified with moral or other values: he is the Real cause-of-science as, more radically, the cause of all thought.  Ignored insofar as One or as ‘premier’ term by philosophy, exploited in a thousand ways, Man is for Laruelle the true ‘beneficiary’ of non-philosophy, in the sense that the rapport of authority between men and philosophy is inverted: while the philosopher represents always the ideal man, and in the philosophical regime a man always represents the philosopher for another man, the real man, himself, no longer represents anything.” (156-57)

-- Moulinier, Didier (1999). De la psychanalyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé. 
-----
“Philosophy, like politics, does not care for the human, for the ordinary man and the ordinary woman....We see here​[105]​ the vision of a kind of moving beyond the harassment of a totalizing politics and a turn toward a deeper gnosticism that runs throughout Laruelle’s work.” (70)

-- Smith, Anthony Paul (2016b). Laruelle: A Stranger Thought.  Malden MA and Cambridge UK: Polity.
----- 
“Humans realize themselves or participate in the real by inventing; invention being the great means of struggle against the claims of received and transmitted knowledge. (324)





“The Non-Proletarian: The Non-Consistency of Communism (bold sic, 138)....a ‘struggle’that is not a war under the law of the World....Man is first one, which does not oppose Man to communism but gives Man in-One or in-Solitude, a solitude without relation to the one spread by the capitalist world...(140)....It is so little a negation or an affirmation of communism that, through the non-consistency that makes everything its reality, it reveals communism as one of its particular models belonging to the capital-world....Non-Communism is made by ‘every’ man, ‘each-and-everyone’.  Non-Marxism is ‘neo-Marxism’ for the poor in philosophy.” (141)

Behind and before and catalytic for this Non-Proletarian and Non-Marxism of Non-Philosophy is I think the interepretations of Michel Henry, for whom: “life as immanence constitutes the permanent theme in the thought of Marx” (Marx, p. 541); the concept of a proletariat, like Athena from the forehead of Zeus, following Henry, would be a creation of “the categorical imperative”, flowing from the critique of religion of German Romantic Idealism, “...’to overthrow all social conditions that make of man an abased, subservient, abandoned and scorned being’ (ibid, p. 136, but citing Marx himself)....However, the German reality not corresponding to the German exigency [a class capable of effectuating this kind of transformation], this is the reason why Marx constructed a priori this reality....and this constructed reality, in line with the theses of German philosophy, was none other than the proletariat.” (ibid).  Beyond what might seem the direct connection between the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 with that of 1789, Henry finds a stronger and more organic connection to the mood of 16th century German alchemy, that is to “the circle of thinkers and philosophers once grouped around Paracelsus [winding its way to the German Romantics by way of Jacob Boehme].  In pretending to make gold out of lead, alchemy implying...that the ground of reality is not fixed things and unchangeable elements, but on the contrary, change” (ibid, 139).  The non-proletarian of Laruelle would then be one who wants out of being the Frankenstein creation of Philosophy’s machine of transformation.

“Marxism has been too visible, it has shown itself as complacent and authoritarian if not terroristic; it is time to take a vow, a vow of a certain clandestinity and poverty that is Man-in person as radical Stranger.” (171)

“Only a clandestine Stranger can arrive and by this arrival itself resist the Evil Demon of capitalism​[106]​ that never stops deforming subjects through the force of regulations and deregulations, through legal means and illegal means, through the perversion of norms and exceptions, through the redress of humiliations and the enriching of exploitations....(172-73) [Marxism] has always been in the process of becoming extinct....We scarcely have any nostalgia or memory, just a rage sufficient to give a positive sense to this loss.  We naively see that capitalism follows its own course in spite, it is all it has to do, it is our element, in it we have life and movement, in it we are like a fish in water.  How can the fish revolt?  Impossible, they think that it is impossible....[sic]” (173)

“There is no final battle with capitalism, no final solution for a history that is always in becoming, just a war of the impossible against the hydra of infinite possibilities.” (183)

“The struggle is essentially messianic or clandestine, it borrows its means of existence from supercapitalism but animates these means by a drive or a force of-the-last-instance that is proper to Man-in-person.  Marxism is the transformation of the World as much as it is itself transformed into non-Marxism.” (194)

-- Laruelle, François (2015d). Introduction to Non-Marxism.  Tr. Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mastery
“The indomitable Other, we’ve seen, is constituted as X, that is to say an exception that confirms [the rule of] mastery.  That is the game of the West: to recuperate for its benefit whatever is most hostile to it.”  (54)

“The master’s game is to make rebellion serve its contrary: not being able to subjugate irrationality, the rational camp exploits whatever is around it by putting it under its control.” (55)

“The Master, identified with rationality, promoted to the status of absolute, is reassured by circumscribing in its body its little part, its little region for irrationality.” (58)

“...it’s the masters that work, ideologically, for the minorities, whose support they need to maintain themselves; they favor and even generate them as so many places for mercantile investment and as many differentiated targets for marketing as you could wish; which tend, at least in the democratic-markets, called ‘advanced,’ to be absorbed completely.” (62)

-- Grelet, Gilles (2002). Déclarer la Gnose: d’une guerre qui revient à la culture [Declaring Gnosis: a War of Culture]. Paris: Harmattan.
-----
“The problem of rebellion is one of risking the introduction of resentment and reaction into the struggle against ‘mastery’ and so returning to the war, to the project of waging war against war....Every philosophy of force and action is contaminated by division and reciprocity of action and reaction, which makes action turn into a reaction.  We must think a mastery that is not merely a reaction, but an occasion, and a human (non)action that is a pure force of action-without-reaction.” (192)​[107]​

If overmastery is to be found everywhere, then it is up to the Man-in-person and partially also to the Rebel to be nowhere, and from here we get the Idea of a Utopian Rebellion in-the-last-instance...The Rebel has ceased to be this fugitive hiding in the forest....this pure transcendental Rebel who has no cause, because the Real without mastery is not even a cause....Man is not a rebel, he can only exist as-Rebel.” (211-12)
-- Laruelle, François (2012g).  Struggle and Utopia at the End Times.  Tr. Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal. Orig. pub. Kimé, 2004: La Lutte et l’Utopie à la fin des temps philosophiques. 
-----
“ ‘It’s an infantile prejudice, whereby the master gives the problem, our task being to resolve it, and the results of the task being qualified as true or false by a powerful authority; and it’s a social prejudice, visibly in the interest of keeping us all children, that convokes us always to resolve problems coming from elsewhere, and which consoles or distracts us in saying we have won if we found the right answer’”​[108]​ (footnote 142)





In the film Neo and Smith would be non-philosophical subjects, the Architect representing philosophical consciousness. (27)

What relates Matrix to non-philosophy especially is its attitude toward “language and its essential ambiguity” (27)

“At no moment does the Matrix allow a stabilization of a sober vision of the Womb [Matrice] and its exact functioning, any more than it allows Neo to consolidate his knowledge.” (24)

“this Hiroshima without disaster of the Matrix we really think has the power to set off in philosophy....Hypothesis 1: Truth does not exist (37)....a Real that escapes as much from humans as from machines.”  Real identity is unknowable.  (39)

“Choice is nothing but an illusion whose purpose is to separate those who have power from those who don’t.”​[109]​ (47)

“In merely affirming this choice...the existence of the active-Subject begins, disobedient, viscerally heretical and irreducible to any new submission: the Existing-Subject-Foreigner or Man-in-Person, according to François Laruelle.” (52)

“Non-philosophy, heretical discipline, is not the hand that seizes nor even the intention of mastery... it’s more like an outstretched hand in which an object is resting, presented in such a way that a new way of vision is always offered to our eyes.” (55)





          “Our thesis is that ecology, as a way of thinking rather than eating, of voyaging messianically rather than simply inhabiting, opens up a new way for humans, one which goes from their retreat from or subtraction from the Earth, to the Universe, which is the correlate of this subtraction.” (195)

-- Laruelle, François (2015b). En dernière humanité: la nouvelle science écologique.  Les éditions du cerf.. [In Last Humanity : the New Ecological Science]  
-----
“Messianic Man designates in-last-humanity the evil-world as agent of a possible ultra model that escapes it in a way, Hell as the ultra-model of the existence of subject-Foreigners struggling against harassment; and the state of ultra-model, is the last farewell to Hell, its transformation, its breakaway from its auto-absolution.  Understand it’s a matter of redeeming the redeemer insofar as sent by the world in the form of the philosopher, sent from Hell as the ultimate adversary of the subject-Foreigner.” (487)
-- Laruelle, François (2008b). “Pour une science non-politique du pouvoir”, Revue de Métaphysique et de la Morale, #8, 2008: 473-87. [“Towards a Non-political Science of Power”] 
-----
“The messiah is the stripping-bare of man of all the predicates that situate him in the world and imposes upon him his coordinates, trajectories, theological positions, and relations, his being as a sinner and his becoming redeemed.  Such is generic universality: in-the-last-instance he is no longer either man or woman, neither master nor servant—neither Torah nor Word.” (145)

“Messianity has no mask (Nietzsche) and, inversely, no interiority (Kierkegaard)....It is also not identifiable by the Churches except in the ‘eyes of the world’.  Neither time nor place can be parameter of it.  There is no traceability of the messiah—this is a great achievement of Judaism that Catholicism, above all, has forgotten through paganism.  But Judaism has multiplied and rendered apocryphal messianic advents, the better to exacerbate waiting and make it passionate.  When Levinas philosophizes the trace, and Derrida follows him, it is a matter of what remains of it as memory and as past eternally present in the self.  They do not venture into the most solitary desert of the soul, as desert of unknowing that accompanies the knowledge that we are, and whose cognizance does not suppose a prior trace via a remainder of Platonism.” (176)

“Messianity does not act: this is why it cuts unilaterally.  Messianity depotentializes the strong force....theology, obsessed by philosophy, has neglected the fact that knowledge of Christ is not at all complete and given, ready-made to enter into a system—it is a process of cognizance in progress.” (254)

-- Laruelle, François (2015a). Christo-Fiction: the Ruins of Athens and Jerusalem.. Tr. Robin Mackay.  New York: Columbia Univ. Press.  
----- 
“A subject not rooted in the position of Being or the Idea, that is the new goal and value...we’re looking for here: from the totality-subject or the totalitarian subject to the minority subject...who is neither finite or infinite like the Being where he isn’t, but whose essence is beyond Being, multiple and dispersed, anterior to the Idea, to Reason, to the World, History...[sic] the Absolute.” (12)





“Non-philosophy anticipates that it is always made and made again, that it is always deceived....We are always the victims of transcendental illusion, but we can always understand it, demonstrate it.” (242)

-- Laruelle, François (2012d).  “Non-Philosophy, Weapon of Last Defense: An Interview with FL”: 238-251. In Laruelle and Non-Philosophy.  Ed. John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul Smith.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press.
-----
“By the same token that non-philosophy is both description and performativity, it is identically past and future, an identity that precedes the disjunction of the retention-as-past and protension....This is why the statements of non-philosophy are indefinitely rectifiable by new statements and, at the same time—if they are correctly formed, based rigorously and on reality, quasi-sedimented.” (195)

-- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mystics   

“For God, reduced to a simple theological model, we’re substituting a first axiom..., the human ‘vision-in-One’​[110]​, cause of mystics [la mystique]....For the cosmo-theo-logical World, the heretic and gnostic World-Hell.” (36)  ‘Mystics’, unless otherwise qualified, refers to a practice as non-philosophy conceives it, not mystics as traditionally understood (Boehme, Eckhart etc.), so is not only a singular noun but takes the singular as subject. This non-philosophical mystics would be a ‘radically immanent’ mysticism, one without a God, or anything else above it, but affording something like a mystical experience, say of ‘wonder’ (Rudolf Otto and Aristotle),--or the way an atheist can take LSD, have a ‘mystical experience’—for instance of love or empathy for all, or the all, and still remain one; but without devolving into secularity, since one where reason has no say.  I’ve borrowed the term ‘mystics’, from Michel de Certeau, who deploys it historically and epistemologically to describe and define the way mysticism and mystics approaches things, their life-style and consciousness, even politics...; Certeau’s  invoking of it would of course not be totally immanent, as is FL’s, since not excluding those ‘worlds’ mysticism traditionally claims to be linked to or manifesting; Certeau being a Jesuit, and one who was and remained in good standing with his order.

“Mystics-fiction does not sink into silence, on the contrary it is the only silence destined for noise, for the noise of the World.” (78)

“Theologians accept the discourse of mystics on the condition of interpreting it, taking it in a metaphorical and literary sense, but it’s not by any means sure that for these experimenters with God,​[111]​ who are not simple believers, there are still metaphors or figures of speech to sweeten and normalize their lives.  This traditionally philosophical ruse of metaphor allows the remission into order of the concept and the reinsertion of the Lost into the body of the Church.” (104)

“We philosophers?  We the without-philosophy, unlettered humans, we the unteachable Taught, for whom philosophy is a symptom...[sic] The complacency and heroism of thought, whether announced as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’, this is exactly what we want no more in philosophy....[Traditional] mystics applied the conclusions from the (agency of) the intellect  to the Real just as philosophers have always more or less applied their conclusions from thought or the transcendental to the Real.  Against the complacency of these conclusions we  value the performed Lived as shut off [forclos] essentially from both thought and knowledge.” (111).

“Future mystics proceeds as if it put its ‘God’, Man-in-person,​[112]​ between parentheses, no longer being concerned with him.”(116)

“Stripping bare the World rather than God, or God insofar as he belongs to the World, these are the most secret object of mystics, its immanent eros.” (136) 

“Mystic heresy is not refusal to think, it’s the refusal of institutional, narcissistic-and-gregarious forms of thought, of an Everything-thought​[113]​, of which philosophy, as world-thought, is the form.” (157)

“With the Verb-fiction, the mystics-world is the object of language games that are lived or immanent, therefore unilateral, supposing the refusal of all rear-logos or rear-Verb​[114]​.....Differently from Being, which ends always by supposing a contrary, deficient or other, a should-be, an appear-entity [être], a non-being, always a neighbor, a subordinated or superior instance, the One-en-person no longer should be thought of as an attribute, and even less so through identity and unicity as attributes”​[115]​ (170)

“Mystics is the experimental science that explains, according-to-the-One,​[116]​ the hallucinated language of the madness-world, in which, by a last turning of thought, faith and belief still are stirring....From that [mystics], results the plasticity of the fiction-Verb, stripped of the heavy ideology of meaning and the ideology of the ‘metaphor’....It is poetry-fiction, philosophy-fiction and now mystic-fiction, but without ever being a simulation of a supposedly ‘real’ mystical experience...” (172-73)

“Who was I ask the ancient mystics, who will I ‘have been’?, demands the future-mystic.”

“Mystic-fiction is based entirely on a non-Christian practice, that is to say non philosophical, of Christ and God.” (203)

“There is no principle of rules of mystic-fiction....To go to the World without coming back from it, you have to get rid of belief, which is suffisance....The vision-in-One does not retreat into any interior fortress, it no more opens up to a World that is too closed than it closes to a World that is too open.” (260-61)

-- Laruelle, François (2007b). Mystique non-philosophique à l’usage des contemporains.  L’Harmattan. [Non-philosophical Mystics for Contemporaries]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                         
Negative

“...he [FL] inverts the conventional wisdom on utopia as a non-place apart from this world.  Laruelle’s utopia is a non-world, yet a non-world entirely rooted in the present.  Laruelle’s non-world is, in fact, entirely real.  Revealing his gnostic tendencies, Laruelle’s non-standard real is rooted in matter, even if the standard world already lays claim to that same space.... (159)  As Laruelle says, insufficiency is absolutely crucial to utopia: ‘We are not saying one has to live according to a well-formed utopia...[sic]  Our solution lies within an insufficient or negative utopia’ (160) citing FL Struggle and Utopia at the End Times (2014), p. 12.”

-- Galloway, Alexander (2014). Laruelle Against the Digital.  Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press . 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nietzsche
“Nietzsche wants to arrive at a new thought through a sort of new linguistics, which he calls active philology.  This discipline has a sole principle and a sole rule: ‘a word says nothing except insofar as the one who utters it wants something thereby’ or ‘treating the word as a real activity means thinking of it from the point of view of its speaker.’” (70)
-- Bertocchi, Alessandro (2006). Philosophie et non-philosophie du poétique.  Houdiard: Paris.
-----
“Philosophy as therapeutics (psychology, psychologism, will to power, moralism) that the ‘medical doctor-philosopher’  of Nietzsche pointed towards, finds, possibly, its paroxysm in schizoanalysis [coinage of Deleuze-Guattari] a ‘practice’ inherited from Spinoza, philosopher (healer) of human passions.” (70)





“We’re searching for a kind of thinking, however inventive, that is an action of non-action, an anti-activist wager, a perform-ation without performance—how we ‘weaken’ an excess of action and its decisions.” (222)

“The immanent is not an all-powerful but an extreme of powerlessness filling heaven and earth and all the same can ‘move mountains’.” (282)





Ray Brassier has been especially noted for critiquing Laruelle’s invoking of the ‘human’:  “Laruelle’s insistence on identifying the unobjectifiable immanence of the real with ‘the human’ surreptitiously re-ontologizes it (136)....The slide from ‘I think according to my ultimate identity with a real that is already given’ to ‘this real of the last-instance is the human that I am’ is as precipitate as the more familiar leap from ‘I think therefore I am’.  This slide envelops what by Laruelle’s own lights amounts to a decision: ‘I am human’.  But what can ‘being-human’ mean given that the radically in-consistent real is not?  What I think I am can have no privilege vis-a-vis the identity of a real already given independently of anything I may happen to think about it.  To claim that I harbour some sort of preontological understanding of my own being-human is to plunge straight back into Heidegger’s hermeneutics of Dasein....Worse, this ultimately arbitrary identification of the real with the human individual threatens to reduce Laruelle’s vaunted non-philosophical radicalism to a transcendental individualism wherein each human self becomes the ultimate determinant of philosophy; a position all too redolent of Fichtean solipsism to be convincingly described as non-philosophical.” (137)

--- Brassier, Ray (2007). Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction.  Palgrave Macmillan.

 In All Thoughts Art Equal, however Ó Maoilearca defends, against Brassier, Laruelle’s deployment as a different ‘human’ than philosophy has ever conceived it, “...which simply subtracts two and a half millenia of philosophical mediation (exploitation, harassment, racism, sexism, inequalities of all kinds) from the image of the human.” (31)  Likewise he responds to Brassier’s objection that Laruelle is merely repeating the authoritarianism of the ‘decisional autoposition’ as incarnated in the Hegelian tradition, which might be a cogent one, “were if not for the fact that we keep shifting approaches, we keep mutating our posture from ethics to logic to behavior and so on, which is to say that there is no one form of philosophy to explain all the others but only a chain of different non-philosophical tangents that appears to create a circle.” (143)  Otherwise, Descartes’ leap, from thinking to being, has been surely much contested since, for instance by the English idealist Berkeley, whose idea was that there was no way of proving we exist; not to mention others like Kierkegaard, for whom the leap would be more I believe therefore I am, or really vice-versa; or Sartre and Camus, I choose therefore... I feel, love (or hate), belong to, rebel therefore...come to mind.   Finally, here, according to Ó Maoilearca it is “Brassier who has an overtly anthropic standard of knowing....Brassier practices epistemology—rather than Laruellian science—and so knows what knowing is....This must be opposed to not-knowing...what the human is, according to non-philosophical posture.  This not-knowing is no mere ignorance, nor even the romantic notion of a negative capability.  It is an active ‘degrowth’ (unknowing) of epistemology by the Real—a de-philosophizing of the philosophy of knowledge.” (286)
                                             -----
“Because the essence remains hidden in itself and continually escapes our view, because it is hiding as such, it falls into forgetfulness....Forgetfulness is  not nothing, it has an object....It is precisely in its reference to ‘recall’ that forgetfulness is first and most often understood.... However, the forgotten reality does not belong strictly to the past....In a certain way, is not what we forget in the essential always there?  And if it is always there...how can we forget it?  By not thinking of it.  Therefore, this is what constitutes the nature of forgetfulness.  Forgetfulness is not even possible in principle except on the foundation of the presence of something which we do not think about, and as this very act of ‘not thinking about’.  Forgetfulness is a fact of thought and, when we are dealing with fundamental ontological forgetfulness which is here in question, viz. with the forgetfulness of pure presence, it is the fact of thought not thinking about this essence which is always present as such and which, nevertheless makes thought possible.” (382-83)

“... ‘divine life...[sic] subsists in the only place where it is able to...[sic] hidden and inaccessible to conceptual thought’, this is why every determination belonging to knowledge, all thought, is not a gain but a loss of Being and this is not the case de facto but de jure.  ‘The more a thing is knowable’, says Nietzsche,...‘the further it withdraws from Being’” (401)​[117]​

“Because it is radically opposed to knowledge, reality takes form and is constituted in the absence of knowledge. ‘God is in this place and I did not know it’ [Eckhart]... The absence of knowledge is not merely contemporaneous with union, it is its condition....The possibility of revelation resides in non-knowing.  ‘No man can see God except he be blind, nor know him except through ignorance, nor understand him except through folly.’ [ibid]” (437)
-- Henry, Michel (1973).  The Essence of Manifestation.  Trans. Girard Etzkorn.  The Hague: Nijhoff.  Orig. pub, 1963: L’essence de la manifestation.  Paris: PUF.                 


------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
Non-politics

 “FL is he who thinks that it’s non-politics that determines politics in the last instance.....[for instance] in the theory of the social contract, the notion of the ‘state of nature’ is doubtless a non-political idea.” (14)

“[according to Nietzsche]There is no ‘original social bond’ and there[man] is a radically non-political animal.” [22, bold sic, section heading]

 “...the apparition of the One...means always in the political domain conceptually a development of non-politics.” (176)

The tyranny of philosophy is that it insists that man be something else than he is: “Man is X, he must become Y’” (205)​[118]​

“ ‘For non-philosophy 1+1= 1’” (240).  Citing Sophie Lesueur’s Capitalisme et philosophie, which I have not been able to find, but did locate this sentence at end of her dissertation, La non-philosophie du suject politique. [The Non-philosophy of the Political Subject]. Unv. Paris Nanterre, 2008; an excerpt or abstract of which can be consulted under that title online, or was on 9/10/17.
My sense of this ‘equation’ here is that, as opposed to Capitalism and Philosophy, which have in common exercising the tyranny of constant growth and progress (1+1=2), insisting ‘we’ become what we’re not (yet)—as in previous excerpt, X must become Y, non-philosophy stays with the One:X=X !

Philosophy means war, also [making itself necessary as] the peacemaker. (206)

“The philosopher pronounces an idea of democracy without the means of attaining it and the worst thing is that democracy is realized through totalitarian means....philosophical democracy is never ‘direct’” (235)

“... ‘man forced to owe his ‘equality’ to the philosopher’” (236)​[119]​

“Equality and liberty should be presupposed (without philosophical operation of presupposition), instead of being sought.” (237)​[120]​

The gist here has been the passage of the primacy of politics in Nietzsche to the primacy of the non-political in Laruelle, passing by the non-irreducible difference between the political and non-political in Freud; (248) the author concluding that non-politics, like non-philosophy always involves “practice....a radically subjective practice.” (250)  In other words each individual would be the one to decide what practice is or meant, not any social contract or civil bond.  This ostensibly could be just thinking, FL having said as much: ‘thinking it is already to practice it.’ (cited Smith, 2016b, p. 152)

-- Chien-Chang, Lee (2012). De la non-philosophie aux non-politiques: Nietzsche, Freud, Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012. 
                                                  ----- 
 “The world and Man are ‘inseparables’, their unilateral duality is their (co)rrelation....  Non-philosophy is the discipline of this rapport-without-rapport...The radically lived is an appeared-without-appearing.” (477)

“Against the neo-liberal philosophy of this time, we have been obliged to think of the evil of the world as a simple effect of power, an evil in the world as such, and to seek to establish the last line of defense possible for subjects as humans.” (479)

“Returning to the cause-in-the-last-instance of science, generic and messianic man, certain positive changes occur, some of whose traits are:
1)	The passage of intra-philosophical politics, that of ‘positions’ and even theo-polito-logics​[121]​ as auto-affection/position of the city to an entirely different object, the power-world that has been given a priori to subject-Foreigners as subject of the science of power—object in a ‘non-political’ sense or generally universalized beyond the political sphere....
2)	The categories of theo-polito-logical power (applied in a limited way by Foucault and Deleuze) that comprise this new object are transformed and lifted from their base of phenomenological or archeological suffisance in a supposedly given world.” (482-83)

-- Laruelle, François (2008b). “Pour une science non-politique du pouvoir”, Revue de Métaphysique et de la Morale, #8, 2008: 473-87. [“Towards a Non-political Science of Power”] 
-----
“The absolute priority of any auto-constituted society is the creation, from the raw material of the human being, of an individual in whom the institution of society is ‘massively incorporated’​[122]​”  This is why the principle of  Sovereignty necessarily is the culmination of the development of political thought of a philosophical type; condensing in a single synthetic term the whole ontology of the unifying One, reducer of multiplicities....Sovereignty is The principle of Subjection...the name for domination through the authority of philosophy in politics.” (258-59) 
	
“The modern state is constantly confronted with the possibility of its violent death through internal or external causes; for the men who founded it, as for those that manage it, it is the means of force of a historical group for durably maintaining itself in existence.” (259-60)

 “From top (philosophy and its major transcendent mode) to the bottom (today’s predominantly capitalist economy whose vocation it is to substitute the identity it sells for the real Identity of humans), the ring of submission is closed.  Man as Work constitutes thereby a sort of ‘occupied territories’, permanently subject to colonization. (270)

“Whether it’s government by one, or a group, or—theoretically by all, in no way modifies this structure intrinsically linked to the structure proper of philosophy and to the hegemony of theory over practice.” (271)






“Why speak of ‘non-religion’?  First off it’s a matter of definition: the reign of Necessity is here called religious.  Where there is submission to the deadly law of the world, there are bonds, alienation—religio.” (182-83)

“Non-religion begins by wiping the slate clean [la table rase] of all interest.  Be interested in nothing.” (208)

--Grelet, Gilles (1998). “Un bréviaire de non-religion”, 182-216. [Brevary of Non-religion]. In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]
-----
“The religious is perhaps more alienating than the philosophical, in any case more criminal, conjuncture proves that religion is a great threat for humans and that one should start by transforming it into a non-religion.” (97)






“Since the One is not philo-sophable, it imposes a new practice of philosophy.  The great rule is: the One is the ensemble of the effects of the One.  More precisely even: the One is the One, plus the effects of the One (on language, philosophy, etc.).... (52)  The philosopher wants to make the real fit his thought, decreeing by idealism, that the real does not exist if it can’t be thought.  The vision-in-One obliges us otherwise: to fit our thought to the real, modifying our concept of it in function of it...to be necessarily naive, experimental, realist, and modifying customary practices of thought and language in function of this experience of the real-One we take for transcendental guide.” (53)
-- Laruelle, François (1989). Philosophie et non-philosophie.  Mardaga: Brussels. 
-----                               
                             
“Non-consistency.  Since the One is not beyond (epekeina) essence or being but only in-One, it is devoid of ontological, linguistic and worldly consistency.  It is without-being and without-essence, without-language and without-thought, even though it is said to be this with the help of being language, thought etc.  This non-consistency entails that the One is indifferent to or tolerant of any material, any particular doctrinal position whatsoever.” (292)

       -- Laruelle, François (2012c). From Decision to Heresy, Experiments in Non-Standard Thought.  Ed. Robin Mckay.  Minneapolis: Urbanomic.  Trans. Ray Brassier. from  La Lutte et l’utopie (2004).
-----                                                         

 “The One is especially not the Unity with which the Greco-Occidental thought has regularly confused it.​[123]​ I insist, from the Greeks to the thinkers of Difference,​[124]​ they’ve put the One to the service of contraries, or totality and unity, of Kosmos and Physis, of Substance and absolute Knowledge, of the Will to Power and of Difference etc.  This confusion is the foundation of unitary and authoritarian thought.” (228-29)

-- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One]  
-----

“It’s Emptiness that suits the One, separated from all desire; which is how the Individual can be liberated from the yoke of thought, of intellectual obligation, that tyrannizes him with a liberty he really cares nothing for, which corresponds to nothing other than  aspirations of a moral sort.  The One is not free anyway, since it has no need to be.” (75)

-- Fontaine, Patrick (2001). L’Amour de la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé.
-----
“In philosophy, the One is never purely and simply ‘One,’ unless it is a mere symbol, as it is in the principle of identity, in which it is already doubled by itself. Philosophy invariably doubles and multiplies it, as in the neo-Platonists’ hierarchy of Ones, or the more or less mediated identity of (difference and) identity. It is imperative not to confuse the One of philosophy, which is the One (of the) One, with the One of non-philosophy, which is the One-in-One or the One-in-person, the One in flesh and blood.” (177)
-- Laruelle, François (2003). “What Can Non-Philosophy Do?”  Angelaki.  Vol. 8, #2.  (August, 2003): 169-89.  Intr. and trans. Ray Brassier.  
-----
“...the ‘power’ (of) the One is not a variant of the philosophical ‘power over meaning’...The One is nothing less than ‘an action’....the One signifies a radically primary subjective action.” (178)

-- Chien-Chang, Lee (2012). De la non-philosophie aux non-politiques: Nietzsche, Freud, Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012.
-----
“The One is not an object, whether spiritual or intellectual, still transcendent: there is no approaching it, it does not ground any pedagogy, commentary, conversion, critique, deconstruction etc.  We are there, we are of it, we are it.  Consequently no reduction, suspension, negation, nihilization [néantisation], no exclusion of an eventual given other than the One is necessary to attain it....On the other hand, the radical immanence of the One implies the reduction, emplacement or unilateral-ization, of the transcendentally given empirics (of World, History, Power—of philosophy).  The a priori of the chora does not mean their destruction, but only the suspension of their sufficiency.” (83)  The chora being the environment in which philosophical forms would lose their sufficiency and (the illusion of) their necessity, becoming so much material for whatever use can be made of them, like a piece of furniture, a chair, say, we can decide whether or not to sit on.  The World etc. is treated as merely assumed as given unilaterally, not essential, like furniture we’ve noticed above that happens to be there in the Chora, or cosmos.

-- Laruelle, François (1989). Philosophie et non-philosophie.  Mardaga: Brussels. 
-----
“To think the Real without error, the One without the Two, is also to think the Two in-One, but certainly not the ‘The Two fuses into One’.” (81)

-- Laruelle, François (2012g).  Struggle and Utopia at the End Times.  Tr. Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal. Orig. pub. Kimé, 2004: La Lutte et l’Utopie à la fin des temps philosophiques.
                                                                  
  FL is cautioning against taking sides, either for the ‘peace’ of the One or the ‘eternal warfare’ of the Two, as Grelet does (see above, under Gnosis), who was opting for the insurrectionary latter, of course.  For non-philosophy the Two does not come from the One (unilaterality is going to, not coming from), but is (always already) in the One, making of choice not one at all.
                                            -----
“While Heidegger pulls Being back toward the land of pure intuition, we should be drawing the One, exiled to the periphery by philosophy, into an a priori material Humanity, toward utopia and heresy.” (153)





“Insofar as last instance we participate in the Universe as a machine to fabricate hypotheses rather than gods [Bergson’s notion of humanity], but as last instance also 
we fabricate them only on the condition of under-determining them, that is to say leaving them open; so this is not a complete and determined knowledge, the problem being to renew them by superposition and quantification on the basis of their givens.  As gnostic beings we have been thrown at the Universe which is our thrown-being itself in spite of its tendency to curl ceaselessly around itself to close itself off like a World.” (60-61)




“...logic too will be central, but a discontinuous one that emerges from cinema’s (visualization of) movement, a movement that some logicians (Graham Priest especially) have likened to paraconsistency, with a notion that a ‘cinematic account of change’ is a form of realized contradiction.” (108, ref. to Priest, In Contradiction..., 2006).

 Paraconsistent, not inconsistent, but a different kind of consistency, as for example, the existence of ‘unreal objects’ (cf. Meinong below) or fictions, philosophy seen as one such, cinema as another...

Laruelle as non-Aristotelian--Aristotle, who thought ‘no contradiction is true’
 (119)

Alexius Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie (Theory of Objects) )—“allowed for such hypothetic exotica as square circles and perpetual motion...objects of an act of intentionality.... There are comparable traits between Meinong and Laruelle...[:] Everything has a standing in the Real, no matter how idiotic or illusory (and that includes the hallucinations of philosophical authority as well).  Even references to what is unthinkable (which then at least has ‘the property of being unthinkable’)” (120, 123).

Mise-en-fiction:
“Nor is fiction to be thought of in non-philosophy as a form of nonbeing.... Deleuze wrote [how] ‘Nietzsche....granted himself the poetic and philosophical right to dream...’... The same thing could be said of Deleuze himself as philosophy’s preeminent science fiction writer on rhizomes, desiring machines and time-images.  Derrida, moving in a different direction, saw philosophy as a species of fiction within literature; while Alfred Jarry, in still another fashion, characterized his ‘pataphysics’ as a science of ‘imaginary solutions’...” (132, this last calling to mind Baudrillard, pataphysician of our times)

“By disassociating fiction from any claim to approximate reality (naturalism, verisimilitude, neorealism, and so on), its own radical Real can emerge.  In some respects, The Five Obstructions supports this approach, not because it blends fact and fiction, nor because it is unclassifiable as one or the other (as Paisley Livingston claims) but in virtue of it operating, as Leth​[125]​ himself claims, ‘exactly on the border between fiction and non-fiction’.” (133)

“Non-philosophy frees philosophy, Laruelle says, ‘as a fiction, which no longer has anything but one last link with philosophical sufficiency’.”  It delivers it from ‘the substantial or humanist burdens of the Real’, that is, from the demand to approximate the Real... for Laruelle, then, fiction can no longer be thought of as a ‘mode of non-being, of the false.’” (134-35, citing FL, Anti-Badiou, of 2011)

Sufficiency = Complacency; as of Badiou’s, for FL, whatever his watershed ontological insights, for instance, in spite of Badiou’s ‘reduction’ of Being to Nothing, which means that we can’t really know What It Is, in harmony with Laruelle’s notion of our ineluctable ignorance of the One, that is the Real—Badiou still insists on the continued authority of philosophy and the philosopher.

“Hence, two things, two truths, may be quantum superposed, but on the basis of the Real rather than dialectics.  And this coincidence has a fictional rigor to it, that is an invented rigor (the rigor of invention, not convention, akin to the science of the quantum, where life and death can coexist” (134)

Exemplary of contradictory logic is Schrödinger’s cat, which, locked away where it cannot be observed, will die if it trips a certain wire; but while we cannot know if that has happened or not, it is both alive and dead.
                                          -----
“While philosophy criticized the spontaneous imagination of the human being, it was to better utilize and canalize it in the service of philosophical comprehension.  Plato, for example utilized myth particularly as a solution to a philosophical problem, allowing therefore his disciples a sensory representation of his thought, owing to the imagination.  The myth of the cave, in Chapter VII of The Republic allows the demonstration of the [sorry] state those find themselves in who take the sensory world as ultimate reality.”(42)

--Ò Maoilearca, John (2015)​[126]​.  All Thoughts are Equal: Laruelle and Nonhuman Philosophy. UMinn: UMinn. Press.

                                            ---
Referring to Spinoza’s critique of human imagination, to the scolia of  Proposition XVII of The Ethics, where the unreliability of the imagination is connected with the position of the perceiver; the farmer seeing the traces of a horse in the mud as those of a work-horse, the stableman imagining a racehorse....: “In philosophy fiction (imagination) would be thought of only as an artefact without reality, criticized by philosophers as source of illusions; while on the contrary F. Laruelle pretends to really understand fiction, the dimension proper to literature, art and science-fiction.  He defines it as ‘a non thétic Universe’” (60, citing FL, Philosophie et non-philosophie,  of 1989)

-- Patoz,  Virginie (1998). “Pédagogie et non-pédagogie,” 39-64.  In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]
-----
“We must abandon thinking in the form of ‘either this...or that...’, for non-philosophy knows no alternative, as it undoes amphibologies via its unilateral style and not via an antithetical style.” (70-71)

-- Laruelle, François (2012g).  Struggle and Utopia at the End Times.  Tr. Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal. Orig. pub. Kimé, 2004: La Lutte et l’Utopie à la fin des temps philosophiques. 
-----
“As compossibility entails that only what can co-exist exists, such that contradictory beings cannot exist, what is to be made of actual contradictory beings such as the waves and particles of quantum mechanics, say, or contradictory claims, such as for the political equality of the cancer cell and its host (or the foetus and its mother)?” (132)
      -- Mullarkey, John (2006). Post Continental Philosophy, an Outline.    N.Y.: Continuum.


Compossibility=correlationism, which is the idea of Kantian provenance that there is a homology between mind and nature, meaning that objects conform to mind—in other words nature and mind are not contradictory; this being too close to an Argument by Design to make any self-respecting secularist or non-philosopher comfortable with it.
                                     -----
“It is a rule of philosophy that the ‘neither … nor …,’ which appears to exclude predicates from the real, actually reintroduces them into it by assuring us that it is ‘at once’ one and the other, with the obvious proviso that this double negation be included within the final result. In non-philosophy, however, the ‘neither … nor …’ is definitive from the outset because it expresses the being separated proper to identity, or to the separated in-person.” (175)

-- Laruelle, François (2003). “What Can Non-Philosophy Do?”  Angelaki.  Vol. 8, #2.  (August, 2003): 169-89.  Intr. and trans. Ray Brassier.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Past, Present and Future

“Non-philosophy does not think about what took place [ce qui a eu lieu]; the past, as philosophy conceives it, is always relief, memory, synthesis, totalization (more or less failed​[127]​).  Non-philosophy rather thinks ‘in-the-Universe’, where everything is strictly multiple and identical at the same time, and not in-Memory or History; all the more reason for it to renounce the old philosophical-romantic ideal of the total work of art; or the traditional cultural functions of collection, shelter, celebration [remémoration] of its truth moments [événements de vérité​[128]​].” (185)
Here the target is Hegel, followed by many others (like Marx), for whom the past is always transcended (aufgehoben) by a present which includes it, becoming something better, finer (progress); for instance monotheism relieving paganism, which in turn is relieved by modern science and technology... 

--Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One] 
-----
“His [FL] project is a new genre akin to science fiction and from which...it takes inspiration.  It knows the future takes precedence over the present, indeed is the present and he knows like the poets and as a poetic thinker and inventor of an imaginary optics, that it is through fiction that we transform the world.  It is through struggle and utopia.” (Drew S. Burk, “Translators’ Introduction”, XVIII)





“In the framework of philosophy, complacent self determination never meant anything other than scarcity and war.” (196)

-- Laruelle, François (1992). Théorie des identités.  Paris: PUF.

                                            -----
“There never was philosophical peace—but instead a war or guerilla, and a philosopher never really recognizes fully the autonomy and positivity of another, but reduces, devalues or overvalues it.” (124)

-- Laruelle, François (1995).  Théorie des étrangers.   Paris: Editions Kimé.  1995. [The Theory of Foreigners]        
                                         -----
“Almost all philosophies...have been processes of domination, Nietzsche demonstrating this definitively, and Heidegger confirmed it.  Even philosophical peace is a way of making war.  The philosopher pretends not to know that their thought is unitary and authoritarian, that the philosophical Authorities are at least as powerful as the political.” 253).






“Not only is non-philosophy not accomplished except in works and exercises that  imply a ‘passage to the act’, but its immanent pragmatic nature obliges it to produce statements that you could call performative, statements that manifest by their very existence what in the last instance they are describing—statements at once descriptive and performative; this is the meaning of  ‘non-thetic Reflection’” (170)

-- Laruelle, François (1989). Philosophie et non-philosophie.  Mardaga: Brussels.
                                                   -----
“The chapter [one] argues against the idea that ‘performance’ and ‘philosophy’ are distinct enterprises, and in favour of the concept of ‘performance as philosophy’.  Cull provides a critique of the tendency merely to apply extant philosophy to performance, but also acknowledges the real difficulty of escaping the illustrative mode, suggesting that to do so requires a radical expansion or mutation of the concept of philosophy—as called for by the French theorist François Laruelle in his evocation of ‘non-standard philosophy’.” (5)

“Alloa’s essay [Chapter 7] is a...manifesto for what the philosopher Arno Böhler calls ‘arts-based philosophy’ or ‘philosophy on stage’: an approach that aims to do philosophy from an artistic perspective.  Arts-based philosophy is a ‘post-dramatic way of performing philosophy’ that refuses to admit of any separation between the idea and the context of its expression according to ontology of immanence.” (my bold, 9)

Cf. Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre (2006, in German 1999), which means the emphasis in avant garde theatre since late 60’s, is no longer on  text or ‘storyline’ either, but on the aesthetic and cultural context of  its staging and performance.  Examples for Lehmann are such as The Living Theatre, Performance Garage, Wooster; as well as the ‘hypernaturalism’ (his term, after Baudrillard’s ‘hyperrealism’—the realer than real) of such as F.X. Kroetz and Werner Schwab. ​[129]​ 

--The editors, Encounters In Performance Philosophy (2014).  Ed. Cull and Lagaay.  NY and UK: Palgrave Mcmillan.
  

“This, I’ll suggest, is one dimension of what Performance Philosophy might become—the staging of a felt ‘knowledge’ of ‘unknowing’ in relation to performance as that which resists all ontological attempts to capture it as a whole.” (16)​[130]​

“Might we...say that performance itself thinks, that performance itself philosophizes—not in a way that reduces it to being the ‘same as’ philosophy...?”  (25)

“Laruelle...argues that ‘we must first change the very concept of thought, in its relations to philosophy and other forms of knowledge.’...  ‘It enlarges the set of things than can count as thoughtful, a set that includes extant philosophy, but also a host of what are often presently deemed (by philosophers) to be nonphilosophies and non-thinking (art, technology, natural science.’)”​[131]​(29)

“Might Performance Philosophy be this: an embodied attitude or act that acknowledges ‘the deep contestability of the most basic assumptions’ of any theory we might adopt, a sensed pluralism ‘that imbues the willingness to constantly re-vision the object and to re-view...how others view it too’” (33)​[132]​

--Cull, Laura. (2014).  “Performance Philosophy: Staging a New Field.”  Encounters In Performance Philosophy (2014).  Ed. Cull and Lagaay.  NY and UK: Palgrave Mcmillan.
  
“...people feel constantly pressurized to be active, creative and what’s more successful, while increasingly risking over-exhaustion, physical and mental burnout [see Jon McKenzie, Perform or Else?].​[133]​  It seemed to me that as a first step, one method to effectively begin to critique this dangerous and alienating development was to explore the negative side of performance: not-doing, waiting, hesitating, refraining from naming or asserting; sleeping, being passive, letting-be etc.” (Lagaay, 51)

“In this context I have learnt a lot from Ivan Vyskocil, one of the major protagonists of the Czech theatre avant-garde of the twentieth century.  [his] Non-theatre....provides some framework that is important in order to cultivate a particular way of acting beyond the focus on efficiency and performance....one particular experiment of Non-theatre [was] called ‘(Inter)acting with the Inner Partner’.  In this practice, the actor enters a free stage watched by the spectators for several minutes—her colleagues practicing the same thing one after another.  The practitioner has no task to perform, no role to incorporate, no object to operate with.  She appears in so-called public solitude.  Public solitude is understood as a situation in which we do not contact the spectators in any way...” (Koubava, 53).

“...this practice [negative performance] does not bring any ontological revelation, resoluteness or re-birth in the form of change into authenticity, the knowledge ‘that’ one is, as Dasein, a potentiality-of-being.  Rather I would say that the nothing lets the actor be.  This means that instead of attaining some knowledge or an attitude of resoluteness,​[134]​ the actor feels released....It is sufficient to be close enough to oneself, to feel oneself near so that one can cease to be interested in oneself and one’s projects....It is not important to be authentic, original, amusing, or eccentric at any price at this moment.  The figure can be quite banal and obvious, impersonal.  The most important thing is to stay close to the nothingness...” (ibid, 54-55)





Extending The Concept of Non-Photography (2011), countering Philosophy’s control of Art—Art “resists the enterprise and rebels” (1), rebutting the consideration of Art as deficient philosophy: Photo-fiction= a non-standard aesthetics (8)

“...the photographer...will abandon the faith (in philosophical reality also) that as an artist he attains a truer real. ”(108, my trans.)

“[Photo-fiction] is a return to the Kierkegaardian and theatrical sense of ‘repetition’ rather than the automaticity of repetition (which determinist necessity often implies) in such a way that the individual agent—subject manipulator of the apparatus merges with the general process....The world of the photo is now the end of realism via an excess of the real....The artist of photo-fiction...loses his realist and causal belief in the world...the photo is no longer an instrument of enslavement of individuals to the world.” (21-22)

“The style of photo-fiction is taking a photo with one’s eyes closed, on the condition that one admits they are closed, which is to say they had been open and more precisely, that they are half-closed...” (35)

“To photograph an object is to address the big Other that either validates or not my understanding.” (50).

Opposed to a principle of “sufficient photography”=photo reducible to philosophy or the world (56-57)

“Photo-fiction is...an insurrection against the all-too-great superior faculties....Art is the world without the world, the entire world but without its over-determined concept...[the] insurrection does not simply substitute itself for domination but acts upon it—redirects it toward its spontaneously insurrectional roots, but which has taken a ‘wrong turn’ into over-transcendence and over-totality.” (63, 65)

“The photo has something sterile about it.  It floats or wanders like angelic multitudes that amble from heaven to earth and hesitate to posit themselves.” (70)

Philosophy as a selfie! (172).

-- Laruelle, François (2012f).  Photo-Fiction, A Non-Standard Aesthetics.  Translated Drew S. Burk.  Minneapolis, Univocal.  Bilingual edition. 
-----
“The end product of this enterprise: the production of non-philosophical statements from philosophical ones.  This we call philo-fiction or hyper-speculation.  Instead of producing effects that only appear non-philosophical by way of processes that remain philosophical (as Heidegger and Derrida do).” (40)

-- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One] 
-----
“Philosophy tolerates fiction on the condition of allotting to it its role and deciding on its essence.  What is at issue here is not therefore any philosophical position of fiction in rapport with the real, but the legislation and rights of philosophy over it.  To understand what’s happening in literature, art, science-fiction, maybe we’ll need to abandon this submission of fiction to a prior philosophical operation and look into the conditions for a rigorous, real and immanent, that is to say quasi-scientific, description of the most undeniable phenomenal givens, those accessible to everyone, to the artist as well as the philosopher, which comprise the specific reality of fiction.” (232)

“Lets finish with the de-realization of fiction; with the historical but vain tentatives to deny to it any pretension to reality or to the co-production of it....If the real is thought of as the nothing-but-real, then fiction will no longer be even of the order of the false, or the lesser real or non-being.” (232)

“Ceasing to subordinate fiction to the authority of philosophy, lets have the latter return to the former, conceiving of philosophy as a more radical mode of this experience, a ‘philosophy fiction’.”(233)

“This rapport of unilateral causality whereby the ultimate phenomenal givens determine fiction, but without being themselves affected with fictionality, we call determination in the last instance.” (233)

“...fiction becomes this radical, non-mixed experience which has no account of itself to render to philosophical rationality, and which is accessible to everyone as One: the Universe or non-thetic Reflection.” (234)

“We pass from the fictional to the fictionel when we assume the point-of-view of the world: the fictionel, in its aesthetic form is a way not of fleeing the World, but after having fled to return and legitimize it.” (237)

“The ‘fictional’​[135]​ does not reflect the world, is not a double or an image of it, even if appears as a simulacra.  Possibly it’s a reflection, but a non-thetic reflection (of the) real.  In its fictional kernel, fiction has never served to repeat the World, but rather—indifferently, to distance it.” (236)
-- Laruelle, François (1989). Philosophie et non-philosophie.  Mardaga: Brussels.
-----
“Philo-fiction is a parallel genre to science fiction, a diminution of dogmatism and of the philosophical axiomatic to the state of a fiction.  Fiction places itself between the real and objective reality, and allows the connection of the two.  Philosophical dogmatism strangles the truth between macroscopic experience and objectivity.  It is a question of slackening this noose that would encircle truth.” (343-44)

-- Laruelle, François (2012c).  “The Degrowth of Philosophy”, lecture,  Abreu Gallery  (NY, 2012).  In  From Decision to Heresy, Experiments in Non-Standard Thought.  Ed. Robin Mckay.  Minneapolis: Urbanomic.  Trans. editor.  
-----
“The generic discipline has some affinity with a philo-fiction that forces the philosophical barrier, its norms, and its criteria of receptivity. It is forcefully heretical...” (81)
-- Laruelle, François (2008a). Introduction aux sciences génériques.   Petra: Paris.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                   
Poverty
“It is appropriate to distinguish the absolute poor—those who are stripped of all their predicates but full of the bedevilling image of Capital as universal predicate, or of the philosophical All—from the radical poor, who are divested only to the point of making apparent their human root, or being able to use their dispossession and turn their destitution against that image itself; that is to say, to subtract themselves from it.” (324-25)




“...Philosophy is a way of thinking whose dogmatism and sufficiency are fundamentally turned against humans it pretends to be meant for.” (44)

-- Borie, Mariane (2007). “La pulsion du chaos: essai sur notre conjoncture”: 31-64. [“The Chaos Drive : Essay on the Conjuncture”]. In Fabriques de l’insécurité. 2007.  Ed. François Laruelle.  Harmattan, [Manufacturers of Insecurity] 
-----              

“All philosophical ideas, simply because they are philosophical, become obsolete by reason of their very eternity, a tiresome repetitive task, through lack of invention” (480)
-- Laruelle, François (2010a). Philosophie non-standard: Générique, Quantique, Philo-fiction.  Paris: Éditions Kimé. [Non-standard Philosophy: Generic, Quantum, Philo-fiction]
-----                    
“Philosophy programs a transformation of the world, but one which is ideal, objectified, incapable of getting an effective grip on it; one that achieves something akin to an effect only by adding to or subtracting from what is given (conceived now as a representation) new and equally ideal determinations that double then redouble it, simplifying or even deconstructing it without really transforming it. Throughout its practice, twentieth-century philosophy has admitted and shown – but only ever under its breath, so to speak, without ever ‘truly’ being aware of it (thereby demonstrating the extent to which its practice remains ideal) – that it has only ever worked with representations, with the logos, which is to say with metaphysics, even as it tried to criticize or deconstruct the latter. Such philosophy remains under the jurisdiction of philosophical tradition and submits to the authority of its tribunal. Genuine transformation does not consist in playing a game (whether at the level of language, of practice, or of the world) with representation, but rather in determining the latter through a radically un-representable agency or instance – more precisely, through a without-representation that allows itself to be thought by means of representations which have been reduced to the status of philosophically inert material.” (184-85)

“Humans are without-philosophy – not just men without qualities but men who are primarily without essence, yet all the more destined-for-the-world or philosophy without having decided or willed it. Philosophy has always wanted us and we have been obliged to consent to it – but have we ever wanted philosophy?”  (187)

-- Laruelle, François (2003). “What Can Non-Philosophy Do?”  Angelaki.  Vol. 8, #2.  (August, 2003): 169-89.  Intr. and trans. Ray Brassier.  
-----                                                                                                                        
The hero emerges as the one who is counted on to deal with the unexpected, but since he must be allowed to do so in his own way, which cannot be that of the System, always anchored in Tradition​[136]​: “This ingerence of the action of a Subject, from now on potentially...author of his own theory, represents a great risk for philosophical thought, an inopportune and dangerous risk for the equilibrium of the ensemble.... and for a moment it comports also the risk of prompting possible but undesirable rebellions against the disposition of  authorities that underlie all political power.  The time of heroic intervention must be therefore clearly indicated as a particular moment, redoubtably efficacious, but decisively more efficacious than redoubtable.  This is why...philosophy invented the kairos, the occasion, this necessary point that constitutes likewise a bridge between tuché and techknè, a junction between chance and technique.  It’s only thanks to kairos that heroic intervention can be limited to a simple effraction into the course of things without being inserted durably.” (266)

“Philosophy, constantly battling chaos, engenders the position of Subject as its founding action, but also the hiatuses, the rebellions that comprise History.” (268)

“On the one hand chronos ,​[137]​ organized, determined and predictable, eminently controllable, because irreversible—and on the other hand kairos, chaotic, hazardous time, where nothing can be calculated.  Philosophy is tireless in wanting to appropriate the kairos, to make it ‘return’ to chronos, condition sine qua non of the Greek cosmos.” (269)
        -- Lesueur, Sophie. (2005).  “Pensée machine et ordre politique”, 251-74. [“Machine Thinking and Political Order”].  In Homo ex Machina Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: L’Harmattan.




“The most widespread statement of political philosophy...is ‘man is X; he must become Y.’  He must do it both for himself, his own survival, but also for the good of all, of the Community, the City: the plurality must absolutely, in whatever way, yield to unity, under the pain and menace of chaos.” (251)

“Law and politics: these two terms essential for political philosophy; one like the other imposing as mechanisms aiming at maximal reduction of the Multiple to the One.  Law ushers in the notion of rational order imposed by ‘the way things are’ (circumstances) or else following a certain constituted logic (necessity or propriety of a body, a being...)....  As to representation, it occupies a central place in political reflection, because of the impossibility of conceiving philosophically social unity with it.  In effect, representation is the only way of making an invisible being (unity of political body) appear by means of a being visible in the public sphere (representatives, less numerous, are potentially more capable to summon a common will), as the only way of passing the whole society through a funnel that allows better control of the rapports of force, a step toward the postulated and wanted unity.” (257-58)

“The Vision-in-One, Thought according to Identity [with the Real], is the posture that radically suspends participation with any mechanism of power and subjection; in that respect non-philosophy is and remains equally foreign and indifferent to whatever constitutes the essence of a mechanical process.  If it is a machine, it is uniquely in the transcendental sense of the term, that is to say as ‘tool’, allowing at once the integration of elements essential to the understanding of system(s), but also and especially to discover, precisely on the basis of the Inspired as Source—an elsewhere of politics, which no longer grows out of the typically ordered philosophical topos.” (273)
-- Lesueur, Sophie. (2005).  “Pensée machine et ordre politique”, 251-74. [“Machine Thinking and Political Order”].  In Homo ex Machina Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: L’Harmattan.
-----
“It may well surprise us that Laruelle is also an inventor of power.  Isn’t his work indeed ruled by the search for a beyond the principle of power (according to the title of a work from Phi I)?​[138]​   Even more so, in Une biographie de l’homme ordinaire (Phi II, 1985)—a book structured by the opposition of non-philosophical minorities to philosophical authorities—doesn’t Laruelle denounce, only to push them further, the limits of this very search beyond power?  ‘There is a minoritory amphibology, deriving from the dominant element in Greek thought about the minority, condemning minorities to a beyond of power, of the principle of power.  This is the contemporary solution, which finds its arguments and fundaments in Freud, Nietzsche, Heidegger (...): the beyond of power remains in the net of power, which has simply been enlarged.’   This singular critique of power...continues right up to Phi IV where Laruelle denounces the ‘labyrinth of strength and weakness where philosophers wander’ , aiming particularly at ‘Levinas’ in the measure that the latter ‘transfers to weakness all the characteristics of the force being exercised against it.’” (234-35)​[139]​

“Does non-philosophy constitute a specific discipline, without equivalent in contemporary thought—its equivalent being rather of the order of philosophy itself?  Or does it rather remain with the typically contemporary action of denunciation/invention of power? (237)

-- Choplin, Hughes (2007).  L’espace de la pensée française contemporaine à partir de Levinas et de Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [The Terrain of Contemporary French Thought, with Focus on Levinas and Laruelle] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
Real (the)

“Let’s posit the Real or the ultimate ‘essence’ of man—to still utilize these terms—is radical unhappiness (malheur radical), one identical with a basic solitude, a solitude-without-essence, of the human being before the Creation even, an ‘inconsistency’ that frees him from philosophy and the world combined, even more so from any ethic, but that makes judgment of ethics possible finally, under the name of ‘non-ethics’.” (9)

-- Laruelle, François (2000). Ethique de l’étranger: du crime contre l’humanité.  Paris: Kimé. [Foreigner Ethics : Of Crimes Against Humanity]  
                                                                                            
This is ‘malheur radical’ is ‘radical unhappiness’, as opposed to the “radical evil”  (mal radical) of Kant, who seems to have suggested thereby, followed I think by such as Arendt, for whom it has become so common it is ‘banal’, that evil is there as an essence, quantity or quality, part of our nature and the world that ‘we give into.’  For Laruelle the ‘mal’ would be rather structural, related to the human condition, an ‘unhappy’ one; hard to argue with him there.... Radical unhappiness overlaps or is perhaps synonymous with two other non-philosophical terms Laruelle often invokes: Radical Solitude (the common fate) and the Stranger or Foreigner we are all, ultimately, or in-the-last-analysis.  Laruelle cautions against a tragic take on these terms.
                                                  -----
“It is not reason that determines what is real; but the real which determines what reason is.” (117)

“...every philosophy pushes aside, implicitly or not, a real it judges too irregular or singular to be reason-able and controllable.” (166)

-- Laruelle, François (1992). Théorie des identités.  Paris: PUF.
-----
“The distinction of the Real of-the-last-instance and of the Stranger as a function of the occasion substitutes for that between essence and existence.  ‘Existence has a cause but not reason’, as is said; it’s a special cause, without essence or signifying structure, without even being causa sui.” (282)

--Laruelle, François (2000). Ethique de l’étranger: du crime contre l’humanité.  Paris: Kimé. [Foreigner Ethics : Of Crimes Against Humanity]

This non-philosophical Real seems to me to be more of a hypothesis, or better yet, invoked as an axiom, than referential or mix (Dyad)—as for instance Parmendes’  Being with Thought, Plato’s with the realm of Ideas, Nietzsche’s link to the Will to Power, Freud’s to drives... 
                                           ------
“...it [the non-philosophical Real] allows the transformation of a philosophical (Marx) and psychoanalytic (Lacan) discourse on the Real into a particularly ‘indicative’ and fecund symptom of an experience of thought, emerging beyond its philosophical possibilities.” (173)
-- Laruelle, Francois (1998a, and collaborators).  Dictionnaire de la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kime.
       -----
“Putting into Dyad is the inaugural act of philosophy, incapable of conceiving of an integral identity (the One, of F. Laruelle)....Philosophical representation functions only in and by this scission of identity.  To be conceived, the identity (of the) real must be divided then ‘connected with a Superior same’” (italics sic, citing FL,  Philosophie et non-philosophie, 1989, p. 56.)

“ ‘The real should itself determine in the last instance how it is described’” (italics sic, 151, citing FL, Théorie des identités, 61, where I found it without italics)
Another stab at this elusive but essential concept of determination-in-the-last instance:  Laruelle was adopting Marx’s concept of causality, as relayed and reinterpreted by Althusser (who also filtered it through Lenin), whereby, for instance, if economics is the crucial element in the ‘history of class war’ it can’t be considered the only one, just the one with the final say, so to speak... In Laruellian terms, as I conceive them therefore: we (humans) may speak for the real and even affect it, but in the final analysis the real exists apart from us, and it is even more beneficial from a human point of view to conceive of it, finally, as non-human, since the centrality of the human always involves the more or less apparent, but always deceiving illusion of the ‘sheltering sky’ or creator...
-- Leboeuf, Mathias (1998)“La Peinture telle qu’elle,” 137-68. [“Painting As Such”]. In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion]
-----
“A simple presentation of non-philosophy conveys that it distinguishes unilaterally the Real from Being and from thought, language, knowledge, not to mention God etc.” (15)
-- Laruelle, François (2007b). Mystique non-philosophique à l’usage des contemporains.  L’Harmattan. [Non-philosophical Mystics for Contemporaries]

My sense here is that since for Non-philosophy the Real cannot be described in language, Being, although closer to it (there is such a thing for Laruelle as ‘closer’) does not really render it either.  Neither in fact does the ‘Real’, or any other words used to approximate it, like the One, Vision-in-One and so forth.  They are just labels, or pointers, and shouldn’t be taken as what they mean, but as pointing to the fact that what they mean can’t be said, ‘Being’ coming with such heavy baggage of meaning, Laruelle reminding us that it too is ‘just a word’.    Above in the first entry under Real, as a matter of fact he calls the real ‘radical unhappiness’ (malheur radical), but says something like ‘if we must have words for it’, in other words not to assume the real has really been expressed thereby.                                                                      
                                   -----
“Missing causality, missing the real, is not all discourse a discourse on the scarcity of reality?  Once more we’re making a more or less hidden reference to surrealism. ​[140]​  The reality that lacks always is its pretension to be consubstantial with thought, which philosophy does not succeed in satisfying and we’re trying to satisfy otherwise?” (n.93, p. 194)

“We will be encountering two other names for the Real, the One and the Vision-in-One.  The Real can have any number of names, according to the subject in question, all the while remaining Real-in-Real.  This confirms the indifference of the Real to language.” (n. 120, p. 198)

-- Bertocchi, Alessandro (2006). Philosophie et non-philosophie du poétique.  Houdiard: Paris.
-----
“the Real is given before all giving” (17)

“If the hypothesis of the force (of) thought is non-philosophical it is precisely because the Real is not non-philosophical, just as besides it is neither philosophical, nor scientific, nor artistic, nor phenomenal...[sic]  It isn’t, strictly speaking, it does not exist, that is to say (in being) only in-the-last-instance, it manifests under no aegis.  You make the One as a transcendental hypothesis, the force (of) thought or the Foreigner, exist, you make it act, on the basis of a Real One that does not exist.” (48).

-- Bufalo, Erik del (2003). Deleuze et Laruelle: de la schizo-analyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé.
-----
“If we want to formulate correctly the question of the effects of non-philosophy, we must have ‘exited’ from the world without first having had to enter into it in order to leave it. We have to think according to the real – which does not mean without the world – rather than according to the world. Non-philosophy is entirely oriented towards the future, and, more fundamentally, it is entirely oriented towards a utopia of the real.(181)

“What alienates the subject is a system of transcendental hallucination and illusion that obviously goes unnoticed, but which the subject has to notice and whose spell he has to shake off, without being able simply to destroy it, in order to constitute himself as such or as subject for the world. To believe that the world can be treated in the same way as an object in the world, that it gives rise to the same kinds of illusion, would simply be a philosophical delusion. The proper distinction is not so much between world and entity as between the world supposedly subsisting in-itself (within an operational transcendence) and the world as reduced or delivered from its sufficiency. Consequently, the distinction is not so much between the world and another realm of practice in-itself, or between the world and a transcendent realm of practice, but between two ways of relating to the world, one governed by the world, the other determined according-to the real.” (181)

-- Laruelle, François (2003). “What Can Non-Philosophy Do?”  Angelaki.  Vol. 8, #2.  (August, 2003): 169-89.  Intr. and trans. Ray Brassier. 
-----

“...a ‘non-philosophy’ of film, that thinks according to the Real...entails a responsibility toward films own ‘intentions’...or to what film ‘wants’.... What film wants is shown indirectly through its resistance to extant philosophy and theory.” (189)
      -- Mullarkey, John (2009). Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image.  London: Palgrave McMillan.
       -----
“Just as there is a 'matter' beyond the Idea and beyond the hyle, there is likewise - insofar as we are beyond the distinction between knowing and the real- a knowing beyond ideal essence. No rational, ratiocinative or merely logical argument will
be able to overcome the resistance proper to this knowing (perhaps we should write gnosis?) - a knowing identical to those immediate data belonging to a transcendental experience (of) the One - through which we know that even the light of the Idea is still relative, relative to this gnosis as to an absolute knowing. Materialism still concedes far too much to idealism, and the gnosis of 'matter', the otherwise-than-materialist gnosis of the dispersive real, must be sought beyond materialism and
beyond the hyle. It is a supplement for materialism as such, but a supplement of matter rather than of materialism, and a supplement of the real rather than of matter, consonant with a new interpretation of the 'veritas transcendentalis'. Another Kehre? A new turning beyond the Idea's accomplished form as presence, 'will to power' and 'Eternal recurrence', Being? Certainly not a turning ... Only the path of the Idea,
of Being, of ontological ideality, knows and tolerates such turnings. We seek a multiplicity beyond essence, one as dis-continuous, as un-Nietzschean, as possible ... one that is immediately given.”​[141]​ (109)

-- Laruelle, François (1981). Le principe de minorité.  Paris: Aubier. [The Minority Principle]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                
Representation
 “Schopenhauer marks a complete rupture with Western philosophy which, since Descartes, sought to provide a theory of knowledge, that is to say, an explanation of the relation between the human being and the objective world, a relation resulting in science and ‘materialism’.  By the latter term, Kandinsky understands the type of thought that only recognizes external being as being real.  Against this view, Schopenhauer claimed that the world is only a secondary representation, an illusory double and an objectification of the true reality of Being. This non-objectifiable, inner and hidden reality is what he calls the Will, and it is only another name for life.”  (113)
“One has to get used to the idea that art does not represent anything—not a world, a force, an affect or life.” (121)
-- Henry, Michel (2009).  Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky.  Trans. Scott Davidson.  New York: Continuum.  Orig. pub,  1988: Voir l’invisible. Paris: François Bourin
-----
“What is a feeling deprived of its reality, a feeling which does not experience itself interiorly...? It is merely a represented feeling.  We will call it an ‘unreal feeling’.  An unreal feeling is a feeling given in representation instead of being a feeling in its affectivity....Acts of representation differ from acts of perception insofar as their object is not the thing itself but merely a ‘portrait’, an ‘image’, a ‘reproduction’, or a ‘representation’ of this thing in its absence..” (627)

-- Henry, Michel (1973).  The Essence of Manifestation.  Trans. Girard Etzkorn.  The Hague: Nijhoff.  Orig. pub, 1963: L’essence de la manifestation.  Paris: PUF.                 
-----

 “Henry’s central thesis...bears on the radical distinction between representation and life.  Representation is incapable of seizing reality, because reality then only offers itself through a visibility in which it reveals itself while at the same time concealing itself.  Being is not visible and does not represent itself.  Thus whatever partakes of the problematics of subject and object must be declared to be unreality and illusion....[however] beneath the  phenomenality of the visible, the original essence can be grasped.  It is this that Descartes termed ‘soul’, that Schopenhauer named ‘body’, Nietzsche ‘will to power,’ Freud ‘the unconscious’, and what Michel Henry prefers to designate ‘life’, that is to say affectivity, that which is experience in itself as pure immanence.” (Roustang, x)

“We can see that representation has nothing to do with phenomenality’s  original upswelling, because sensation—pain for example—is entirely what it is in the immanence of its affectivity without being first posed before itself, in-front of itself: in order to be certain of itself, it has no need of that coming to obstance; its suffering is sufficient.” (70-71)​[142]​

“But we must not merely contest Heidegger’s affirmation that ‘representational thinking...is a fundamental characteristic of all human behavior, even nonepistemological behavior.’  We must overturn it.  Not only are the nonepistemological ‘behaviors’, like feelings, passions, and will totally foreign to representation in Descartes, but this radical incompatibility constitutes and defines the cogito’s original dimension.” (78-79)​[143]​

 “Whatever deploys its essence independent of representation (independent of the ecstatic​[144]​ dimension that gives representation its light) remains in itself, in its radical immanence.” (169)

“As immanence, life’s original meaning is so unheard of, so foreign to representivity, that Schopenhauer cannot help interpreting it according to representivity.  In representation’s open space, anyone who moves according to a nonrepresentative principle is like a drunken fool.” (171)

“In the end, only a mode of thought deliberately opposed to representation, to its foundation as well as its forms, the actuality of praxis, can deliver power from ek-static lighting and same its original possibility.  That is what occurs when adopting Maine de Biran’s brilliant discoveries as his own, Schopenhauer locates the center of the debate in the body—not the body of representation, which traditional philosophy has exclusively and superficially devoted itself to, thus missing any possibility of grasping the essence of power, of any power whatsoever, especially that of the body.” (322)
-- Henry, Michel (1993).  The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis.  Trans. Douglas Brick.  Intro. François Roustang, “A Philosophy for Psychoanalysis?”.   Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
                                                                -----
 “One Less Manifesto” [Deleuze] is nothing less than a call to arms for theatre practitioners and audiences alike....The programme: to construct a theatre that escapes representation and creates the conditions for presence as the encounter with what Deleuze calls ‘continuous variation’....Deleuze’s essay draws on Bene’s​[145]​ example to articulate a tripartite methodology for creating a theatre of ‘non-representative force’: (1) deducting the stable elements, (2) placing everything in perpetual variation, (3) then transposing everything in minor​[146]​....[tantamount to] the removal from theatre of what he calls ‘the elements of Power’.  This is an operation on the form of theatre as much as its contents: not only a subtraction of representations of power (kings and rulers) but the subtraction of representation as power.  For Deleuze, representation means the assumption and imposition of stasis upon that which perpetually differs from itself.” (5)
--The editors. Encounters In Performance Philosophy (2014).  Ed. Cull and Lagaay.  NY and UK: Palgrave Mcmillan.


“In the introduction to Difference and Repetition (1968), Deleuze singles out Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as two thinkers of repetition who have introduced radically innovative means of expression into philosophy by elaborating an anti-representational notion of movement.  These authors invent a philosophy that directly proposes itself as a theatrical philosophy, a philosophy in the guise of theatre.  For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, it is a question of ‘producing within the work a movement capable of unsettling the spirit outside of all representation: it is a question of making movement itself a work, without interpretation’ (ibid, English trans. of 1994, p. 8)” (71)
 
“Among the virtues of Deleuze’s interpretation of Bene’s theatre is the way in which it characterizes it as an anti-historical theatre of the immediate.  For Bene, what is immediate—the time of Aion—is the act that suspends the actions of history—the time of Kronos. Theatre must be anti-representational in so far as it needs to recuperate the anti-historical elements of history.  As Bene has it, ‘the history we live, the history that has been imposed on us, is nothing other than the result of the other histories that this very history had to oust in order to affirm itself’.  The principal task of theatre is therefore to ‘wage war’ on history.” (ibid, p. 74)

-- Chiesa, Lorenzo (2014) “A Theatre of Subtractive Extinction: Bene Without Deleuze”. Encounters In Performance Philosophy (2014).  Ed. Cull and Lagaay.  NY and UK: Palgrave Mcmillan.
-----
“...when looking at Freud’s case study of ‘The Wolfman’...Deleuze takes an anti-representational and anti-oedipal standpoint: the aetiology of the case does not  involve a wolf standing for a father, it involves a wolf or, rather, a man becoming a wolf.  The image, for Deleuze, is not a metaphor for something else, it does not represent: it is its own thing, a real process.  Metaphors are metamorphoses....:... ‘Freud obviously knows nothing about the fascination exerted by wolves and the meaning of their silent call, the call to become a wolf...’”.​[147]​ (84-85)
       
               -- Mullarkey, John (2009). Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the  Moving Image.  London: Palgrave McMillan. 

                  ---
“In effect, what else is representation in politics if not the substitution of a person for someone else, because pretended to be more qualified or wiser, or at least more efficacious from the point of view of the objectives of the system?” (258)

“There is convertibility between Man and the State in modern political philosophy, subsisting in contemporary political philosophy in the form of creation/representation, whereby the human has been foreclosed, reduced to the status of process or mechanism.  Our hypothesis is that there is an In-Man that escapes from all convertibility....This In-Man or Foreigner...is a non-representable political Real, Rebel against all tentative of appropriation, manipulation....  Non-philosophy puts an end to the reign of terror in politics, as it has been tyrannically imposed in philosophical mode....It substitutes the thought according to the Real for thought according to order.” (260)
-- Lesueur, Sophie. (2005).  “Pensée machine et ordre politique”, 251-74. [“Machine Thinking and Political Order”].  In Homo ex Machina Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: L’Harmattan.
---
“By emphasizing the bodily being-in-the-world of humans, embodiment creates the possibility for the body to function as the object, subject, material and source of symbolic construction, as well as the product of cultural inscriptions.  Theatre and literary studies long overlooked this obvious fact.  The same is true for cultural anthropology....Accordingly, cultural anthropology was dominated by the explanatory metaphor of ‘culture as text,’ which Thomas Csòrdas contrasts with the concept of embodiment.​[148]​  He defines it as ‘the existential ground fo culture and self’ and confronts the concept of representation with that of ‘lived experience’ and ‘experiencing’. (89)

“Since the 1960’s, theatre, action and performance artists have repeatedly....based their performance on the radical opposition of presence and representation, which allowed them to isolate and magnify the phenomenon of presence.  The newly established genre of action and performance art...vehemently opposed the theatre’s convention to depict as present fictive literary worlds and their characters.  This form of theatre epitomized representation.  Its presentness remained an ‘as if,’ a pretense.  What occurred in an action of performance always really happened in the present—in real space and time, always hic et nunc.  Theatre in the 1960’s completed the oppositionality of representation and presence by erasing the still widely assumed unity of actor and dramatic character and created ever new ways of separating the two.” (97)

“While Lewald, Akáts, and others saw the value of the mise en scène in its ability to illustrate and represent something else, [Edward Gordon] Craig’s conception of the mise en scene stresses the use of all artistic and technical means to make something appear as itself....Mise en scene here does not refer to a strategy of representation but to one of creation.” (186)

--Fischer-Lichte, Erika (2008). The Transformative Power of Performance: A new aesthetics.  London and NY: Routledge.
---
“These new forms of appearance—the creative occupations of UK Uncut, the encampments of Occupy, the human microphone....are like models or theatrical stagings, both metaphorical and practical, and their importance is as much about manifesting an image of a ‘we’ as they are an implementation of that collective force....But has this focus on the fabrication of forms of community been taken too far?  Many critics on the left have warned of the danger of fetishizing these forms of organization....pernicious is the way that exclusions are reinstated: even as these new forms attempt to counter the hierarchies of received forms of representation, the ‘democracy’ they create frequently remains open only to those who have economic or social privilege....As Jodi Dean and Jason Jones summarise, some advocates of these social movements describe their practices as anti- or post representation, characterized by non-hierarchical horizontality, individual self-determination and self-authorization.​[149]​ Indeed, in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Declaration,​[150]​ in which they attempt to articulate Occupy and other popular movements of 2011, ‘representation’ recurs as an obstacle to democracy: ‘representation is in itself, by definition, a mechanism that separates the population from power, the commanded from those who command’, they write.; it blocks democracy rather than fosters it’.
--Schmidt, Theron. (2017 ).  “Is This What Democracy Looks Like?  The Politics of Representation and the Representation of Politics,” Performing Antagonism: Theatre, Performance & Radical Democracy.  Ed. Fisher and Katsouraki.  London: Palgrave Macmillan, 101-30.
---

“As pointed out by Bruno Bosteels, for Badiou ‘dialectics ultimately means a form of thinking that grasps the truth of a situation not by way of mediation, but through an interruption, a scission, or a cut in representation’. (211)​[151]​

“In Being and Event (2006) [1988], Badiou writes: ‘Rather than a warrior beneath the walls of the State, a political activist is a patient watchman of the void instructed by the event.’  Here, what is required of the militant is to place faith in the void.  That is, to be open to the possibility of a truth transiting the gap between situation and the state of the situation (or representation of the situation). (225)

--Dalmasso, Fred (2017). “Remote Spectating: Drone Images and the Spectacular Image of Revolt,”  Performing Antagonism: Theatre, Performance & Radical Democracy.  Ed. Fisher and Katsouraki.  London: Palgrave Macmillan: 209-29.
---
“...Michel Foucault has already taught us that it is power that creates resistance and, for that reason, power continually works against itself, constituting its own limits.​[152]​  Likewise, for other post-Marxist critics, such as Erneseto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, it is power conceived in relational and hegemonic terms that creates resistance and struggle....In this particular sense, the term hegemony is also seen to designate an identity construction that is a product of representation....But if representation is intimately connected to the practice of hegemony, then it might also be argued that the task of freeing life from certain forms of representation is not what leads to emancipation, but what compels emancipation through and within a person’s participation in antagonistic processes whereby people come to be newly authorized...” (290-91)

“If tragedy, ‘in its repeated scenes of horror—both physical and psychological’, as Catherine Silverstone observes in her co-edited collection Tragedy in Transition [2007], ‘works at the limit of representation’, then it could equally be argued that there is nothing more political than the negation of the order of representation—which put in particularly antagonistic terms, is the ‘limit’ of that order.​[153]​ (292)

“In his Disagreement, Rancière explains that politics needs to be thought of as a matter of ‘performing or playing, in the theatrical sense of the word, the gap between a place where the demos exists and a place where it does not’.​[154]​  What this association leads us straight to is the issue of representation that in the context of the ‘political’, theatrically speaking, is always the contingent dramatization of dissensus—‘the unauthorized and impromptu improvisation of a democratic voice, as Peter Hallward puts it,​[155]​ that stirs up the old tensions of ‘anti-theatricality’.  Anti-theatrical discourse contradicts and problematises the formal structures of theatrical representation in negating appearance and semblance over dispassionate truth or reality itself.” (293-94)
                                                  
--Katsouraki,  Eve (2017). “Epilogue: The ‘Trojan Horse’—Or, from Antagonism to the Politics of Resilience.”  Performing Antagonism: Theatre, Performance & Radical Democracy.  Ed. Fisher and Katsouraki.  London: Palgrave Macmillan: 289-311.
--- 
“Jérôme Bel’s Critique of Representation”​[156]​....In his piece The Last Performance (1998), the question of presence, visibility, representation, and subjectivity are brought to the fore, and then examined, probed, exhausted....four dancers...continuously exchange names, characters, subjectivities: a body that is not Jérôme Bel opens the piece by announcing to the audience, deadpan, alone center stage, by the standing microphone, “Je suis Jérôme Bel”....The Last Performance displays very clearly how bodies and subjectivities are held captive within linguistic, cultural, but also within material and physical spaces of representation.  All of Bel’s works display how putative ‘outsides’ of choreography (particularly language and the actual space of the theatre) are in fact accomplices to a collective subjection to representation. But his work also displays how the end of representation remains both a project and an impossibility.  Bel would agree with Derrida when he writes, ‘because it has always already begun, representation therefore has  no end’​[157]​....His work displays the ambiguity of subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari identify when they state, ‘we fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are’.​[158]​  But if representation’s end remains an unfinishable political and esthetic project, the exploration of its means remains a necessity—given representation’s entanglement with hegemonic forms of subjection....Indeed, Bel’s pieces constantly indicate that both performers and audiences are coextensively  trapped in those particularly charged representational machines: language and the theatre.  In the piece Jérôme Bel (1995), four naked dancers walk onto the stage carrying only a lit light bulb and some white chalk....the old woman...holding the light bulb writes and stands under ‘Thomas Edison’​[159]​.  The younger woman...who will sing the entire The Rite of Spring throughout almost all of Jérôme Bel writes and stands under ‘Stravinsky, Igor’.  The former indexes the photology at the core of representation; the latter foregrounds the haunting force of dance trickling down across time.  The localized light, the emptiness of the stage, the nakedness of the dancers, all the names overdetermining presence (including the choreographer’s name, hovering throughout as the title of the piece), all show how representation operates as an isolating and centripetal force that constantly defines its space as one of pure interiority.  Jérôme Bel’s Jérôme Bel reminds us that, if representation allows for an experience of an outside, it is only in a subordinate relation to the inside that representation holds, preserves and reproduces.  And what representation endlessly reproduces is itself—representation reproduces its power for perpetually mirroring its self-embrace.  This is how Jean-Luc Nancy describes representations’ functioning in his short essay, ‘The Birth to Presence.’ For Nancy, ‘representation is what determines itself by its own limit’.  Thus the temporal and geographical expansion of the West corresponds to an endless, centripetal reiteration of the West’s confinement within its own ‘closure...named representation’.​[160]​
       Bel explores and destabilizes the self-enclosure of representation by messing up the reified isomorphism representation establishes between presence, visibility, character, name, body, subjectivity, and being—for representation, all functionally equivalent concepts sustaining the fantasy of the subjects’ unity.” (45-50)

“It should not be taken lightly that the birth of choreography—as a name and as discipline—happened through the writings of a priest.​[161]​  This is where the history of choreography reveals its more than metaphoric entanglement with what Derrida, in his essay on Artaud, called representation’s ‘theological stage’....such a stage ‘comports...an author-creator who, absent and from afar, is armed with a text and keeps watch over, assembles, regulates the time or the meaning of representation, letting this latter represent him as concerned what is called the content of his thoughts, his intentions, his ideas.  He lets representation represent him through representatives, director or actors, enslaved interpreters who represent the thought of the creator.’​[162]​” (52)

“The mode of performance that occasions the self-enclosure of subjectivity within representation as an entrapment in spectacular compulsive mobility is the one that early modernity invents and gives a proper name: choreography.  Choreography is a necessary technology for an agitated subjectivity that can only find its ontological grounding as a perpetual being-toward-movement.
    Describing the main characteristics of the work of German choreographer Thomas Lehmen, dance theorist Gerald Siegmund indicates some traits that I believe could be extrapolated to characterize Jérôme Bel’s own critique of dance’s participation in this project of perpetual agitation.  Siegmund notes that it is important ‘to avoid representing the body as a sign to be consumed by the audience as a representation of flexibility, mobility, youth, athleticism, strength and economic power.’​[163]​  It is no wonder that dance must be slowed down—as a way of decelerating the blind and totalitarian impetus of the kinetic-representational machine.” (58)

“The moment one gives up one’s verticality, the first thing one discovers is that even the smoothest ground is not flat.​[164]​  The ground is grooved, cracked, cool, painful, hot, smelly, dirty....[Paul] Carter advances his notion of a ‘politics of the ground’ in his  extraordinary book The Lie of the Land (1996:302), where he probes a troublesome question: what are the deep relations between ‘all that is comprehended by the Western arts of representation’ (ibid 5) and the philosophical, political, kinetic and racial underpinnings of ‘the colonial experience’ (ibid 13), particularly of colonialist racism?  Carter ties the question of colonialism to the question of representation, to the question of ontology, and to the notion of the ground.” (99)

“[Marcia] Siegel proposes that dance’s inability to be held, the inability for it to acquire an endurable temporality and a density, is what clogs its inclusion in economy: ‘precisely because it does not lend itself to any form of reproduction, dance was the only one of the arts that had not been cut up into handy packages and distributed to a mass market’.​[165]​  But I would argue that not lending oneself to reproduction does not extricate one from hegemonic forces and ontological violences proper of the representational, of the economy of representation, what Derrida called ‘economimesis’​[166]​  For it is precisely dance’s self-depiction as a lamentably ephemeral art form, the melancholic drive at its core, that generates systems and performances of high reproducibility...A  whole economy of dance and its supplements energized by the melancholic plaint of the lawyer Capriol​[167]​ allows precisely for dance and dances to constantly be recycled, reproduced, packaged, distributed, institutionalized, sold.  Siegel’s depiction of dance’s existence at the vanishing point ironically places it right back at the core of the psycho-philosophical system that allows the reproducibility of representation at the (ontotheological) core of the visible.....To exist at the vanishing point is to exist right at the core of that which guarantees the very possibility of representation, it is to exist at the core of the power in representation.” (125-26)




Revolution          

“Here we discover a real change of terrain in the practice of thought generally pointing toward an internal reappropriation of the political field : Through a new economy of thought, we come to understand that the true revolution is a revolution of thought. ” (32)
-- Maclos, Vincent (1995).  “De la Science de l’Histoire à la Science en l’Un: Essai de transformation du concept althusserian de science par F. Laruelle”: 7-32. ["From the Science of History to the Science in One :[ “ Essay in the Transformation of the Althusserian Concept of Science by F. Laruelle”].  In (La) Non-Philosophie des contemporains. Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: Kimé. [The Non-Philosophy of Contemporaries]
---
“If we substitute radical or real identity (unknown in philosophy) for synthesis not only do we cut off the dialectic from its ‘mystical’ totality but we cut off the combination of science and philosophy from the dialectic itself.  This is the introduction of radical democracy into thought between thought’s two possible forms, knowledge and philosophy.... (6) to transform the revolutionary into a heretical subject.” (108)
--Laruelle, François (2015d). Introduction to Non-Marxism.  Tr. Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal.  
                                 ---
“Revolution as process and potentialization, not as entity.” (51)

“The Revolution, insofar as it extends Dissidence and Resistance, is a process whose cruelty  the Bourgeois or Proletarian, since they’ve been grossly and gregariously individualized by classes as statistical entities, cannot tolerate, any more that the Prince or the Citizen—except in letting themselves be destroyed, allowing the constrained masses to escape from under their broken statues.” (69)

“Even the proletariat granted a privileged point of view on the meaning of history or of a revolutionary wisdom innate to it would be part of the discourse of the masters...feeding into particularly a marxism and functioning as a major argument in favor of the philosophy of the subjective essence of manifestation (M. Henry) and his reinterpretation of the thought of Marx....to these ancient hermeneutics we ‘oppose’ an a-logical, a-predicative, univocality, and its non?existential indifference also....This is what the subject is able for when floating or fluctuating in the abyss of the un?power sprung from revolutionary investments before being appropriated, coded, normalized by Reason, the State, Existence, Social Classes, the Subject of the signifier, at once puppets and tyrants, a little of both—in short, our masters new clothes. ” (87-90)

“It is not surprising that marxist and bourgeois activism are responsible for the subjects indifference to becoming subject of the Revolution, thinking of it as something that would break it in two.  They have been able to be constituted  only through the submission of the subject, through a politics of disciplining consisting in making of it and maintaining a gregarious political essence, no matter whether immediate or mediate...” (290)







“The word [la parole] produces action, is defined by that action, as its goal.  Now F. Laruelle writes that the causality proper to philosophy only produces ontic or ontological effects, that is to say imaginary.  On the contrary, the causality proper to non-philosophy produces real effects, allowing him to speak of the performativity of saying [dire].  F. Laruelle supposes the radical identity of saying and doing (‘doing(-in-)saying, saying(-in)doing’).”  (54, citing FL, course at UParis X, 1992-93.)

-- Patoz,  Virginie (1998). “Pédagogie et non-pédagogie,” 39-64.  In Discipline hérétique: esthétique, psychanalyse, religion. Non-Philosophie, le Collectif. Kimé. [Heretic Discipline : Aesthetics, Psychoanalysis, Religion] 
-----

“Non-philosophy has nothing to say.” (107, bold sic, also a heading)






“The subject as I imagine him to be is not always surrounding himself with things, in particular objects: it’s a subject-without-object, and I speak of human solitude.” (216)
-- Laruelle, François (1991). En tant qu’un.  Paris: Aubier. [Insofar As One]
-----
“Radical solitude is one of the many names that Laruelle’s non-philosophy gives to (the state of inhabiting) the identity in the last instance of the human-in-human, the radical concept of humanity, correlating with the real of the pure, nonreflected experience of ‘being human.’” (108)





“It’s the State, and its capitalization of (energetico-temporal) space, that enjoys a really special relation with philosophy, since it is only the manifestation par excellence of the non-separability of the thought-world.” (242)

-- Bufalo, Erik del (2003). Deleuze et Laruelle: de la schizo-analyse à la non-philosophie.  Paris: Kimé.
-----
“... ‘the problematic of a relation to support, or a social bond or contract to maintain and affirm between supposedly autonomous individuals...to assure the constitution and the reproduction of the social body...is only a philosophical ‘question, that is a problematic proper to the State.’​[168]​” (195)





“...under the sign of the ‘Stranger’ as a specific subject of democracy and real content of the ‘proletariat’”. (142)

“This [the Stranger] is what is at least at the heart of a new practice of thought, it is not given by society, culture, language, or history, which are only ‘occasional’ causes’ of its manifestation or its existence....The properties of the Stranger are obviously those of the non-proletariat.  We gather them in the formula of the non-proletarian as transcendental function of the proletariat or class struggle. (146)....The institution of democracy...is only possible through the discovery that man has no ontological place in the World, but merely occupies a situation simultaneously of knowledge, politics and ethics as a Stranger.  Man has nothing essential to expect from the World—if it is not as necessary material from which man can construct a City for which there is no map in society, Culture, or History. ” (148)
   
 -- Laruelle, François (2015d). Introduction to Non-Marxism.  Tr. Anthony Paul Smith.  Minneapolis: Univocal.
-----
“The heretic’s vulnerable opening toward the World exposes the solitary...incessantly suffering because the Lived is sheer suffering (beyond the distinction of pleasure and pain).  The protection that can be provided through the instance of the Subject—by mediation of the Stranger (l’Etranger)—is fatally porous since the Heretic Subject is affected by the radically vulnerable Lived.  ‘Because man is without-consistency, he is on principle, in contrast to other beings, able to be murdered, he is even the Murdered as the first term for heretical thought and for the struggle that it performs.’” (221, citing Laruelle).
--Kolozova, Katerina (2012).  “Theories of the Immanent Rebellion: Non-Marxism and Non-Christianity”, 209-26.  In Laruelle and Non-Philosophy.  Ed. John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul Smith.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press.
  -----
“Cloning the subject Stranger  (sic, heading)
        Philosophy also has its immigrants, at once internal and external, semi-foreigner waves of them.  First there was the wave of philosophers from the East, sowing the seed of philosophy in the Greeks.  The second great wave was marked by the name of Kant, who brought for a moment, but finally always internally, the sense of the real as an Other irreducible to thought and its laws.  The third wave was marked by the name of Freud, of psychoanalysis and ethnology, then by the contemporary postmoderns caught up in the ‘Judaic turn’ taken by Freud; bringing on the experience of the extraterritoriality of the Other, the Stranger more definitively external than internal.....While philosophy was ushered in by the first Stranger, who always increased the pressure, taking on more and more threatening masks, but always individualized, only a second really universal Stranger can bring on this non-differentiating and saving power whose formula, according to Saint Paul, was ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female...’ [Galatians 3, 28—King James]; and we should add ‘neither citizens nor foreigners’.  This second Stranger...alone can vanquish this theatre of comi-tragic masks and syndrome of threats philosophy implacably comports, undoing the illusions necessary to the first Stranger.  The first Stranger was a destiny—philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche—the second is a non-philosophical utopia.” (259-60)

“To the non-essence of mankind, neither individual man nor humanity as ensemble of man as defined by Reason, but as other-Strangers or the Nearby [Prochains], corresponds a multitude of non-ethical judgments.... The search for a rational consensus and its sociologizing form is finished. ” (329)

“The Stranger is not a worker or a laborer of ethics...and while he transforms material, it isn’t through technological process or else continuous abstraction but by his unparalleled solitude.” (335)

“Non-ethics is the kind of decision to become an other-Stranger.  Stranger—we become it without reasons that are particularly ethical, rather heretically by a choice determined-in-the-last-instance by the Without-choice of misery.” (341)

 “[Ours is] a responsibility without finality whose roots are in the universality of unhappiness.... For the Stranger...the World and its Authorities have never been but an occasion, rather than an object or goal; and the task that belongs to the Stranger is to manifest this (unilateralized) being-reduced in the eyes of the World, and to oblige man to detach himself from the World.
     Such a detachment, all the same cannot be of the order of a retreat, step back, or even being-hostage.  The Stranger is entirely a force of insurrection...or—it’s the same thing—of rebellion.  This rebel does not stand up as a thing-force against other things that are also forces—lets not confound the Rebel and the Warrior.” (372-73)

-- Laruelle, François (2000). Ethique de l’étranger: du crime contre l’humanité.  Paris: Kimé. [Foreigner Ethics : Of Crimes Against Humanity] 
-----
“We shall suggest that genericity, without destroying the market and capitalist structure of exchange and equivalence which is necessary to it as the element in which it intervenes and which is of another order, no longer simply reproduces it even with differe(a)nce​[169]​, but contributes to transforming it through its operation which is of the order of idempotence, as we shall make clear later on. This [idempotence] is a transformation that takes place according to a subject of-the-last instance and as its defense as Stranger​[170]​ against capitalist-and-epistemological sufficiency. It bears witness to a completely different ‘program’ of thought than philosophies and thus  epistemologies. It no doubt stems from what we call a ‘human messianism’. Since it is obviously an atheistic messianism, the generic science-thought is not the byproduct of a ‘shameful’ creationism but rather always seeks to eradicate the constantly revived religious and metaphysical nostalgias concerning the scientific.” (50-51)

-- Laruelle, François (2008a). Introduction aux sciences génériques.  Petra: Paris.  
-----
“Pure heresy proceeds with indifference regarding history and philosophy, regarding their common sense which is that of consumerist nihilism, mortifying institutions and worldly and mundane training.  But with the indifference one has for one’s unilateral enemy....It conveys neither an ideology of progress nor even that (already more interesting) of the avant-garde.  It is a pure verticality as an apriori power of refusal, capable of uncovering the enemy-World....Heresy is the eternal and foreclosed protestation of the Foreigner who has no more place in the world than in History....it is a protestation against philosophical consolation.. and against not only religious but also philosophical apocalypses....The pure heretic, not the heretic of something, of some institution of knowledge or belief, is therefore the only non-believer, the only Knower...” (282, trans. slightly modified)

-- Laruelle, François (2012c). From Decision to Heresy, Experiments in Non-Standard Thought.  Ed. Robin Mckay.  Minneapolis: Urbanomic.  Translators various. 
---
      “The Force (of) Rebellion is the specificity of the Foreigner in non-philosophical political mode: if politics must be defined ultimately, it will be determined in Last-Identity from this Foreigner-Rebel, another name for the Existent-in-struggle....Th
e Foreigner-Rebel has broken with all hegemonic order: he is so, not by decision, but because he is radically indifferent to all ortho-doxy, all system of Law...” (260)

      “There is a Real-death.  Philosophy flees from or forecloses it, subjugating Man, making him Subject in arrogating the risk of death.  To break with this mode of thought implies thinking on the basis of Real-death....Thought according to the Real...is much more Force (of) Rebellion than act of resistance.  For the Foreigner-Rebel is he who simply does not recognize authority.  The Foreigner, indifferent to the world and all the back-Worlds, of philosophy, is always already the Rebel directly engaged in-Struggle.” (262-63)






“What’s at stake is the possibility of thinking of the subject beyond subjection, that is to say insofar as autonomous relatively to authoritarian expressions, to quasi-autonomous logico-linguistic systems, really dependant on the action of the real subject...Subjection is inevitable if the subject and his actions be defined in this context ; however this is not the case, when it knows himself to be beyond circular structures.” (p. 218)  ‘Beyond circular structures’, meaning beyond depending on the state etc. or the state upon it.

-- Sumares, Manuel (1995) “Quand être sujet c’est ne pas être assujeti (Wittgenstein)”: 208-21. [“When Being a Subject Doesn’t Mean Being Subjected”]. In (La) Non-Philosophie des contemporains. Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: Kimé. [The Non-Philosophy of Contemporaries] 
                                       -----

Brassier sees the originality of non-philosophy to be a matter of form, style and approach rather than content: “The originality of a philosopher is usually gauged in terms of what he thinks.  By way of contrast, Laruelle’s singular contribution ...is that he proposes to transform how philosophers think.  His innovation is fundamentally formal...a new kind of transcendental​[171]​ logic....It is no longer thought that determines the object, whether through representation or intuition, but rather the object that seizes thought and forces it to think it, or better yet according to it....whereby the object thinks through the subject.” (148-9)
                                                
“The psychosis of instrumental reason​[172]​ allows subjective reflexivity to be swallowed up in the brute opacity of the object.  Yet thanatropic mimicry is the symptom of a non-conceptual negativity which is already at work among objects independently of their relation to subjectivity; a non-dialectical negativity which is not only independent of the mind but realizes the indistinction of identity and non-identity outside the concept.  (We shall see in Chapter 5 how this is the negativity of ‘being-nothing’ through which the object ‘unilateralizes’​[173]​ the constituting object and becomes the subject of its own knowledge.)” (44)

“The transcendental question provoked by the ancestral phenomenon​[174]​ is: how is thought able to know an object whose existence does not depend upon some constituting relation to thought?  In order to address this question, we need to be able to think terms independently of the primacy of relation, and hence to think the primacy of the object over any of its relations to things, whether they be thinking or non-thinking. (64)... We shall attempt to elaborate some of the conceptual resources required for such a task via a critical discussion of the work of François Laruelle... (note, p. 246)”

For Brassier, Laruelle’s characterization of the essence of philosophy (as being self-sufficient, self-defining, complacent and authoritarian) begs the question that there is such an essence: “And it is Laruelle’s own self-avowed preoccupation with identifying the essence of philosophizing (which he prefers to call its ‘identity’), his attempt to uncover a trans-historical invariant governing the possibilities of philosophy, which lies at the root of this conflation....he is driven to do so because he uncritically accepts the Heideggerian premise that the entire history of philosophy can be reduced to a single structure (121).... As with Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’ or Henry’s ‘Life’,​[175]​ and notwithstanding the now familiar claim that subject-object dualism has been left behind, the unobjectifiable immanence of Laruelle’s ‘One’ seems to be situated squarely on the side of the subject rather than on the side of the object.”(127)

-- Brassier, Ray (2007). Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction.  Palgrave Macmillan.
-----
“It is only when Being, the Idea,, the World, and Totality abandon us, but absolutely, when the ontological affects and anguish linked to the power of powerlessness, the supreme possibility of impossibility, the joy also, linked to the higher power of power, when the extreme withering of beings and objects, feelings and powers, creates a vacuum in us, when indeterminacy affects not only all events, their relativity and contingency, but also entirely as such—that is when this experience of a solitude beyond Being itself will have uncovered, outside of any horizon, from now on invisible, outside of any manifesting revelation, a passivity of beings altogether distinct from the solitude of a object, suddenly deprived—relatively, not absolutely—of horizon, light, world, flux, lines of becoming and history.  When this non-reversal, this withering cease being relative events, squeezed between two returns of Being and the Idea and in the angle of convergence and divergence of continuums and fluxes, when they attain a point of non-return or non-revolution, the subject is reduced—if not thrown at...[sic]—a passivity that is the signature of its absoluteness, of its minority, beyond the circle of  life and death...” (184)

-- Laruelle, François (1981). Le principe de minorité.  Paris: Aubier. [The Minority Principle]
-----
“Philosophy has its masses,​[176]​ which are humans in great number in a condition of political and psychological servitude, who need to be taught, those potential philosophers.  The best among them are exemplified as subjects and models programmed by philosophy to teach others, lifting them to the practice and contemplation of contemplation.  Given the multiplicity of dominated and the rarety of subject-models these are distributed through the hierarchies by the philosophical machine, double of the world, under the guidance of the Master Philosopher who reprograms incessantly the machine and watches over its good functioning.  Under a generic regime, we define humans in a manner we call gnostic, by a certain knowledge and un-locatable lived [vécu] that we establish on the basis of knowledge connected to disciplines that humanity ceaselessly produces.  In the last instance all possible human subjects are Sameknowers, knowing the Same, who are distributed or better yet propagate themselves otherwise through the eccentricity of singular or global individuals.” (149)





“Pain is nothing which can present itself to us as a clarified being, as an object; we are never in front of it as in front of something which is in front of us.  Only a representation of pain can present itself in this way, in the form of a transcendent content.” (540)

“The essence of affectivity resides in suffering and is constituted by it,  In suffering, feeling experience itself in its absolute passivity with regard to self, in its impotence at changing itself...as loaded forever with the weight of its own Being....Being, affectivity, in essence is suffering.” (658)

“...must we not now ask about the form of this determined feeling which we call pain or suffering?  Every ‘explanation’ of this presupposes it, presupposes its original arising in the essence of affection, in the essence of affectivity itself...” (660)

“The essence of life, as Nietzsche recognized, ...is an original power of oscillating between suffering and joy, a power anterior to these feelings as their source...” (667) 

“The original and effective revelation of the absolute does not itself precede suffering; it arises at the same time as suffering; it is its arising, the Being-given-to-itself of suffering....It is in this sense that suffering reveals the absolute.” (667)

“Experiencing itself in suffering and in the enjoyment of self, the suffering of existence becomes what it is, viz. this suffering of Being and its enjoyment...: ‘We at least feel ourselves and possess ourselves in the feeling of pain,’ says Fichte, ‘and this alone already gives us an inexpressible happiness.’” (669-70)​[177]​

--Henry, Michel (1973).  The Essence of Manifestation.  Trans. Girard Etzkorn.  The Hague: Nijhoff.  Orig. pub, 1963: L’essence de la manifestation.  Paris: PUF.     
-----            
“Bene’s rejection of a vitalist understanding of life as the continuous variation of ‘pure forces’—the ‘terrible power’ that, according to Difference and Repetition, accounts ontologically for the theatre of repetition—is unquestionable.  Not only...is life nothing other than perpetual putrefaction, but this very process cannot even be understood in terms of movement; according to Bene, conceiving of life as becoming already presupposes the adoption of the standpoint of representation....As Bene writes, since ‘we are handicapped by this mass of signifiers that we ourselves put on stage, all we can do is abolish ourselves as signified, both in the body and the voice’...Judging from sentences like this, Deleuze would then be correct in focusing on the centrality of aphasic and apraxic handicaps in Bene’s theatre....In contrast, Bene prefers to understand his theatre as anti-therapeutic in the wake of Lacanian psychoanalysis.  Just as in Lacan’s ‘analytic theatre...[sic]the anxious demands of the patient-spectator are never attended to or healed...[sic] theatre ‘is sent back to the sender and amplified to the point of rendering it intolerable.  Spectators witness my gestures (apraxia) and my words (aphasia) insofar as they find there their own disguised dilemmas.’”​[178]​ (82-83)





“Our hypothesis is different than that of philosophers whose ideal is that of a super-humanity, descending from the old desire of domination and the hybris of super-humanization.  On the quantum side, this hypothesis...is that of a downfall and of a collapse of this humanity, of a stunting of the metaphysical nature of man as living and therefore of his hegemonic function over nature, revealed to be an apparence or an unreality.” (159)






“We pass from the World to the Universe, from mundane ecology to the ecology of the universe through what we can call the true ‘quantum leap’.  Thought is not the intrinsic property of humans using it to define their essence, which in that case we would call it ‘local’; it is a universal milieu that must free itself from the ‘anthropic principle’” (79)

-- Laruelle, François (2015b). En dernière humanité: la nouvelle science écologique.  Les éditions du cerf.. [In Last Humanity : the New Ecological Science] 
                                                               -----
“A poet, Daumal, has given us a key to our work, if we understand in a quantum way his use of the word ‘superposition’: ‘a human being is a superposition of vicious circles’ (9)​[179]​

“Other than the affinity from its beginnings of non-philosophical practice with the technique of superposition that makes its style difficult to understand for philosophers used to semantics, the order of reasons and reflection...it allows us to explicate one of our most fundamental axioms which is ‘unilateral duality’ as a causality of the Real.  In summary, imagine that you throw dice not in the heaven of ideas, so that they fall on immobile earth, but you throw them instead directly on the waters of the Heraclitian flow; and that knowing what waves will result is the whole problem we are trying to solve.” (31)

“Understood as the primacy of immanence, superposition is the solution to the problem of the Marxist and Structuralist overturning-and-substitution of Hegelian idealism....problems being resolved in a quantum manner and not philosophically, generically and not positively.  This is a wave [sea?] change for philosophy which doesn’t disappear totally....but is conserved as transformed...reduced to the silence proper to the sea or the ocean, not a complete absence of concepts but a flux-without-echo...” (299)
-- Laruelle, François (2010a). Philosophie non-standard: Générique, Quantique, Philo-fiction.  Paris: Éditions Kimé. [Non-standard Philosophy: Generic, Quantum, Philo-fiction]   
-----                 
“Laruelle himself uses the term ‘quantware’ to describe his engagement with quantum theory.  It is not a matter of providing quantum theory with a philosophy, but of creating a discontinuous or non-identical thought.” (39)

    -- Smith, Anthony Paul (2016b). Laruelle: A Stranger Thought.  Malden MA and Cambridge UK: Polity. 
-----
“ ‘What I do is to operate a reduction that I call generic.  Generic reduction consists in bringing together science and philosophy very closely, through an operation that I borrow essentially from quantum mechanics, that of superposition.  A superposition of science and philosophy—so that we are no longer in a hierarchy.....The idea of superposition permits the fabrication of a non-individual generic.  It allows us to fuse contraries intoa quasi-identiy, not a logical identity but an algebraic identity: A+A=A.’’” (22-24, editor citing FL, italics sic)

-- Laruelle, François (2012c). From Decision to Heresy, Experiments in Non-Standard Thought.  Ed. Robin Mckay.  Minneapolis: Urbanomic.  Translators various. 
-----
“If we contract, as indivisible, the phases of the Gospel stories, we obtain Schrodinger’s Christ, with the Resurrection and his cadaver superposed.” (211)

-- Laruelle, François (2015a). Christo-Fiction: the Ruins of Athens and Jerusalem.. Tr. Robin Mackay.  New York: Columbia Univ. Press.                                                                                             

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                          
   Thought

“We pass from the World to the Universe, from mundane ecology to the ecology of the universe through what we can call the true ‘quantum leap’.  Thought is not the intrinsic property of humans using it to define their essence, which in that case we would call it ‘local’; it is a universal milieu that must free itself from the ‘anthropic principle’” (79)

-- Laruelle, François (2015b). En dernière humanité: la nouvelle science écologique.  Les éditions du cerf.. [In Last Humanity : the New Ecological Science] 
-----

“I call the ‘age of poets’ the moment proper to the history of philosophy in which the latter is sutured—that is to say, delegated or subjected to a single one of its conditions.  In essence it is a question of suture to: the scientific condition, in the different avatars of positivism and the doctrine of progress; the political condition, in the different avatars of revolutionary political philosophy; a mixture of the two, which is reflected in Marxism as ‘scientific socialism’....In these conditions, inherited from the nineteenth century the poem can assume within thinking the operation left vacant by philosophy when its suture obliterates or paralyses it....in a situation in which philosophy is sutured either onto science or politics, certain poets, or rather certain poems, come to occupy the place where ordinarily, the properly philosophical strategies of thought are declared.” (4-5)

-- Badiou, Alain (2014). The Age of Poets. Tr. Bruno Bosteels.  N.Y.: Verso.                            
                                                -----
“...he (FL) explains, at the end of Philosophie et non-philosophie (1989) that the ‘ultimate meaning—if there is one in a science that excludes by definition all teleology—of the non-philosophical pragmatic of philosophy’ connects with a radical ‘subjectivity’, more exactly with a ‘becoming human (...) of the philosophical decision....’​[180]​   ‘What we’re no longer able to do?  To think still in terms of (...) differences and mixes, (...) in terms of unity, reconciliation or of contraries belonging together as philosophy does.’  This is what makes us think that the principal stake of Laruelle is less to define a new humanism than to propose, in the wake of Heidegger and especially of Derrida, but in delivering himself from the mix that determines their problematics, -- ‘a mutation in the traditional exercise of thought’ which allows the ‘functioning of thought otherwise than philosophically’.” (48-49)​[181]​

“...non-philosophy produces, in the field of thought, an opening such that it doesn’t seem illegitimate to parallel it, following the suggestions of Laruelle, with the revolutions that have traversed the fields of art and science since the end of the 19th century...[so] it is not surprising that Laruelle proposes, to characterize the originality of non-philosophy...to associate it with a third age of thought, succeeding the two ages of Being (metaphysical age), of the Other (or of difference—contemporary age).”​[182]​ (222, 231)
-- Choplin, Hughes (2007).  L’espace de la pensée française contemporaine à partir de Levinas et de Laruelle.  Paris: L’Harmattan. [The Terrain of Contemporary French Thought, with Focus on Levinas and Laruelle] 
-----
“To the widespread question: what is it to think?, non-philosophy responds that thinking is not ‘thought’, but performing, and that to perform is to clone the world ‘in Real’”. (233)
-- Laruelle, François (2012c). From Decision to Heresy, Experiments in Non-Standard Thought.  Ed. Robin Mckay.  Minneapolis: Urbanomic.  Translators various. 
                                                 -----
“Deleuze forcefully maintained...that thinking is never a matter of voluntary decision or natural inclination.  We are always, he declared, forced to think.” (110)

-- Badiou, Alain (2009).  Second Manifesto for Philosophy.  Trans. Louise Burchill.  Polity: Cambridge UK.
                                                   ------  
“...a non-philosophical realm might be able to think without being reduced to illustrative mode.  That would challenge what we mean by philosophy and thought itself; in our case, not only might film be philosophical but, even worse, philosophy might be filmic.” (xvii)

 “... ‘mediated philosophy’, the possibility of theory becoming an a posteriori activity: no longer an a priori defined theory that is applied to subject matter, but a subject matter that is becoming-philosophical in its own immanent process....As such, the focus moves to the performative dimension of philosophy—philosophy being that which one does, that which one names ‘philosophy’ after the event.  This would be a ‘bottom-up’ extensional characterization....If film is to think, if film is to philosophize, then we must get away from any definition of film, as well as any definition of thinking and philosophy.... ‘Process’ here signifies a quasi-concept at best: it marks the lack of an essence to film rather than a positive definition of one. This is what the non-philosophy of François Laruelle calls a ‘democracy of thought’—what allows every theory to be partially right in as much as each is only partial, but absolutely wrong in as much as each tries to be absolute or transcendent.” (12)​[183]​
-- Mullarkey, John (2009). Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image.  London: Palgrave McMillan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                  

   Truth

“ ‘About everything you can make two affirmations exactly contrary’. Therefore, since value is merely convention, then all values are contingent and none is any more legitimate than any other.” (149)

-- Lacrosse, J.M. (2005). “Pensée radicale en l’Homme”, 89-151.  In Homo ex Machina.  Ed. F. Laruelle. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005.

Citing Protagoras. meaning that you can prove, rationally, the truth of any affirmation—I would think depending, of course, on your premiss...Thousands of years later Kant was affirming similarly with his antinomies in the First Critique: that one could prove, with impeccable logic, contradictory statements; e.g. that creation has a beginning or does not...
-----
“[As opposed to Badiou] Non-Philosophy makes no truth claim at all.  It is instead a thought alongside the Real, not about the Real.  And it is this abstention from reference, this epistemic passivity alongside the Real, that makes it the most rigorous thought conceivable.” (136)

“As the most rigorous thought of immanence possible, non-philosophy allows every philosophy its truth and reality, not  in the name of an epistemological relativism (more Continental philosophy), but through a hypothetical Real-ism (a kind of Post-Continental naturalism).” (149)




“For us, it is rather a question of elaborating, in a ‘messianic’ margin of philosophy, with philosophy’s help but without its authority, an ethics of defense of mankind....All of this assumes another idea of man than that of Greek metaphysics, where man is organized by the  transcendence of the cosmos or even that of Judaic metaphysics, where he is subordinated to the infinite transcendence of God....Thus a different idea of the generic intellectual and his tasks, which are no longer classically heroic (virtue, happiness, courage) or heroico-political (taking sides against the powers that be, defense of democracy, etc.), but in prior-priority the defense of victims....The highest thought boasts of its proud virtues while mocking weak passions—Spinoza sadness, Hegel the ‘beautiful soul’, Nietzsche pity....Against philosophy’s sufficiency, we introduce into philosophy a Principle of Compassion, which will substitute itself for pity, and likewise for vengeance and heroism.” (5-6)

“Man is the only animal capable of being persecuted as such but also capable of insurrection without divine aid.” (7)

“The victim is the most exposed depth of humans,  their capacity to be defeated on occasions that also revive this capacity as a week force of resistance....there is no absolute and in-itself victim; the victim is caught in a process of continual victimization, victim also of not yet knowing who and what its executioner is.” (8)

“A relatively rigorous theory of the victim must outstrip the discourse of power and domination characteristic of every philosophy....Put another way, in order to summarize this undertaking in a few words, it is necessary to remove ethics from philosophy...and place ethics under the condition of the Victim-in-person.....One might think that we are refusing to open the mass graves of history to the great sun of Reason....One might think that we are closing them up too quickly, just as someone,  fascinated or stunned, closes off a dreadful sight or memory upon its secret.  It would have no doubt required a Christ to command that Lazarus rise up and come out of his ‘sickness unto death’ (Kierkegaard).....Now that the old divine plan for salvation is no more than a memory of which only a trace remains...a question remains to be asked.  Who still deserves to arise?  Our response is without a doubt very intuitive but can be set out with means other than exclusively philosophical ones.  Only victims, that is, humans in-prior-priority, deserve to arise and are likely able to do so.”(9-10)

“To give a certain right to the reality of evil, let us introduce it into the concept of man.  But in what form?  Not that of the criminal—that would be too easy—but that of the victim as the non-good that the Good needs, in the same way Being needs non-being to exercise all its possibilities....Our thesis is that man is ‘fundamentally’ a victim or an ‘object’ of evil, and occasionally a criminal, that it belongs to his essence to be virtually a victim, and that his criminal effectiveness is contingent and cannot be used to define him.  It is a question of getting rid of the duality of Good and Evil that holds man in its forceps.” (13)

“Let us advance as a suggestion the term ‘oraxiom’ to describe our non-humanist method of access to humans.  Why?  On a theoretical plane, three current solutions make it difficult to approach the problem of man and victim without misunderstanding...: (1) the creationist reaction..., without doubt the most dangerous regression...; (2) the diehard imagination of science fiction..., confusing the vanishing being of the subject with that of man, which it reduces to android and humanoid states...; (3) finally, the politico-historical model of the victim, the defeated of the local revolt, the one crushed by repression, the excluded or the illegal immigrant of contemporary societies doomed to migratory flux, anguish and the porosity of borders.... In these ways of thinking..., nothing is demanded of the subject but to walk in already worn tracks....Only a non-philosophy of humans as immanent victims, not as all-victim, can oppose the ontological anonymity of things, of bodies and of historical events.” (17-18)

“We need a thought that retains Man, but as having lost all his attributes.  Let us then write this hollow man with axioms:....Man’s disappearance is not relative or absolute; it is, as we say, radical: he is withdrawn into himself, into his radical immanence—this is his non-consistency or his In-person insistence.” (19)

                             “The defense of humans
It seems it is not only God who has abandoned us, or history, and the ideologies it has carried along, it is also philosophy, insofar as it has always been a masked theodicy, its preparation or its consequence....We already knew from the cries of victims and from the courage of certain heretics...—that in God was concealed the Grand Persecutor....true atheism is not as simple as philosophy imagines it to be...: the banal refusal to believe in a God is self-contradictory and satisfies those who think little, but the refusal to believe in a good God is the true rebellion.  There is always a God lying in ambush..., but it is important that it be a malicious God.” ((20-21)

“We move from the overexposed or over-represented victim to the victim that we name according to a method of thought taken from quantum physics, which serves us as a scientific model, superposed, or again, from the victim-image to the victim-in-person or lived victim, the one that the intellectual in his person must revive and clone rather than repeat....You will not make of the victim an absolute or a  mode of the absolute (against Judaism); you will not make of it an accident of history or the world (against philosophy)” (28-31)

“What do victims expect from us?  What form of ‘recognition’ if not an understanding rather than a memory and obviously rather than revenge?  Perhaps they expect an unhoped-for gift from us who, after having persecuted them, believe that we have done a lot by giving them a bit of memory or duty, a low form of conscience or bad conscience?....that memory is not of the order of victims in the strict sense, but rather of the order of the mixes they form with their representations; it is the victimo-logical complex with its Judaic, Christian, Islamic modalities, its persecuted or its martyrs.” (34-35)

“The Victim-in-person is thus the generic human insofar as it is capable of being, without a vicious circle, at once radical victim and resistant to the oppressor, capable of rising up and of bringing about the transformation of an object or an event of the world.” (39)

                                   “Glorious bodies
Our matrix, for example, is neither a ‘class’ nor a ‘set’ nor a ‘world’, as dialectical materialisms have proposed, but that which conjugates and weakens these  knowledges to reduce them to the state of simple means for the defense of victims....The imaginary number and its ‘vectorial’...representation substitute their insurrectional objectivity for the subjectivity of the transcendental imagination (Kant and Fichte), but, more profoundly still, for the macroscopic objectivity of the logics that are the transcendental of classes or even of worlds (Badiou)....Respect for the victim consists of treating it as a human offered to the world as possibly or occasionally murderable, persecutable, humiliatable, and thus also capable of rising up against the adversary and thereby of indicating it or naming it.  Indicating or naming the one who kills you or exploits you is the uprising itself...The defeated of history and more generically the rebels in the world...cannot be named....For us, the most significant uprisings are those that...pertain to humans as such...rather than to their specification as proletariat; they are at least as much the uprisings of the Gnostics and heretics, of the Anabaptists and the messianic movements, as those...according to the classically political criteria used in the human and social sciences.” (39-41)

“In the end we distinguish two types of victims....On the one hand, the victim as interpreted by the world, condemned to survival, even when supposed dead.  Memorial survival is the maximum that philosophy and religion can offer....;it is in reality a continued death of a victimization-in-the-world.  On the other hand, there is the victim interpreted according to its generic essence...’awakened,’ which is to say saved from continued victimization....The victim is a power of ‘awakening’...in the order of lived experiences opposed to the simple dialectical or differential repetition of survival.  Survival reinforces transcendence, an act that exceeds death or persecution and prolongs the world, whereas insurrection, which is the root of resurrection, weakens or debases this transcendence of a world to the state of lived experience....The death of the old, individual body, standardized and established by philosophy and religion together...is at once...the occasion of the insurrectional awakening and the effect of the insurrection that transforms bodies.  For us-the-Gnostics and us-the-generics, this is the role of the intellectual: to help victims in this uprising, to imitate and prolong this uprising in the human dimensions of thought.” (43-45)

“Even victims have compassion for their executioner; compassion extends even to them.  It alone can save them or bring them back into the realm of humans.  Compassion....is the final lived experience, the experience of the defeated that borders death and still gives it is meaning in-the-last-instance.” (49)

“We  will call overrepresentation or overexposure the type of visibility victims get from mediatic thought, directed from afar by the spirit of philosophy...This overstatement of transcendence (associations, groups for self-defense that produce political parties) makes the victim a weapon and an instrument of vengeance—nationalist, communitarian, geostrategic, and so forth....Justice, medicine, and psychology take hold of the victim; a science of crime and of the victim, a victimology...; pressure groups form, initially but not exclusively following genocides.  They cultivate a memory, which of course turns towards vengeance, then make from it a weapon of demand, of ‘reparation’ and of international compassion.
    These groups and even these intellectuals sometimes claim the title of ‘survivors’.  These are the miraculated victims who bear witness and take on real victims through representation.  They have become ‘representative’, returning from the land of the dead and playing a testimonial role....Faced with this daily parade of the dead, compassion becomes nausea....The problem will be to dissolve the combination, the mix or crossbreeding of victim and intellectual, which works towards the greater glory of the thought-world and thus towards the production of future victims.” (57-61)

“According to the conditions of the philosophical structure, the victim’s meaning can only appear in its correlation, its opposition, its difference, its opposition, its difference to heroes (of act, of speech, of thought).....philosophy is the correlation of heroes and victims, more nobly  of Immortals and Mortals.  Memory is the glory proper to heroes, memory as duty (Judaism) and as work (Christianity) to victims.  Whereas heroes are entitled to double glory, ceaselessly reaffirmed..., victims are doomed to a double forgetting (death and second death)...to a subterranean monumentalization.  Victims are the guardians and companions of subterranean gods, buried in the past, without future and without light.” (67)

“Man-in-person inverts the priorities and thus the hierarchy of Good and Evil by ordering creation (supposedly Good but in fact a failure) according to the inmost misfortune that constitutes humans. (74)”

“What is necessary here is what we have called compassion as the revival of the acting of non-acting proper to the victim....It is not a question of denying, pure and simple, the world..., but of giving oneself the means of preventing oneself from being indefinitely and absolutely enclosed in the world, that is, in its magic.  A simple overturning of Good and Evil would only further muddle the confusions introduced by religions into ethics...” (76-78)

“Weak force is specific and qualitative (generic) and not a strong force weakened.  Its essence is radical weakness or the acting of its non-acting...” (79)

“Let us recall the theory of the survivor....The philosophical destiny of the victim is worse than that of nothingness of the negative, or of ‘real opposition, which at least have a history.  The victim remains what it is—a waste of thought.  Deconstruction gives a Greco-Judaic interpretation of these phenomena.  Derrida, for example, says that narcissism pursues us to death.  Obviously, he is thinking of man as a survivor damaged by death, but in no way of Man-in-person, incorruptible, whose identity—which is neither biological nor civil—cannot be reached by death...” (101) 

“Oraxioms or formulas that express the Victim-in-person deal with its attributes drawn from victimology so that...floating in a new sphere of philo-fiction....a radically fictional discourse about victims—fictional insofar as the victims are never its simple objects or subjects, but its conditions and occasions.” (113-14)

“Every intellectual born directly or, even worse, indirectly of philosophy is a ‘totalitarian’ feigning ignorance of the fact.... The dominant intellectual interpolates victims, even ‘inspects’ them; the generic intellectual imitates them the way a clone to a certain extent imitates its original material.” (118)

The generic intellectual, as opposed to the dominant intellectual operates under the aegis or authority of no entity—religious, state, etc.—not even belonging to the ‘world of art’ or identifying with any minority (all such are ‘minorities of the state’, which they implicitly support by asking for ‘recognition’ by it).  The generic intellectual, does not stand, like the dominant intellectual outside (really of course above) the victim, whom he pities, beats his or her breast about, ‘helps’, but instead becomes inseparable (clones) the victim.  A synonym for clone in Laruellese is ‘force-of-thought’, which in his  Dictionnaire de la non-philosphie, (p. 76), is said to be named after the ‘force of labor’ of Marx, having an effect, without being a material reality, the parenthesis I think here indicating this insubstantial (non-) aspect.  This cloning of the victim is of course not empirical, factual, historical, or even anecdotal, but a fiction, and imaginary; what Laruelle will call a ‘philo-fiction’, one that opens things up rather than closing them off, whereby of course the line between fiction and reality is crossed, and recrossed...

“Really, intellectuals have always positioned themselves alongside the strong and alongside the State, when not alongside the Churches, and even alongside the victims when they believe the victims to be ‘strong’ and capable of absolutely reversing a situation, to the point of becoming—in the contemporary age, following their failure—puppets of the most mediocre power. When they criticized the State or religions, nations, or communities, and when they took the side of victims, it was often because victims seemed to them to be a force capable of subverting the actual or present order of the world....How in these conditions and with this belief, do we not return to a flat conformism?  But it is a question, to take up a Kierkegaardian dialectic, either of denying the world...or of transforming it and awakening the prior-to-the-first defense of victims, their weak power of insurrection.  Or again, either a ‘strong thought’ always newly directed towards a hallucinated superhuman destination...or a thought of ensuring that history will not be buried even amidst the stars.” (131-32)

“...unpower is insurrectional...because non-acting is the radical non-acting prior- to-the-first-insurrection....Compassion is the specific non-acting of all acting within affect as determined in-the-last-instance by this non-acting....It renders accessible to us, as interferents, other subjects as Strangers with whom we superpose ourselves as persecuted or denied.  Compassion is not the doing of heroes and is not aimed at them except through derision or a superior form of love, with the result that certain traces of compassion appear even in victims with regard to their persecutors. (134-35)

“What counts as non-calculable in the plan for salvation is not the Cross—too foreseeable—but the Resurrection.  It is not the visible Crucified, the victim offered up to the concupiscence of believers but the spectral Arisen of the Christophanies.  Stripped of the rags of Christian belief, what remains of the Resurrection is what constitutes its prior-to-the-first condition, its radical kernel of Insurrection, the uprising by which the new realm of humans begins.” (136)

-- Laruelle, François (2015c). General Theory of Victims.  Tr. Jessie Hook & Alex Dubilet.  Polity, 2015 (Théorie générale des victimes. Fayard 2012).

                                                      -----
“The cradle of intellectuals is philosophy as vision of the world proper to the conquerors, their manner of deciding that history has meaning, and which one, to manipulate it.  I would opposed the heroic intellectual and the determined one (rather than dominant one), one who can act in spite of the great mediated vacuum.” (27)

“As non-philosopher, I admit there must be an irreducible. definitive presupposed of thought, necessary to defeat idealism and think according to the real, for example according to the victim, if this presupposed is the victim, instead of according to philosophy....No always more original experience, but a presupposed.” (42)

“I take literally Nietzsche’s idea that philosophy is a way of denigrating the real and a vengeance against it.” (45)

“The Real no longer tolerates categories, is not expressed in  terms of World, History or Truth....You see that as soon as I give a definition it is a failure.  We must refuse the temptation or the appearance of a definition.  Man-in-man is neither a psychological nor political subject.  It’s rather the presupposed, the condition, that determines negatively or in-final-analysis a subject for all those games of definitions and predicates that move philosophy alone.” (51)

“The Real is not a problem and in a sense it’s of no interest to me.  What interests me is how to treat victims, how to disengage them from philosophy, science, or their aesthetization, but under the necessary but insufficient condition which is the presupposition of the Real, which furthermore is no philosophical presupposition.” (53)

“The real is neither a conscious nor unconscious knowledge, since the unconscious is also a form of knowledge....Therefore if all the same I want to designate—and it’s necessary to do so— this Real as a kind of knowledge, one of the third type, I would say that the Real, rather than a ‘learned ignorance’,​[184]​ is an unlearned knowledge.  Unlearned means that it is neither a savant knowledge nor a taught one.  It is a non-taught knowledge...” (53)

“Let’s be clear that non-philosophy is what-I-say-in-saying and not so much what I say, which can always be recuperated by philosophy.” (61)

“The prudence of the non-philosopher follows the logic of the necessary worst, which is not the principle of the best but of the worst (‘you haven’t seen anything yet’), which is a great metaphysical principle, one that can simulate the process of the cogito and at the same time destroy it.” (62)

“...justice, which is  certainly the dominating value of the ‘humanitarian’ intellectual, is favored compared to the ultimate end of philosophy, which is man....the intellectual has still other values to lean on than justice—land, earth, blood, race, freedom of speech, the proletariat, the rights of man etc.—these are the values that first of all motivate his actions and gives him the occasion to exert himself; with the consequence that the intellectual always depends on values that he refuses to put into question.  This is true also for university intellectuals, Aron​[185]​ for example, anchored in sociology, who defends a form of critical intelligence close to that of the enlightenment.” (67)

“You’re asking me to define what I think as non-philosopher of a recent war,​[186]​but non-philosophy is a practice that excludes definitions, univocal, immediate and definitive—too bad about the war, the ‘true’ one and that of intellectuals.  There are multiple opinions about the war, which is a triviality the intellectuals ceaselessly prove.  The problem is to make use of these opinions, transforming them in the service of the Man in the victim.” (76)

“We’re not fleeing, we’ve always been elsewhere, from where we’ve come, we’re coming from nowhere.” (76)

“The style of action of this intellectual​[187]​is to analyze, separate, elucidate, dissolve ambiguities, ‘explode’, as he says, with the truth, revindicated in the name of capital and anonymous values, be the best kind of transcendental journalist, one sworn to the World, or otherwise a ‘transcendent’ one, at the worst, that is to say sworn to his reveries.....Another characteristic is that he needs to inscribe his action in an enlarged public space and time in the way a director does....One of his dominant traits is that he considers existence as theatre, which arises from its most ancient roots in philosophy....He’s  related to or near still the philosopher considered as a semi-god who contemplates the comedy of existence and who laughs over it, silently however, since he forbids himself cynicism over the miseries of mankind.  There Foucault, as a good Nietzschean philosopher, spilled the beans.  How nauseating, existence as theatre and diversion!  Didn’t Rousseau condemn theatre for these good reasons...?” (78)

“It goes without saying that I’d like to rid thought of the sacrificial image of the victim, which is exactly the religious image or representation that the conquerors make of it.  Giving  a meaning to the death of victims is the cynical generosity of the triumphant.  I believe we should not make a more compassionate image of victims, but abandon all images and attribute them an unpower [impouvoir] that transforms their conquerors.  We may wonder whether all victims, even involuntary, are not sacrificial, which is to say that a tapestry of bodies, charnel houses and funeral pyres serve to unify groups, that is to say humanity and history.  This law of world-history, apparently unknown in all its starkness to the dominant intellectual, will be the material of the determined intellectual.​[188]​
                Isn’t it dangerous to make so much of the victim?​[189]​
I rather think it’s necessary to put the victim into his true non-philosophical place.  A danger waits to ambush victims but not always from where you think.  It’s from philosophy of the World reappropriating them and inserting them into their vicious circular logic.  Also, once in the circle, the victim changes status.  Only innocent until the moment she is killed, exterminated, she is not innocent once connected to the global and worldly cycle of violence....In this circle, any victim becomes persecutory in their turn in rapport with other possible victims.  And any persecutor is in turn victim of another persecutor....The more the rapport of the victim and the persecutor stretches on the map of history and adheres to the plan of history and universal becoming [devenir], more likely will the victim find herself in the role of persecutor or to be a former persecutor.  The paradigmatic dimension​[190]​ tends to be disappear into the syntagmatic or horizontal  dimension,​[191]​ but subsists like a monstrous body of the history of the World State that feeds off its victims...
                That’s really dangerous.  For example, could we say that the ancient victims of the camps have become Israeli persecutors?  Is this arguable?
Quite, but out of what necessity?  The remark of Primo Levi​[192]​ isn’t true only about the camps. This is a philosophical and universal law, inherited, like memory, from the preceding generation....There is an affinity even in the widest disjunction, the greatest difference, between the victim and the executioner, the tortured and the torturer.  This is a universal scheme that allows us insight, at least provisionally, into certain rapports of force or events in history.  I understand totally that this could be considered a formula quite dangerous for Israel, but for the reason that Judaism reads history very differently than Greek philosophy, thinking of history as contretemps against the special rapports of the chosen people to God, its persecutor.  This rapport of infinite transcendence does not result in a totalization​[193]​ of victims and persecutors, a totalization that is eminently Greek, implying a sort of reciprocal approximation of the victim and the executioner.  This proximity is a problem that philosophers cannot not pose.  I think of  Sartre who posed it through the regard.​[194]​  The regard, but not only it, is a mode of victimary [victimologique] distance.
                  Yet according to this law of the persecuting victim, can the violence exerted against the victim be legitimized?
Of course, there is no end to there being legitimized, and by the intellectuals themselves.  There are always plenty of intellectuals, jurists, doctors, politicians, philosophers to establish cause and derive sufficient reasons from them....Either, in effect, all violence can always be legitimized, we’ll not distinguish the good from the bad legitimizations, straight reasoning from twisted rationalizations....It’s not only Reason of State [la raison d’État] that can claim a legitimate violence.  Or, on the contrary, you can refuse, condemning globally this circle of violence and call on a universal pity, a circle of pity.  Non-Hegelian  philosophers, like Rousseau and Schopenhauer do this, they refuse Reason in History​[195]​, but such a pity is still universal and conforms to philosophical criteria in a disguised form....There is a sort of homology or in any case affinity between the victim and the philosopher, the victim being the hidden, dark side, his unthinkable verso....Evidently the philosopher doesn’t present himself at all as victim, but  on the contrary, like a hero, sparked by the hope of triumph.  A word about method and an explication:  I am not describing situations of fact...I put history in parentheses, and I describe its structures, possible  projections and finally I deliver them with non-philosophy to a sort of utopia, a utopia of the victim and the intellectual based on a refusal of justification by history.  I believe that this method, which is that of the worst, is the only one that we have still left for us to hope for rescue, and not identify with the abyssal psychology of dictators and tyrants.  We haven’t yet explored all the possibilities of thought, therefore of struggle.  My hypothesis is that of the worst, but under human conditions and not to sink into the worst of the worst.....Lets make the leap into a type of ‘non-philosophy’ thought, the determined intellectual allowing themselves to be motivated by, not determined by history....In spite of certain efforts, of Rousseau in particular, most often the victim is a victimary [victimologique] object, an intellectual alibi, useful for abandoning all conceptual rigor, laying claim to affectivity, sensitivity, alterity etc.  Philosophy has its victim but the victim of philosophy is possibly the repression of another victim, too obvious not to be forgotten or ignored.” (88-93).

“I might as well admit it, that I’m tired of this theme of resistance that postulates man is an animal that tears himself away from animality, an oppressed who resists his oppressors, consummately in philosophical heroism...Most victims are mute, dead or reduced to silence at the instant of the crime, having long ago lost any taste for the ambrosia of the Logos.  You’ll understand why I maintain that the victim is victim twice over.  The uninteresting victim, with no future chez the philosopher, interests me even if I don’t know very well how to understand her or be understood by her.  The true victim, differently from Socrates, leaves no monumental image behind her, nor any word worthy of being collected by a philosopher.” (98-99).
       
“The homeless, as is often the case, who refuse to be taken charge of by the city, what are your thoughts about them?
“We’ll force them to be free”, as Rousseau would have said, that is to be warm, properly fed, subjected to the advantages of an almost normal existence, survival.  This humanitarian compulsion (there are others like the security compulsion), is a mine of contradictions, since philosophy wants to force and not force individuals, plus it is the absolute compulsion...if at least you see through the particular opinions cultivated by most philosophers and intellectuals....As to non-philosophy, it clearly admits ...an initial compulsion (the presupposed real), but no final one, like philosophy does....the victim is just before any justification....They want me to give an example, a representation of this man-in-man​[196]​...but it’s philosophy that wants to represent [what resists representation]....She is the victim unknown to philosophers, or else too well known and forgotten by them, no matter...She should first of all change the mode of thought of the intellectual, modifying more or less radically his theory and the type of action it makes possible....First of all this action would not be a Platonism, that is the Victim-in-person is not the victim in itself, Idea or Model, paradigm of the victim.  Secondly it isn’t a concrete victim on the battlefield or television screen.  Nor is it the victim like the Other..., it wouldn’t be the other persecuted by me or the philosophical universal, but it’s neither myself who would be persecuted by the other.  Then what is it?  What is its identity, its attributes?  This exactly is the question that must be refused, insofar as it conforms to the philosophical interrogation of things and the World.  We don’t realize that the apparently natural way of thinking is not the most helpful and is even repressive and falsifying....
But how proceed if we can’t define the Victim?
A ‘normal’ definition serves to pose a subject and an ensemble of properties that are said to belong to it.  But since what I call Victim is not of the order of a subject with properties, you need in order to give the equivalent of a definition proceed otherwise...This type of definition imposes an ascesis on passion because it refuses to put hands directly on the Victim....Definitions by subject, attribute or predicate and particularly this definition of man as rational animal or of victim as resisting animal, these philosophical definitions are no longer operational.  We need to exit these mélanges and prefer the style of axioms....This provides hints as to the meaning of what I call non-philosophy, which proceeds by hypotheses and axioms, even by utopias, and refuses to let itself be locked in by facts, not in order to deny facts or history, but to explicate the philosophical dimension of history.  The axiom is presupposed true and that’s enough for me.” (101-04)

“The Victim-in-person is not representable, but a function of a vacuum as to temporal or other representation, but prompts the action of the determined intellectual.  The dominating intellectual rushes into the idea he has of a conflict [between victim and victimizer], he battles incessantly in the vacuum of appearances while the determined intellectual acts by virtue of the emptiness he is and conveys as a presupposed.  This is a quasi-Eastern formula.” (119)

“The determined intellectual must make a general hypothesis on the meaning of history, in relation to our problem, of course, which specifies this hypothesis....which we’ve called that of victimization—that any victim can become in turn a persecutor.” (125)

“...The determined intellectual has a practice rather than an action.  Normally we think of a practice as an action or an activity, but really action leads immediately to a reaction.  Action can be active, as Nietzsche says, but also it is fundamentally reactive, that is ‘vengeful’; while practice is not contained in the circle of action and reaction, but transforms a given and really inert material....Finally, action reproduces images and doubles of itself, producing representation, while practice destroys representation.” (131-33)

“ ‘Demanding’ or ‘claiming’ justice is progress in the theory of victims, but also a problematic revindication making a circle or system with violence and prolongs this all-inclusive category of ‘rendering justice’.  Giving justice, its donation quickly becomes sufficient justice....​[197]​  The victim isn’t very prized by philosophers, who like to refer with scorn to ‘victim rhetoric’....Obviously when a victim like the Jewish people starts to refuse to be forgotten, as is customary, and was long tolerated, philosophy doesn’t know ‘where to turn’ and doesn’t understand that Being and meaning are not sufficient consolation.  However in its turn the refusal to be forgotten is an ambiguous argument that can serve for behaving as conquerors.” (145-47)

“I think I’ve said enough.  No, one word more—there are no examples, non-philosophy is a practice, an act, performative pretty close to crime, its only way of demonstrating.” (160, next-to-last sentences)
--Laruelle, François (2003a). L’ultime honneur des intellectuels: entretien mené par Philippe Petit.  [The Ultimate Honor of Intellectual: Conversation with Philip Petit].  Paris: Les éditions textuels, 2003                                                                                                                          

                                                           -----
“...we define ‘non-philosophy’ as the only defense of humans as Victims in the philosophical milieu, that is to say one globally hostile to them, being a deficient protector of them and one in bad faith.” (10)

-- Laruelle, François (2007a). “Du Principe de Sécurité (PS) à la Défense générique”: 5-16.  [“From the Principle of Security to Generic Defense”]. In Fabriques de l’insécurité. 2007.  Ed. François Laruelle.  Harmattan, [Manufacturers of Insecurity] 
-----
“Laruelle’s victimology drives his thinking regarding art.....in this victimology—or, perhaps more accurately, ‘victim-fiction’ and victim-thinking—the victim is not understood as weak and in need of saving, but as the very power of insurrection, as fiction-making or fabulating.  Thus, his own conception of art as a form of thought is that art may be directed by the victim and join in her insurrection too, as crafting a form of life within the world.” 

“This victim-thinking gives attention to suffering without reifying it.  This form of thinking responds to suffering without treating suffering as something to redeem and thereby forget.  Victim-thinking is developed in direct antagonism to theodicy as developed classically by Leibniz which states that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds.  Laruelle’s principle of victim-thinking instead begins from the logic of the ‘worst necessary’...” (121)​[198]​

-- Smith, Anthony Paul (2016b). Laruelle: A Stranger Thought.  Malden MA and Cambridge UK: Polity
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vision
“...vision ‘abandons perception and sees-in-the night’.  This is what he [FL] means when he deploys that thorny non-philosophical term of art ‘vison-in-One.” (148)​[199]​
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^1	  My translations, unless otherwise noted; notes and un-cited text are mine (either paraphrase and/or commentary) too.  In main text my comments or paraphrases are in Arial, the citations in Times New Roman, to further demarcate them.
^2	  Cf. Plato’s dialogue, the Meno, where teaching is described as impossible: If they know already, why bother?  And if not, what is there in place to comprehend the teaching?  Perhaps ‘noncinema, nondance’, afortiori ‘noneducation’ etc. would be another way to overcome this paradox.  Of course for Plato, knowledge is innate, education merely its awakening...
^3	  Ref. to Stendhal’s concept, expressed in De l’amour of crystallization, point at which love appears, like a snowflake... Baudrillard is fond of this figure too.
^4	  Ostensibly transformative of art the way the redoubtable Thesis 11 of Marx on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world...the point, however, is to change it.” --was about transforming existence.
^5	  Aiming at Derrida, whose deconstruction is thought of as taking the position of all positions.
^6	  Levi-Strauss anthropological  term for ‘making do with what you have’ he thought characteristic of the tribal society he studied—‘bricolage’ was a term deployed commonly by French philosophy of the time, which FL would see as providing a new rule (say of spontaneity) to replace the old, not necessarily making us freer....
^7	  Thetic: “Involving  direct or positive statement; (of a proposition, thesis etc.) that has been laid down or stated.” [Shorter Oxford Engl. Dict., 5th ed. Vol.2]—anathema to philosophies of Imminence, which abhor (after Nietzsche) all ‘rear worlds’ or ones that come after or are higher or lower.  FL has been thinking around the Other of E. Levinas but stripped of its transcendental theses, for instance of a sense of infinite responsibility awakened by the other’s visage... .
^8	  Citing FL and collaborators, Dic. de la non- phil. (Paris: Kimé, 1998)
^9	  Citing FL, Photo-Fiction (2012), 63.
^10	  Michel Henry, French philosopher (1922-2002), whose ideas about what he called the ‘radical imminence ‘ of life, and essentially in life feeling (affectivity) were catalytic also for non-philosophy.
^11	  Citing Critique of Practical Reason.
^12	  Citing Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik.  Italics Henry.
^13	  Citing what he calls the ‘fine analyses’ of Scheler’s Nature of Sympathy.
^14	  Brussels: Mardaga, 1989.
^15	  A revolutionary concept, representing a world ‘without masters or slaves’, articulated by C. Jambet and G, Lardreau.  Cf. their book, L’Ange (Paris: Grasset, 1976)
^16	  In Nietzsche contre Heidegger (Paris : Payot, 1977).
^17	  Schopenhauer, explaining music’s greater power to convey the Will than the other arts...
^18	  For instance his theory of sublimation, whereby the artist channels libidinal energies into the creation of culturally valued works.
^19	  Really repressive desublimation, a coinage of Marcuse’s telling critique of the “drugs, sex and rock and roll” hedonist counterculture of the 60’s, whereby such liberties become safety valves for a pressure cooker System, letting off steam  that would otherwise explode it...
^20	  Therefore authoritarian, from the point of view of non-philosophy..
^21	  Art or craft
^22	  Citing a 1987 conference, as was the previous, “What is an Act of Creation?”.  Can be consulted online.
^23	  The rule of law, closely and literally followed.
^24	  As per the deconstructions of Jacques Derrida.
^25	  Seemingly Welsh for English name “John Mullarkey”, who as such published much on FL previously.
^26	  A view FL attributes to Sartre, in the tradition of Descartes.
^27	  The One (man)-in-person is man-as-such, not as part (attribute) of anything else.
^28	  More a phenomenology of the consciousness of mystics and mysticism than referring to those thought of usually as mystics (Boehme, Eckhart)
^29	  Last sentence in footnote, citing FL, Principes de non-philosophie (1996), Blanchot, Le pas au-delà (1973) and L’Entretien infini (1969)
^30	   Citing, FL, and Blanchot, both ibid.
^31	  FL, “De la non-philosophie comme hérésie” (1998).
^32	  FL’s most recent work does that with Opera: Tetralogos (Paris: Cerf, 2019)—a sizable excerpt is available online.
^33	  Seems akin, or a variety of  photo-fiction, where you shoot without aiming, non-thetic, with no thesis you’re trying to demonstrate, even without eyes (more than half) open...
^34	  Outside of human control, unlike techknè, which affirms at least its possibility.
^35	  The notion of superposition in Quantum physics, ‘repealing’, from non-philosophy’s point-of-view the time-honored Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction: in short that A can’t be A and not A at the same time or in two different spaces and/or times.  Schrödinger’s cat, a classic example of superposition is both alive and dead at the same time (or can be assumed both, until one or the other is ‘empirically’ confirmed).  In tune with this ‘uncertainty principle’ (Heisenberg), Belief (croyance), for FL is a pejorative, because seeking a perfect, unassailable authority, to obey; as opposed to faith (foi), which assumes nothing, except, like science, the need to keep looking...
^36	  FL is targeting (not too extreme a word for it) Derrida, whose critique of the authority and tyranny of voice and reason, of presence (phono and logocentrism), for FL, turns into another authority.   
^37	  Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction.  New York:and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 135-38
^38	  Citing Birth of Tragedy.
^39	  quote within quote from an H. Nast, cited G. Revill (2004) “Performing French folk music: Dance, authenticity and nonrepresentational theory,” Cultural Geographies, 11(2), 199-209. 
^40	  K. Somdahl-Sands (2006).  “The BodyCartography Project: an Investigation of space”.  Text Practice and Performance, 4: 39-53.
^41	  Reference: Jone Johnson Lewis (2010), “Isadora Duncan Quotes”.  Internet. 
^42	  Citing FL, Principe de minorité (1981).
^43	  Citing Sophie Lesueur’s dissertation, La non-philosophie du suject politique. [The Non-philosophy of the Political Subject]. Unv. Paris Nanterre, 2008; an excerpt or abstract of which can be consulted under that title on line, or was on 9/10/17.
^44	  Cf. excerpts from her above under Art
^45	  See Affectivity above, and note 10
^46	  The philosophical assumption non-philosophy disputes here, derived again from Parmendes, is that Thought would necessarily be a representation of Being (the One)
^47	  Equivalence is certainly the theme of the book this same author published under the name of John Ò Maoilearca,  All Thoughts are Equal: Laruelle and Nonhuman Philosophy. UMinn, 2015
^48	  Refers to FL, Ethique de l’étranger (2000). 
^49	  In French also meaning rehearsal, as if all of these have become merely roles.
^50	  This intriguing neologism meaning I’d say our Zeitgeist is technology; for ‘Difference’
^51	  Of course the commanding Kantian notion of an ethical duty beyond the powers of reason to confute: for example, the golden rule or (at least much of) the decalogue
^52	  i.e. Kant’s imperative excoriating lying, under any circumstance, now quite outdated in our world of interpretation,  deconstruction, context, not to say alternate facts or reality!
^53	  Emmanuel Levinas, (religious) existentialist contemporary of Sartre, known for his Philosophy of the Other, whose hostage we are...
^54	  Commenting Kant’s Metaphysic of Morals, Laruelle uses the German terms, which I have translated (inexpertly).
^55	 A pejorative that suggests an external judgement, situated ‘well above’ the judged, and also trivial and punctilious as to literal wording of the law.
^56	  Without mentioning him by name Laruelle is surely developing on Badiou’s by then familiar concept of the Event (through his major work L’Être et l’événement , of 1988), and limned in the excerpt just above, adapting it, which he regards as still too philosophical, to the urgencies, that is the Real, of non-philosophy...
^57	  Echo of how Blanchot, whose rapport (or rapport of non-rapport) with non-phiilosophy we have taken some account of here, described the poetry of Louis-René des Fôrets, Une voix venue d’ailleurs (1989) [A Voice From Elsewhere]
^58	  His targets are I opine, in order: Kant, Hobbes, Marx, Sade-Bataille-Pasolini, Ricoeur.
^59	  Hegel’s pejorative characterization of Romantics, like Novalis, Holderlin...’dreamers’ incapable of functioning in the real world.
^60	  Nietzsche and Max Scheler: Geneology of Morals and Ressentiment.
^61	  Title of a book by Vladimir Jankélévitch, a philosopher also notable for Derrida’s demurral with his position on the impossibility of pardon, for such horrors as genocide....
^62	  Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, in that order...
^63	  Wondering why arts of the word are closer to non-philosophy than painting, I’ve surmised it’s because words are easier to erase and start anew, therefore already generally fractal, as Laruelle defines it... 
^64	  Up to here in the excerpt this is translated from FL, Philosophie et non-philosophie, p.50, reproduced in the original in notes, but strangely not introduced as such, or accompanied by quotation marks in text.
^65	  FL’s opposition to approaching The Real (the One) by mixing it with other things: History, Language, Religion etc.
^66	  Cf. “The Fragmentary Word of Maurice Blanchot”, in my I Am a Process With No Subject (1988), 94-122; Substance 39 (1983): 58-74.
^67	  Politics, science, art and love.
^68	  As in Mobius strip or ribbon, as in here I think: anyway you twist (deconstruct etc.) it, it’s the same old ribbon of  authoritarian, self-appointed and dictatorial philosophy. 
^69	  The (relatively) unread etc.
^70	  See note 10
^71	  Although still keyed to the French original, translation is by Taylor Adkins, from chapter 2, as “The Generic as Predicate and Constant” in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism. ed. Byant, Srnicek, Harman.  re.press: Melbourne, n.d.: 237-60 
^72	  Cf. my Theatre of Naturalism (Lang, N.Y., 2011), p. 113, n 8.
^73	  ‘Radical immanence’, a revelation of Henry essential in the formulation of ‘non-philosophy’, but, following Laruelle, needing to be stripped of its ‘spiritualist’, ‘transcendental’, decisionist baggage.
^74	  trans. Etzkorn.  The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973 (orig. pub. in French, 1963).
^75	  Cites FL,  Introduction to Non-Marxism, 43-6. 
^76	  Principles of Non-Philosophy, p. 111. ‘Auto-affection’ is a concept associated with Michel Henry, (whose name has come up often in these pages),which I take to be the radical immanence (Real) of self-love; something perhaps not unrelated to the Sartrean take on consciousness as being self-approving  (whatever ‘the world’ may think). 
^77	  Likely another dig against deconstruction and Derrida, one of whose books is called Marges (1972). 
^78	  Medieval mystic, citing her Mirror of Simple Souls.
^79	  Before it has been articulated as such, the way we’re alive before we ‘know’ it.
^80	  Citing Heidegger, Being and Time and Sartre, Situations I
^81	  Citing Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception.
^82	  Galloway’s non-philosophical rebel, if it is one, seems to be of the more retiring sort, see excerpts under Generic....
^83	  In Une Biographie de l’homme ordinaire (1985); here FL is being interviewed, in a chapter “Hérésie,” by Jean-Didier Wagner.
^84	  Subtitle of Une Biographie de l’homme ordinaire was des Autorités et des Minorités
^85	  In pp. 11-13 Bertocchi explains: The first two poles are (1) thought, and (2), its object, what is thought about.  The third, what comes before thought ; which is I’d say comparable to the Real of FL, before the language to (not) say it.
^86	  This of course is Nietzschean language for immanence, conveying a rejection of any Platonic world of ideas and ideals our world would (only) echo or repeat
^87	  Meaning here I think treating language primarily from the point of view of the speaker, not the listener..
^88	  Meaning I think cut off from its back world, meanings,  ‘roots’...
^89	  A note refers to W.O. Quine for this statement.
^90	  Citing FL, Philosophie et non-philosophie, p. 245, emphasis FL, however found it in (I think only) edition (Brussels, 1989) without emphasis...
^91	  Again not requiring any agreement or response, or to relate to any pasts or ‘rear world’ or traditions, just assumed, like the precedence of the One, axiomatically....
^92	  Citing FL, Principes de non-philosophie (1996), p. 120
^93	  The author is posing (himself) questions in bold, answering them in non-bold.
^94	  Angelus Silesius, 17th Century mystic, is quoted here, homo ex machina I suppose standing for the machinery—that of the Church (and faith)—the future non-philosophical mystics leave behind.  
^95	  grounds by which something is thought to be known
^96	  Citing Deleuze and Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie (1991), p. 105.
^97	  Citing FL, Philosophie et non-philosophie, p. 51.
^98	  Here FL recuperates the story of non-philosophy, its five-or-so phases.
^99	  Citing Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini, p. 142.
^100	  The human situation, according to Levinas.
^101	   What Laruelle calls an “invention of a new usage of philosophical languages and forms” in Philosophie non-standard, p. 458.
^102	  In Greek letters, meaning a work or creation...
^103	  Max Scheler, German phenomenologist.  Henry has been citing his multivolume Formalism in Ethics (1913-16) and also The Nature of Sympathy (1913, 1923)..
^104	  Citing Heidegger, Langue de tradition et langue technique.  Brussels, 1990.
^105	  In Une biographie de l’homme ordinaire (1985)..
^106	  Not in the sense of ‘bad’, but as in the ‘mauvais démon’ of Descartes’, who recommends the hypothesis of there being one that comes between ourselves and our perceptions, distorting them....
^107	  Grelet’s ‘war on culture’  is certainly being critiqued here.
^108	  Citing Deleuze and Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie (1991), p. 233.
^109	  Citing the Merovingian, a program in the Matrix
^110	  “The vision-in-One is....the radical phenomenon, without a phenomenological rear-world in the vastest sense: without Being behind the phenomenon or in connection with it.”   (Dictonnaire non-philosophique, 205.)
^111	  Not excluding  the traditional mystics, but referring here more to the new ones, ‘future mystics’,  praticing a ‘mystics-fiction’.
^112	  non-philosophy sees God as being in Man, not something he believes in or not, like his heart (or spleen?).
^113	  One with an explanation for everything.
^114	  Non-philosophy here following Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism, his rejection of all other worlds, rear in the sense of behind this one...
^115	  Once again, the One (man)-in-person is man-as-such, not as part (attribute) of anything else.
^116	  That means according to a basic concept of non-philosophy, the vision-in-One.   See note 110.
^117	  First citation Fichte, Guide to Holy Life.
^118	  Citing Sophie Lesueur, “Pensée-machine et ordre politique” in Homo ex Machina, ed. FL.  Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005. 
^119	  Citing FL, Théorie des étrangers (1995). 
^120	  Referencing FL, Principes de la non-philosophie (1996)
^121	  Targetting a notable work of Derrida, Positions (1972), and a concept thematic in political philosophy of Carl Schmitt: that modern politics is secularized theology.
^122	  Citing C. Castoriadis, Domaines de l’homme: Les carrefours du labyrinthe II  (1986), p. 264.
^123	  Italics sic; FL is responding to questions posed by Didier Cahen in an interview, “Le Nouvel Esprit Hérétique”
^124	  The major four for FL: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze...
^125	  Remaking film of Jorgen Leth​​​​ The Perfect Human (1967) eschewing the traditional ‘beauties’ of cinema is the subject of The Five Obstructions of 2003 of Lars Van Trier, made in conjunction with Leth.
^126	  Seemingly Welsh for English name “John Mullarkey”, who as such published much on FL previously.
^127	  by dint of the inability or impossibility of including or accounting for everything and everybody!
^128	  Badiou’s four truth events: love, politics, poetry, revolution.
^129	   Cf. “Ushering in the Spectacle”, in my Theatre of Naturalism: Disappearing Act (2011), p. 1-10 and passim.
^130	  Following up on Laruelle’s ‘non-standard’ philosophy, referencing Mullarkey, Refractions of Reality...(2009), p. 211.
^131	  First citation is Laruelle, from an interview in Laruelle and Non-Philosophy, p 232; the second, spite of citation marks, seems to be either a misattribution or a paraphrase from the introduction to that volume by the editors (Mullarkey and Smith), Cull referencing p. 5, where I could not find these exact words. 
^132	  Citing Connolly, Neuropolitics (2002), cited in Mullarkey, Refractions of Reality..., p. 206, who is cited himself for second citation, on same page.
^133	  Psychology Press, 2001; see also Alain Ehrenburg, Weariness of the Self (Canada: McGill-Queens UP, 2010); orig. La fatigue d’être soi (Paris, 1998), which, as a matter of fact comes in for some detailed analysis in Koubava, Self-Identity and Powerlessness (2013), Chapter 4.
^134	  Allusion is to Heidegger
^135	  As opposed to ‘fictionel’, still reporting to philosophy.
^136	  Tradition for philosophy, for instance meaning the need for citation of previous authors; FL’s non-philosophy having been conspicuous for the paucity of such grounding.
^137	  Chronological, linear time.
^138	  Au-delà du principe du pouvoir (Paris: Payot, 1978), Phi 1 meaning Philosophy I, the earliest of the periods of the 5 (for now) in which FL divides his prolific output.  Non-philosophy does not begin to be formalized until Phi II.
^139	  Citing Une biographie de l’homme ordinaire, p. 47, underlining Choplin; also FL : Le Christ futur (2002) 154. 132 (underlining both Choplin); and FL :  “Au-delà du pouvoir.  Le concept transcendantal de la diaspora...” in Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas (1980, ed. FL), 112.
^140	  “Le peu de réalité ” of Breton.
^141	  Trans. Ray Brassier, “The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter” (The Non-Philosophy Project.  Ed. Alkon and Gunjevic. New York: Telos, 2012: pp. 168-69).  This translation, of pp. 103-09 of the Principe de minorité, first appeared in Pli (2001) and can be consulted online.
^142	  Mullarkey calls this persuasive point into question, in citing meditative practice as one of the (all the same) rare ways withdrawal from pain can be feasible...See above, under Immanence.
^143	  Citing Heidegger’s Nietzsche; Henry going on to affirm even epistemological thinking is non-representational in Descartes.
^144	  Meaning something outside of the phenomenon itself—and so that the representation is not the thing.  The previous spelling with a ek- (for ex, or outside of stasis) is much more frequent here.
^145	  Carmelo Bene (1937-2002), avant-garde Italian actor, film and theatre director, actor, playwright...
^146	  As for him and Guattari a literature, whose model is Kafka, which is out of the beaten bath of classical precedent, which it rather blows apart...
^147	  Citing Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaux.
^148	  Citing his introduction to Embodiment and Experience (1994).
^149	  Who apparently take the position (“Occupy Wall Street and the Politics of Representation”, Chto Delat, 10(34), 5-6), along with Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (opposing Jacques Rancière), and the author, that representation is ineluctable for there to be democracy, advocating what Schmidt here calls “a representational pluralism”, something that sounds like reforming voter and election laws (giving greater representation to cities and populous states?).
^150	  2012, ebook, online.
^151	  Bruno Bosteels, Badiou and Politics (2011).  Dalmasso’s perspective is the filming and transmission of images taken by participants in the Taksim Square demonstrations in Istanbul in 2013, in terms of what they could mean to the militant photographers as opposed to how images (often taken from the militants) were deployed in the mainstream media to channel, defuse and domesticate the protest (for instance to define it as mainly youth ‘letting off steam’).
^152	  Citing History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (Penguin, 1981), p. 95.
^153	  Citing her ‘Afterword: Ending Tragedy’, p. 278.
^154	  Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (UMinn, 1999), p 88.
^155	  “Staging Equality, On Rancière’s Theatrocracy”.  New Left Review 37 (2006), p. 111.
^156	  Subtitle of Chapter 4
^157	  Writing and Difference (1978), p. 250.
^158	  A Thousand Plateaus (1987), p. 249.
^159	  Names were scrawled on a blackboard.
^160	  The last two sentence comprise note 9, p. 136, citing Birth to Presence (Stanford, 1993), p. 1.
^161	  “Jesuit priest and dance master Thoinot Arbeau (a pen name for Jehan Tabourot), who allowed for the first time in one name the kinetic with the linguistic, creating in 1589 the first signifier for modernity’s being-toward-movment, ‘orchesographie’ (the graphie, writing, or the orchesis, dance).” (n. 14, p. 136) 
^162	  Citing Writing and Difference, p. 235.  Last italics only a quote within quote.
^163	  Citing  “Strategies of Avoidance: Dance in the Age of the Mass Culture of the Body,” Performance Research,  8, 2 (June), 82-90.
^164	  The subject has been the crawling dances of William Pope.L., for instance Tompkins Square Crawl (aka How much is that Nigger in the Window), NYC, 1991.
^165	  At the Vanishing Point (1972, p. 5)
^166	  “Economimesis”, Diacritics, 11, 2-25.
^167	  Seems to be related to ‘capriole’, meaning a caper or playful leap, thus as a lawyer capable of giving the right spin to any performance.
^168	  Citing FL, Théorie des étrangers (1995). 
^169	  see my comment on Harlingue excerpt under Blanchot, above.
^170	  ‘Etranger’, which also, again, means foreigner, a significant nuance, since s(h)e comes to us not as a member of any particular group, ethnos or nation, but only as a human, for instance whose rights were violated. 
^171	  ‘Transcendental’ meaning not to be validated empirically (‘beyond’ it), the model for which are the Kantian apriori of space and time, really ideas that are conditions of knowledge rather than empirical objects of it. 
^172	  This is a pejorative for the misuse of reason as denounced by Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944, 1947)
^173	  Laruellese for ‘clones’, meaning validates itself only by itself, as in Why Is It?  Because It Is?.  Chapter 5 will be on Laruelle.
^174	  Before the advent of humanity.
^175	  Michel Henry, French philosopher, who (like Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, Levinas..) had a profound impact on Laruelle, especially through his concept of Radical Immanence (see Immanence above) but whom he distanced himself from what he thought as his ‘Bergsonian’ vitalism.
^176	  Population, not ceremony, but I think the latter superposed meaning would be not be unwelcome to FL, even if only in translation.
^177	  Citing Die Anweisung zum Seligen Leben.
^178	  Cited from C. Bene and G. Dotto eds.  Vita di Carmelo Bene, Milan: Bompiani, 1998.  Translation seemingly Chiesa’s.
^179	  René Daumal, Le Contre-Ciel (1936)
^180	  Citing pp. 249-50, also identifying this as a fundamental theme of Didier Moulinier’s De la psychanalyse à la non-philosophie, where he cites pp. 156-57.
^181	  Citing En tant qu’un, p. 64, Théorie des identitités, p. 13.  Principes de non philosophie, 120 (underlining his).
^182	  For this interesting diachrony, comparable to those of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Blanchot, author refers to F.L., “Que-ce que la non-philosophie?”, in Juan Diego Blanco, Initiation à la pensée de F. Laruelle, pp. 20, 23.
^183	  Citing Frampton, Filmosophy (2006); Laruelle’s phrase ‘democracy of thought’  is a leitmotif he frequently invoked.
^184	  The reference of course to the mystic Eckhart 
^185	  Raymond Aron (1905-83), French philosopher and political scientist.
^186	  Petit had asked about the Iraq war, raging and controversial at the time.
^187	  Petit had asked about the typical traits of the ‘dominant intellectual’, which as I describe above is of course a pejorative for FL.
^188	  Endorsed, as opposed to the previous note.
^189	  Petit’s question, as are following, bolded.
^190	  Vertical or temporal, for instance which determines a choice of word among possibilities or synonyms.
^191	   Space or present, for instance the way the words would relate to the demands or necessities of the grammar of the sentence
^192	  Doubtless “Everybody is somebody’s Jew.  And today the Palestinians are the Jews of the Israelis” [Judith Butler citing Carole Angier, The Double Bind: Primo Levi, A Biography (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Gioroux, 2002, p. 628), in “Primo Levi for the Present”, in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2014), p. 202, Levi’s remark originally appearing in an Italian newspaper, Il Manifesto; see also Stefano Bellin’s essay, “The Wound and the Hope: Primo Levi’s Troubled Relationship with Israel” (n.d. but after Butler essay, which it references), accessible on the Internet.
^193	  totalize= “to comprehend in an all encompassing way”, which I take to mean here consider victim and victimizer as part of the same structure, which FL is saying Judaism does not do.
^194	  cf. Being and Nothingness, statements like “The Other looks at me and as such he holds the secret of my being.” (p. 363, Barnes translation)
^195	  Essentially Hegelian notion of the work of the negative, for instance the use of ‘base passions’ like jealousy, ambition, hatred, lust (history with a small h), in furthering human progress (History with a capital H). i.e. Because of vanity and desire for glory I invent penicillin, saving millions of lives...
^196	  a synonym for what FL calls the victim-in-person
^197	  FL was asked about the Shoah
^198	  Citing FL, Intellectuals and Power: The Insurrection of the Victim (2010)
^199	  Citing FL, “Biographie de l’oeil”, La Decision Philosophique 9 (1989).
^200	  Seemingly Welsh for English name “John Mullarkey”, who as such published much on FL previously.
